structured around military phrasing. Absolute political control and comprehensive iron discipline, often gruesomely enforced, helped bridge the still-inevitable gaps between peace and war. But in the summer of 1941, too many officers and men, active soldiers and recalled reservists, were ignorant of such basics as minor tactics and fire discipline. They would fight—but too often did not know how.
That disconnect was replicated at the levels of doctrine and planning. For the emerging Soviet Union, war was not a contingency but a given. The external class enemy, the capitalist states surrounding the USSR, sought its destruction from their own objective dynamics. Preparing for war, total war, was a pragmatic imperative, implemented in a context that defined war as a science. Marxism-Leninism, the USSR’s legitimating ideology, was a science. The Soviet state and Soviet society were organized on abstract, scientific principles. Studied systematically and properly applied, these principles made it possible to anticipate the consequences of decisions, behaviors—even attitudes. War making too was a science. The application of its objective principles by trained and skilled engineers was the best predictor of victory.
In that matrix, a rising generation of technocrats saw the Soviet Union’s military future in terms of a mass mechanized army. In the mid-1920s, instructors at the Red Army Military Academy described the total destruction of enemy forces by a series of “deep operations”: shock armies for breakthrough, mobile echelons for exploitation and pursuit. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, appointed deputy people’s commissar for military and naval affairs in 1931, was the focal point of a school of thought arguing that mechanization vitalized and extended revolutionary war. A technologized mass army could export communism as well as defend it. “Reluctant soldiers” would be transformed into enthusiasts by experiencing directly what the Soviet Union could do to its enemies. They would become part of a new proletariat, able to make optimum use of the military technologies created under communism.
Stalin internalized and epitomized the conviction that the non-Communist world embodied an irreconcilable hatred for the Soviet system. Even the Great Depression did not change his mind: capitalism in its death throes might be even more willing to undo history by turning its armed forces against the USSR. However intensely managers, soldiers, and officials might dispute specific policies or details of production, the basic assumption of isolation in a mortally hostile world went unchallenged throughout the period. Moderation in defense planning was criminal. Cycles of purge, disruption, and reorganization characterized the defense industry well before they became a general norm in the late 1930s.
The Red Army’s unwavering support for Stalin in the intraparty struggles of the 1920s reflected its appreciation for Stalin’s support of military spending at the expense of balanced budgets and civilian production, to a permanent “half war, half peace” level. “Deep battle” became a comprehensive doctrine that included air- supported, fully mechanized mobile groups taking the fight into the enemy’s rear at a rate of twenty-five or thirty miles a day. By 1938, the Soviet order of battle included four tank corps and a large number of tank brigades. But in November 1939, these formations were disbanded, replaced by motorized divisions and tank brigades designed essentially for close infantry support.
One reason for this measure—the public one—was that the Spanish Civil War had shown the relative vulnerability of tanks, while large armored formations had proved difficult to control both against the Japanese in Mongolia and during the occupation of eastern Poland. Reinforcing operational experience was Stalin’s concern for the armored force as a potential domestic threat. Not only were the top-level advocates of mobile war, men like Tukhachevsky, eliminated—all but one commander at brigade level and 80 percent of the battalion commanders were replaced as well.
The successes of Hitler’s panzers combined with the winding down of the purges to encourage reappraisal. Beginning in 1940, the People’s Commissariat of Defense began authorizing what became a total of twenty-nine mechanized corps, each with two tank divisions and a motorized division: thirty-six thousand men and over a thousand tanks each, plus twenty more brigades of three hundred light T-26 tanks intended for infantry support. The numbers are mind-boggling even by subsequent Soviet reckoning. But low maintenance standards kept field strength down, and the sheer size of the mechanized corps defied all but the best efforts at command and control.
As the Germans drove toward Moscow in 1941, the Red Army began rebuilding virtually from the ground up. Infantry, the rifle divisions, remained the backbone, but their authorized strength was reduced to around eleven thousand and their supporting arms and services were cut to minimums. Even vehicles were reduced by two-thirds, and most of those were horse-drawn. These frugal formations were supplemented by a large number of brigades less than half their size. The new structures reflected not only the heavy losses in men and equipment during Barbarossa, but also the fact that effective command of more complex formations was simply beyond the skill of the colonels and junior generals who took the places of those killed, captured, or replaced.
Higher command structures were correspondingly simplified. Divisions—four or five, sometimes more— were for a time assigned directly to rifle armies, which also controlled most of the service and support elements. During 1942, as supplies of armor and artillery increased, communications improved, and staff work grew more competent, the rifle corps reemerged to enhance flexibility. A rifle army might field three or four of them, each with three or four divisions, sometimes upgraded from the independent brigades, which disappeared in their turn.
Divisional allocations of guns and automatic weapons increased, but the bulk of supporting assets remained pooled at army level, assigned as needed. Throughout 1942, Soviet rifle formations were seldom anywhere near their authorized numbers. In theory and practice, they were regarded as expendable: to be kept in the line until reduced to cadre strength, then either broken up or completely rebuilt. Shock troops or cannon fodder? It depended on perspective. Nineteen-year-old Boris Gorbachevsky entered the army in January 1942. He first saw combat in August, in front of Rzhev, in a mixed-bag rifle company of “Russians, Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Uzbeks…. We now no longer belong to ourselves; we have all been seized by the incomprehensibly savage element of battle. Shell bursts, shell fragments, and bullets are sweeping away the infantry lines…. The remnants of former companies and battalions have turned into a senseless mass of onward-charging, desperate men.” Like so many Red Army attacks in 1942, this one collapsed in a welter of blood and bodies. Wounded and hospitalized, Gorbachevsky encountered his regiment’s Communist Youth organizer, also a casualty: “How are we fighting? Everyone from the army commander down to the company commander … drives the soldiers forward into the chopping machine. And the result! We don’t have enough paper for all the funeral notices!”
Yet many a veteran
The armored force, prime target on all of Barbarossa’s fronts, was eviscerated in a matter of weeks. On July 15, 1941, the elephantine mechanized corps were disbanded. The signature unit became the tank brigade: initially around two thousand men and ninety-three tanks, two-thirds of them light T-60 tanks, whose 20 mm popguns and thin armor made them meat on the table for the panzers. Even that low strength proved materially unsustainable and beyond the capacity of most commanders. In December, the brigade was cut back to eight hundred men and forty-six tanks, about the strength of a Western battalion.
These small formations made predictably little headway in the winter counterattacks. In March 1942, the first four tank corps were authorized. Between April and September 1942, twenty-five more joined the order of battle. Their final configuration on paper was three tank brigades and a motorized rifle brigade: just short of ten thousand men and 165 tanks. A third of those tanks were T-60s. Their more complex stablemates, the medium T-34s that became the Red Army’s signature armored vehicle, were still entering mass production.
The 1942 order of battle remained the standard tank corps framework for the rest of the war. Light tanks were replaced by T-34s in a structure that was armor-heavy by developing Western standards, lacking both artillery to deal with German infantry and antitank guns and infantry to hold the ground it might gain. The former shortcoming would eventually be modified by increasing the number of turretless assault guns, the latter by creating mechanized corps built around truck-borne infantry. But the tank corps’s structure was a function of its mission: exploiting the breakthroughs made by infantry- and artillery-heavy “shock forces” as described before the war.
That mission was easier defined than accomplished. The new tank corps underwent their first serious test in the Soviet Kharkov offensive in May 1942. Over thirteen hundred armored vehicles were concentrated for the attack. Early successes gained by mass could not be sustained against a flexible German defense built around coordinated air and armor strikes. The tank corps lagged too far behind the fighting lines to intervene quickly, then
