As soon as the troops deplaned, the helicopters lifted off and headed south. Ted located an isolated
Unbeknown to the helicopter crews, things had not gone according to plan at NSO. Some of the explosive charges intended to blow access holes through the outer security wall had failed to function causing delay in the assault on buildings. All resistance had been overcome by the time the assault force commander, Captain Martin Pearse, threw in a delayed-action bunker bomb to blow down a wall to gain access to the guard room. He had moved around the corner of the building, where he should have been completely safe from the explosion, but the quality of the building was so poor that the wall behind which Martin was sheltering collapsed on him. The death of this truly superb and much revered officer stunned everyone, though it did not prevent them from continuing to work with typical SAS efficiency.
Upon their recall to target, the helicopter crews were greeted with the sight of flattened buildings and huge piles of bags filled with NSO paperwork. These bags and all the men they had brought to Lusaka were quickly loaded together with one protesting prisoner who claimed to be an innocent local visiting a friend.
Because of the early-morning delay, fuel remained a problem but there was just sufficient to get all the machines back to Rhodesian soil. A reserve Cheetah waiting at Makuti brought forward a whole load of drummed fuel to link up with the formation that waited on the ground close to the south bank of the Zambezi River. Once refuelled the force returned to base.
The helicopters were still refuelling near the Zambezi when nine Hunters made a formation fly-past over the parade that marked the opening of Parliament for the first black Government. We had not yet received replacement Hunters and had only nine, four of which had been seen over Lusaka that morning.
The precision flypast was widely publicised with supporting photographs which, when added to reports of the morning strikes in Zambia, caused quite a stir since it was thought that we might have more Hunters in service than the nine the West had on record. Outsiders could not guess that 100% serviceability was possible in a fighter squadron lambasted by sanctions. This is because they had no idea of the astounding capabilities and dedication of Rhodesian Air Force technicians.
The SAS failed to capture any of the ZIPRA men they had hoped to find because none was present at NSO. Following the attack on Nkomo’s house, all had taken the precaution of sleeping elsewhere. I will deal with Dumiso Dabengwa’s account of this matter later. In the meanwhile, Elliott Sibanda blew the cover of the prisoner, who continued to claim he had been a local visitor. He was in fact a high-ranking Russian-trained ZIPRA intelligence officer by the name of Alex Vusa. His capture substantially reduced SAS disappointment at missing the three big fish because Vusa’s information led them straight into their next big hit.
The SAS were also disappointed that, because of the lateness of their arrival at target and the poor building standards, they had been unable to locate a bunker in which ZIPRA was reported to hold its most important files and a safe containing a large quantity of American dollars. But, because of the rubble from destroyed walls, discovery of the bunker’s entrance coincided with Lieutenant-Colonel Barrett’s order to withdraw. Fortunately, however, a master index of files amongst the recovered documents showed that the SAS had collected all but a handful of NSO’s material.
The information gleaned from the captured documents not only confirmed all of Elliott Sibanda’s facts, it expanded on them. Of importance too were lists of names of individuals and a host of overseas organisations supplying ZIPRA with intelligence on Rhodesian affairs. Details of this information were not immediately made known to COMOPS staff because other agencies would be following up on them. Alex Vusa’s verbal information was our priority concern!
Xai Xai
UNRELATED TO VUSA’S INFORMATION, A very real opportunity to kill both Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe presented itself when we learned that these two leaders and their party hierarchy would be meeting in the Chongoene Hotel in the coastal village of Xai Xai.
On 22 June Maputo sent this message to Xai Xai: “Do all the preparations in Chongoene Hotel in order to receive the participants to the conference of the five Patriotic Front and representatives of ZANU foreseen for next July.” Three days later, Zambian Air Force HQ informed Lusaka International Airport that, “ZAF transport to route Lusaka-Beira (refuel)— Maputo to stop over for seven days—return Lusaka. Aircraft to convey Nkomo plus party of ten leaving Lusaka 280400 June 1979.”
Rhodesian operations against ZIPRA in Zambia may have prompted this meeting. Additionally, or alternatively, the new British Government or Frontline presidents may have insisted on ZANU and ZAPU coming together. Whatever the case we recognised that, potentially, we had a great opportunity target on our hands, though there were important issues to take into account.
The meeting at Chongoene Hotel was likely to commence on Saturday 30 June or 1 July but because ZANU and ZAPU seldom saw eye to eye, there was always the possibility that one party would walk out on the other. With six days apparently set aside for the meeting, Sunday 1 July was selected as the best time to strike.
Hurriedly we took aerial photographs of the hotel and managed to get detailed plans of its two-storeyed layout and construction. Six Hunters dropping Golf bombs and four Canberras each delivering four 1,000-pound high-explosive bombs from relatively low level were considered more than sufficient to destroy the entire hotel and everyone in it. The big question on our minds was, “Who is everyone?” Who besides ZAPU and ZANU might be at the conference?
The heads of state for Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania seemed likely participants as they all had a vested interest in seeing ZAPU and ZANU settle their differences so their operations might at last be co-ordinated to mutual advantage.
We did not think the death of Samora Machel would rock the political boat too much. But the death of Kenneth Kaunda or Julius Nyerere, heads of British Commonwealth countries, by an overt Rhodesian Air Force strike would seriously upset Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party when there seemed to be an improvement in attitude towards Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
The intelligence people made every effort to establish what these leaders were planning for 1 July, and to pick up on any clues concerning members of the OAU. The only positive information gleaned showed that President Seretse Khama of Botswana was to open a two-day conference in Arusha for Front-line States’ foreign ministers and overseas development representatives of major donor nations.
Nyerere should have been attending a mini-summit in Khartoum during 24 and 25 June to discuss Western Sahara issues, after which he was to meet with the Nigerian leader, Olesgun Obasanjo—probably in Nigeria. At short notice, he cancelled this trip and sent a representative instead. No reason for this change of plan could be established, but the timing was suspiciously close to the Xai Xai meeting and Kaunda’s movements could not be established at all; so, we had no alternative but to turn away from the opportunity.
Nevertheless, plans to assassinate Mugabe and Nkomo remained COMOPS priorities.
