beginning. Repair crews had reduced the long-term armor losses to around fifteen, bringing the panzer regiments back to near authorized strength. On July 6, Hausser deployed them on an even narrower front. Leibstandarte and Das Reich again went in side by side on a front of a little over six miles, with a shallow river and soft ground on both flanks. Their first objective was a network of fortified heights, the core of the second Russian line in the sector. Leibstandarte jumped off at around 7:30 and took fire and losses from elements of the First Tank Army, but by midmorning pushed through the remnants of the 51st Guards Rifle Division, bypassed the strongpoint village of Yakovolevo, and shouldered the Soviet defenders westward. While the panzer grenadiers kept the Russians in check, an armored battle group drove as far as eight miles into the Soviet defenses before encountering the next zone of minefields, bunkers, and antitank guns.
The panzers had already refueled and rearmed in the forward zone once that afternoon. Now they were falling victim to mines scattered openly on the roads and trails—and occasionally delivered by specially trained dogs. The air support coordinator’s radio vehicle was destroyed: no small loss to a spearhead now beyond its own artillery’s effective range. The approaching darkness amply justified closing down and closing up.
Das Reich faced tougher going in the early stages. Its leading panzer grenadier regiment was halted in front of Hill 243 by knee-deep mud, minefields, dug-in tanks, and artillery and small-arms fire. The division’s Tigers stopped an armored counterattack, but not until Das Reich’s headquarters could coordinate a ninety-minute air and artillery strike on the hill were the infantry able to storm and clear the bunker-trench complex. It was the kind of technologically based flexibility at which the Germans excelled, enabling Das Reich’s tanks to keep pace with Leibstandarte in the course of the afternoon.
By the end of the day, the SS had breached the defense system’s second line. But the Soviet strongpoints on the flanks held on and held out. Around noon on July 5, Leibstandarte had reported a “general impression that the Russians were running.” By evening, its reports spoke of “tough and determined resistance” with “strong” air support. The corps reported a total of 552 prisoners for the first day. Only 15 were turned in by Leibstandarte. It was enough for interrogation purposes. The fresh-caught POWs said the rifle companies were well supplied with weapons and ammunition. Rations were good, thanks in part to Lend-Lease. Decades later, Red Army veterans remembered their surprise and amusement at cartons that contained packets of salt, factory-made cigarettes, and toilet paper sometimes used to write letters home. Morale was generally described as “good.” But that the SS already knew. For all the superheated postbattle narratives of participants and correspondents, the ground gained by Leibstandarte and Das Reich on July 5–6 was no more than a narrow salient, on a map resembling nothing so much as an upthrust middle finger.
Whether more could be made of it remained an open question. Leibstandarte proposed to establish a bridgehead over the Psel on the next day, but its Tigers were still engaging T-34s at midnight. Corps headquarters, moreover, had other concerns. Totenkopf’s dual mission as offensive force and flank guard involved at best a dispersion of effort. With the Tiger company leading the way, armored battle groups made gains of up to twenty miles, crossing the Oboyan–Belgorod road and reaching the Belgorod–Kursk railway before halting. So far, so good. But the success of the division’s advance left its right flank—and that of the corps—increasingly exposed. By the panzer handbook, security was the task of the infantry, but the division assigned had already been committed elsewhere. Manstein had been aware of the potential problem and had stressed his need for at least two more infantry divisions, but he had been refused. Meantime, Totenkopf was ordered to find flank guards from its own resources—at the expense of being able to develop opportunities in the main sector.
Smoke, mirrors, and shows of force worked well enough during the afternoon. But the Soviets continued first harassing, then counterattacking, the lengthening right flank of the SS panzers. Hoth’s orders for the next day praised the corps’s “unstoppable forward storming” and recognized the problem by ordering Totenkopf to attack east-northeast early and often the next day, thereby securing the corps flank and supporting III Panzer Corps’s advance.
II
Unlike Model and Rommel, Hermann Hoth did not make a practice of trying to command an army from the front. But since Citadel’s beginning, he had been visiting corps and division headquarters, seeing for himself and making recommendations. Hoth had expected a breakthrough of the Russian second line of defense on July 6. Muddy ground and Russian resistance had prevented that, but the Fourth Panzer Army’s commander felt comfortable describing the day as “a complete success.” Manstein, though, was sufficiently concerned at the general lack of progress that on July 6 he asked the Army high command to release XXIV Panzer Corps. When Zeitzler refused, Manstein responded by ordering Hoth to keep hammering forward. But both generals understood too well that Fourth Panzer Army’s further success depended on Kempf and III Panzer Corps securing Hoth’s increasingly exposed right flank.
Like everything else about Citadel, that was easier stated than achieved. For July 6, Breith had ordered 19th Panzer Division to move north along the Donets, while 6th and 7th Panzer were to advance northeast in the dual role of flank guard and strike force. It took 6th Panzer the entire morning to concentrate and cross the heavy pontoon bridge in 7th Panzer’s sector. The other two divisions were in action before dawn. The 19th Panzer lost eighteen tanks to mines before successfully shifting its axis of advance, taking the 81st Guards Rifle Division in the flank and rear, and capturing the strongpoint village of Razumnoye and its environs. But casualties in the panzer grenadier regiments were high; the Russian defense was comprehensive and stubborn, and the fierce counterattacks shook the division’s many green replacements.
The 7th Panzer, Erwin Rommel’s old Ghost Division, led with its 25th Panzer Regiment and an attached Tiger company and reached Krutoi Log before encountering a blocking position established the previous night by a division committed from the Seventh Guards Army’s reserve. The 73rd Guards Rifles answered the doubts about the Red Army’s ability to fight outside of prepared positions. “Step on it!” (
Vatutin had spent almost as much time on July 6 arguing with his superiors as fighting the Germans. It was increasingly apparent that the armored counterattacks of Voronezh Front’s tank corps were too small to have a serious effect on the massed German armor. Vatutin responded by requesting the prompt commitment of four additional tank corps from Stavka reserve. This formidable force would enable a counterattack with enough weight to at least shift the balance in his sector.
Vasilevsky concurred, recommending two tank corps as direct reinforcements and moving the Fifth Guards Tank Army closer to the combat zone. Stalin telephoned his reply. Vatutin would receive the two tank corps, hold his ground, and wear the Germans down. Steppe Front would move the Fifth Guards Tank Army toward Kursk. All these decisions were aimed at keeping the enemy fixed until the projected multifront offensive was ready.
Vatutin’s response for July 7 was to reinforce his forward positions: pin the German center in place and wear it down. This would give the newly committed tank corps time to move up and turn stalemate to victory. The 2nd and 5th Tank Corps would hold the SS while the 31st Tank Corps moved against their right flank. The 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps would block Knobelsdorff’s advance toward Oboyan. Two air armies would provide all-out support. Local Soviet counterattacks continued across the front through the night of July 6–7 until mist forced a general breaking of contact. The mist prefigured a weather change: rain and clouds, which would slow the German tanks and hinder their Stukas. Manstein’s weathermen could also read charts. For July 7, Knobelsdorff’s corps was ordered to drive toward Oboyan and cover Hausser’s left flank as the SS drove into and through the Soviet defense system. The unspoken demand on both generals was “Pick up the pace!”
The Luftwaffe promised Hoth the bulk of its assets as well, and when the Fourth Panzer Army crossed its start lines around 4:00 A.M., the Stukas were overhead, hammering Soviet positions. Sixty to eighty aircraft every five or ten minutes concentrated on anything resembling an artillery or antitank position. The 11th Panzer and Grossdeutschland, the center and right-flank formations, broke through around Dubrova in the early morning—only
