Attempts to assassinate Robert Mugabe
WE KNEW THE LOCATION OF Robert Mugabe’s home on Avenida Dona Maria Segunda in the once-plush suburb of Maputo and a CIO undercover agent had been watching this house for some time, studying Mugabe’s movements and habits. Unlike Nkomo, Mugabe’s routines were easy to monitor and were highly predictable. So a small SAS team was assigned to take on the task of assassinating the ZANU President.
Opting for a sea approach to a beach that had been well known to holidaymakers during Portuguese times, the SAS used inflatable rubber dinghies, powered by silent motors to avoid having to move through populated areas. Twice the team arrived at Mugabe’s house around midnight but on both occasions it was vacant, despite the fact that the agent had watched Mugabe arrive home a few hours earlier. This made it blatantly clear that someone ‘in the know’ in Salisbury had tipped off Robert Mugabe in time for him to get away to safety.
Both times the disappointed SAS team left the house untouched and returned silently to their hidden dinghies. The next day ZANLA and FRELIMO security personnel were observed to check out the rooms and garden before Mugabe himself returned home.
Though substantially annoyed by this, the SAS and COMOPS staff could not help being impressed by the fact that, unlike Nkomo, Mugabe had taken the trouble to get his entire household and security personnel to safety. We were also impressed by the fact that FRELIMO had not been called to ambush the house, obviously to safeguard their mole in Salisbury.
Having established modus operandi, thought was given to paying a third visit; this time to plant high explosives in the roof of Mugabe’s house that apparently had not previously been checked by security guards. The existence of these explosives would be withheld from CIO until the agent advised that Mugabe had re-entered his home when they would be activated by a highflying Canberra. This might have worked, had other priorities not overtaken SAS.
ZIPRA loses war holdings
ALEX VUSA, THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER from ZIPRA’s NSO, told of a large build-up of arms and equipment at a location west of Lusaka. He had not been to this location himself but during his regular visits to JZ training camp he had noticed many large ZIPRA vehicles, all heavily laden, moving westward past JZ camp. He believed there had to be a storage site in the countryside close by because, after a short time, specific laden vehicles that had passed him earlier were seen to be heading back towards Lusaka empty.
We already knew that flights were coming in from Angola at night to deliver large amounts of ZIPRA equipment—but why at night? Why was ZIPRA not using Zambia’s National Stores in accordance with Zambian Government instructions? Putting two and two together, it became obvious that Nkomo was not only intent on hiding his build-up from us; he was also hiding it from the Zambian Government.
The location of JZ camp was known, so a Canberra recce was flown over the area that Vusa had indicated. Photographs showing multiple tracks covering a huge area in which plies of equipment lay stacked under bush cover immediately confirmed Vusa’s story. There could be no doubt that these were ZIPRA’s main stores for its invasion plan.
There was urgent need to get troops to this location as the possibility existed that ZIPRA might move everything to a new site, particularly with NSO records and Alex Vusa in Rhodesian hands. Again the task fell to the SAS. At the very time that we had planned for the now-abandoned strike against the Chongoene Hotel in Xai Xai, Operation Chicory was launched.
On 1 July five Cheetahs, carrying a force of fifty men laden with demolition equipment, lifted off from Bumi Hills.
Being a Sunday, ZIPRA’s defending force was expected to be pretty relaxed and probably reduced in strength. Religion had little to do with this. In southern Africa it was almost standard practice for Sunday to be a time for visiting, resting and drinking. Nevertheless, we decided that an opening airstrike was essential to soften defences and create distraction whilst Cheetahs landed the SAS force.
Considering there was so much high explosive on the ground, I remember being somewhat concerned for the safety of the Canberras if Air HQ chose to make a low-level attack with Alpha bombs. With Norman Walsh overseeing the air plan this was simply not something to be worrying about and the strikes went in without problems. Five Cheetahs landed the troops during Hunter re-strikes then turned back for Bumi.
The shortest day of the year had only just passed so nightfall was quick in coming; not that this limited the SAS. By the time the Cheetahs came in to collect them in fading light, everything had either been destroyed or was rigged for destruction.
The ground force had enjoyed an exciting time with rockets zooming out of large fires with huge bangs and pressure waves emanating from ground through which the fast-moving line had passed. The destruction of weapons, explosives, vehicles, tents, bulk fuel, boats and so on was right up SAS’s street. As they flew back towards Kariba, they were able to look back with satisfaction as timed charges continued to set off massive explosions that lit up the clouds and bush for miles around.
This was another very bad day for ZIPRA—their invasion plan was doomed. They had not only lost all they had been hiding from the Zambian authorities, they were red-faced by Rhodesia’s exposure of their underhandedness.
Political turmoil
IT WAS VERY FRUSTRATING TO be tied to COMOPS where I lost close contact with the goings-on in Air HQ, the messes, the squadrons and FAFs. Air Strike Reports were seldom seen; not that these were withheld in any way. I could have gone up to Air HQ to read them but the tempo of work in COMOPS prevented me from doing so.
By now almost all young pilots and technicians were unknown to me. I knew they were out there performing fantastic work, but reading daily Sitreps (Situation Reports) from the JOCs failed to put names and faces to actions and incidents. Planning, reviewing, listening to operational debriefs and tasking new ones was all very well, even exciting, but one always saw the same people attending planning and debriefing sessions. All were familiar personalities from happier days in the field though few were blue jobs. This really niggled me giving emphasis to a grim sense of being separated from my own force.
Being mid-winter, the Fireforces were rattling up great successes against ZANLA which, when added to the mayhem being meted out to ZIPRA, should have put smiles on our faces; but political issues tended to darken the long hours and weekends in COMOPS.
In early June, US President Jimmy Carter, contrary to British Government’s perceived intentions, ruled against the lifting of sanctions by the USA. Then in early August, Margaret Thatcher dashed all hopes of granting Zimbabwe-Rhodesia recognition when, at the Commonwealth conference held in the Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka, she reneged on her earlier promises. She moved instead for an all-party conference to be held in London.
What was particularly galling to Rhodesians was the fact that Maggie had been pressurised into this by the
