driven back by a tank brigade counterattack, in its turn checked at short range by German rocket launchers. Totenkopf committed a tank battalion. Panzers and panzer grenadiers cleared the village of Soviet armor by 2:40 P.M., but Soviet riflemen held on in Vasilyevka’s eastern half: a desolation of mud, smoke, flames, and rubble.
Not until almost 3:00 P.M. did the engineers report the bridges over the Psel ready for use, forcing Totenkopf’s commander to apply his math skills. His tank losses had been light and his mechanics busy; Totenkopf could now muster almost a hundred tanks, ten of them Tigers, and twenty assault guns. Had the last two days gone as planned, they might be deploying on Leibstandarte’s left as muscle to carry the SS into Prokhorovka. As matters stood, the Russians were massing for another attack on Vasilyevka despite the best efforts of Totenkopf’s division artillery. Tanks and trucks were having more problems than ever getting through the mud; fuel and ammunition reserves were limited. Losses for July 11 totaled 450 dead and wounded—most of them in the battalion that had done most of the fighting and that would carry the burden of covering the tanks. True nightfall was about four hours away, and most of that time would be required to move into position for an attack in Leibstandarte’s direction. This meant going forward into the kind of broken terrain that, unless patrolled and cleared, was natural cover for antitank guns. Totenkopf resolved this particular round of scissors-paper-stone by informing Hausser that it would not be able to attack until next morning.
Das Reich spent most of July 11 handing over the southern part of its sector to the 167th Infantry Division, shifting its panzer grenadier regiments to the left to concentrate on the attack on Prokhorovka. One regiment did not begin arriving in its new sector until after noon. By that time, the other regiment had been caught up in a Soviet attack aimed at the Leibstandarte flank it was tasked with screening. The division and corps reports refer to “strong resistance” and heavy counterattacks, with woods and the high ground in front of the advance strongly occupied. All in all, July 11 was not one of Das Reich’s more spectacular days.
If the Germans had fallen short of expectations, the Russians were explaining defeat. The Fifth Guards Army’s commander admitted his people had been surprised. Vatutin, at 7:45 P.M., informed the commanders of the Sixty-ninth Army and 2nd Tank Corps that the German advance was the result of their carelessness and poor preparation, and ordered the lost ground to be retaken immediately. Fifteen minutes earlier Sixty-ninth Army had issued similar orders. At 11:00 P.M., it reported the situation stabilized despite continuous attacks by German air and armor. The unstated subtext was that more could not be expected at that late hour. Certainly the attacks made during the rest of the night by the frontline rifle divisions never came within small-arms range of October State Farm.
From Vatutin’s perspective, a variety of threats remained as the day turned. The Germans were reaching the limits of the front zone’s prepared defensive belts. If they got through Prokhorovka, the next field fortifications were twelve to fifteen miles away, deep in Voronezh Front’s rear. To be sure, the Fifth Guards Tank Army barred that way. But the Germans also had the option—which had concerned Vatutin for three days—of swinging left, across the Psel and toward Oboyan. Rotmistrov’s counterattack was intended to prevent that alternative. But a good share of Rotmistrov’s projected start lines were now in German hands—a fact calling for more improvisation on top of earlier improvisations almost German in their scale, and not calculated to improve the front commander’s peace of mind.
Nor did Stalin remain dormant. Around 7:00 P.M., Vasilevsky turned up at Rotmistrov’s headquarters, unannounced and unexpected. The army commander reported his plans and dispositions. Vasilevsky approved and informed Rotmistrov that the Vozhd had ordered him to coordinate and render all assistance to the Fifth Guards and Fifth Guards Tank Armies. As a start, Vasilevsky proposed taking advantage of the waning daylight to visit the positions that 29th and 18th Tank Corps would occupy for the morning’s attack. As the generals drove along, Rotmistrov indicated the positions into which his tanks would move during the night. Suddenly Vasilevsky ordered the driver to stop and turn off the road. The now clearly audible noise of tank engines gave way to the vehicles themselves. Vasilevsky turned to Rotmistrov and asked why exactly tanks intended to attack by surprise were moving about so close to the front in daylight, under German eyes. Rotmistrov looked through his binoculars and replied that they were German!
Vasilevsky responded that the enemy must have broken through somewhere and was aiming for Prokhorovka. Rotmistrov ordered two of his own tank brigades forward as a gesture, and the two generals returned to Fifth Guards Tank’s HQ. Rotmistrov and his staff promptly revised the details of their tactical plan: artillery support, formation sectors, routes of attack, and everything else. The unexpected, unperceived German gains required recalibration—most of it at the level of brigades and regiments, whose commands and staffs were likely to find improvisation difficult and who were by now fully absorbed in their own detailed preparations. The situation worsened as it became plain that 2nd Tank Corps was too enmeshed on the front line and had suffered too heavy casualties to be a major factor in the next day’s offensive.
With his strike force reduced by a fifth, and constrained to find new start lines by midnight, Rotmistrov was in no position to begin from scratch. The plan was to deploy 2nd Guards, 29th, and 18th Tank Corps in the first line, with 5th Guards Mechanized Corps following to exploit success and react to emergencies. The 2nd Tank Corps would contribute what it could. The attack would go in at 3:00 A.M.: 2nd Guards against Das Reich, the other two corps against Leibstandarte and any of Totenkopf’s units that came in range.
Rotmistrov put his expectations on the initial shock. Five hundred AFVs were going in. Vatutin had combed his rear echelons for a brigade of artillery, five independent rocket and mortar regiments, and a full division of antiaircraft guns. The leading brigades of 29th and 18th Tank Corps were front-loaded with an extra battalion of T-34s. Their light T-70s might be little more than moving targets, but they could at least draw fire and provide distraction. Against the Tigers and their excellent gun sights, against the Stukas and the rocket launchers, across the twelve miles of open ground west and southwest of Prokhorovka, the armor’s best chance was to get as close as possible as quickly as possible—five hundred yards was the generally accepted range for a T-34 facing a Tiger. Given the stress and fatigue levels in the tank companies, an advance straight ahead at full speed was probably the most promising in human terms as well. Sophisticated situational awareness would not be at a premium when the alternatives were stark: Kill or die.
HARD POUNDING
HAUSSER WAS READY TO OBLIGE. His orders for July 12 were straightforward. No more fooling around. This time apply the panzers’ mantra:
Leibstandarte’s 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment with a panzer battalion attached would move out at 4:50 A.M. and establish a left-flank guard. The rest of the division was to capture Hill 252.4, the Stalinsk State Farm, then Prokhorovka—but only once Totenkopf’s attack had destabilized the Russians: no need to risk getting an extended finger broken. Das Reich would in turn drive straight east, take the high ground south of Prokhorovka, and establish positions for extending the attack on July 13. Das Reich’s orders also made it clear that the division was expected to accelerate its pace and keep in touch with its partners regardless of threats to its southern flank.
Corps maintenance crews worked through the night to put more than three hundred tanks and assault guns on line. But in both corps and army higher headquarters, the question loomed ever larger: Where was III Panzer Corps? On the Eastern Front, willingness to shovel manure was a necessary mind-set. But when work just kept piling up and there were no more shovels…?
