Dennis E. Showalter
ARMOR AND BLOOD
INTRODUCTION
THE BATTLE OF KURSK is a continuing paradox. On the one hand, it is regularly described as a military epic: history’s greatest armored battle, the first stage on the Red Army’s road to Berlin, an ultimate test of Nazi and Soviet military/political systems. On the other, it is strangely blurred. Compared with Stalingrad or Barbarossa, it remains obscure, its narrative fostering myth as much as history. In the context of Western, particularly English- language, writing on World War II, Kursk is part of an imbalance that focuses on Anglo-American operations. The sheer scale of the fighting, the absence of significant cultural and political reference points, and an understandable interest in the deeds of one’s own countries combine in a literature acknowledging the Russo-German War after Stalingrad as a vital factor in the war’s development and outcome but restricting it to the periphery in terms of page counts.
A recent development in the historiography of the Russo-German War integrates it into the related perspectives of total war and genocide. Sometimes it becomes pivotal, as in Niall Ferguson’s
In the context of the Russo-German War as a subject of military analysis, Kursk remains blended with what Germany’s Military History Research Institute, the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, calls the “forgotten year” (from summer 1943 to summer 1944), a time of inglorious retreats on the German side and inglorious victories for the Soviets—both achieved at excessive cost and neither offering much inspiration or value to students of the art/science/craft of war. In that sense, Kursk becomes a counterpoint to Passchendaele and Chemin des Dames in World War I, or the American Civil War’s Wilderness: a tribute to uninspired hard fighting and colossal human suffering.
Well before John Keegan’s
Addressing the contradictions between the two memes has been complicated until recently by a virtual German monopoly of Eastern Front narratives. The USSR’s determination to control the story of the Great Fatherland Patriotic War was complemented by a discouraging of memory and memoir at every rank from private to marshal of the Soviet Union. The improved post-Soviet access to archives, memories, and battlefields has combined with postreunification developments in German military historiography to revitalize, indeed revolutionize, the academic and general-audience writing on Kursk and its matrices.
The general intention of this book is to synthesize the material and the perspectives that have in some cases been upheld and in others modified, reshaped, or revised. It is operationally structured, but not operationally focused. The events of the battle are used to contextualize wider issues of operations and strategy, institutional structure and state policy, and to convey some of the Eastern Front’s human dimension.
This work has a specific purpose as well: to structure and clarify the newly available mass of detail, official, tactical, and personal, on the fighting. Kursk was a battle before it became anything else. That makes it worthwhile knowing who did what, where, when, with what, to whom, and above all
For the sake of clarity, the text uses Russian orthography for geographic features. It addresses the two-hour difference between German and Russian official time by citing the time noted by the subjects of the narrative: German when the actors are German, Russian for Russian. The text also minimizes references to the obscure villages and low heights that were the usual foci of orders and reports and challenge the most detailed and costly tactical maps. In each case of this kind of judgment call, the author acknowledges any misjudgments and requests charity.
For the sake of another kind of clarity, the linguistically and orthographically complex ranks of the Waffen SS have been translated into their U.S. Army counterparts.
The same acknowledgment and the same request apply to the book’s subtext. That is, to avoid “war porn,” whether in contexts of heroism, pathos, horror, or voyeurism. Should it succeed in nothing else, may that objective stand.
ORDER OF BATTLE, OPERATION CITADEL
ARMY GROUP CENTER—
FIELD MARSHAL GUNTHER VON KLUGE
ARMY GROUP SOUTH—FIELD MARSHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN
ARMY DETACHMENT KEMPF— GENERAL WERNER KEMPF