Arbenz was tolerant of locally known Communists, making him what the Americans regarded as a ‘fellow traveller’ and possibly a Communist himself, and when he brought in an Agrarian Reform Law that redistributed land belonging to the United Fruit Company this made some in the US administration believe that the Communists had now established a beachhead in Latin America via Arbenz.
The CIA felt that the military were ‘the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation’, but the agency was aware that they would need considerable encouragement to make the right decision. Graffiti, political pamphlets, character assassinations and the daily delivery of fake death-notices to Arbenz and members of his cabinet all helped to prepare the way for the eventual invasion.
In the end, the army did turn on Arbenz, and he was forced to resign — but their actions perhaps were dictated more by the concern that the Americans would invade if Guzman remained in power, than because they feared the frankly feeble Colonel Armas and his very small
After losing so many key agents in the West thanks to the various defections and revelations from the Venona transcripts, the KGB needed to rebuild its networks. In addition to infiltrating George Blake into MI6, they also targeted French intelligence and the new West German organization. Many of these were never discovered, unlike one of their best agents (in his own opinion) Georges Paques, who was Chef de Cabinet and adviser to several French ministers in the post-war period before becoming a key agent during de Gaulle’s administration in 1958.
Former SS captain Hans Clemens, already working for Moscow, was recruited by the West German intelligence agency and in 1951 was able to turn another former SS officer Heinze Felfe, who distinguished himself in Western eyes by allegedly setting up a network of agents in Moscow — all of whose ‘information’ was carefully prepared by Moscow Centre, in the full knowledge it would reach West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
In Norway in 1949, the KGB was able to recruit Gunvor Galtung Haavik, an employee at the Norwegian embassy in Moscow, by threatening to send her Russian lover to Siberia. Sent back to Oslo in 1955, she became an important source for the KGB at her new posting at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the next twenty-two years, until her cover was blown by British agent Oleg Gordievsky in 1977.
However, as many, if not more, of State Security’s operations would be directed internally. Stalin believed that the break between Russia and Yugoslavia was simply part of a wide-ranging imperialist conspiracy to undermine the Soviet power bloc, and agents were on the hunt for conspirators. The Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Laszlo Rajk was accused of being part of a grand Titoist conspiracy against the Soviets and was subject to a show trial in Budapest in 1949. An anti-Semitic witch-hunt began after Stalin perceived links between the new state of Israel and the USA, and switched Soviet support to Israel’s Arab enemies. This was to form the last great purge of Stalin’s life, with all Jewish officers (bar a number of so-called ‘hidden Jews’ who were officially part of other ethnic groups) removed from positions of power, and from the MGB. A perceived plot against the state by doctors saw the dictator’s rage vented on those who ‘trampled the sacred banner of science’ — agents of British and American intelligence working through ‘a corrupt Jewish bourgeois nationalist organisation’.
Josef Stalin died in March 1953, and during the inevitable power struggle in the Kremlin, Beria expanded the power of the state security organs under his control, bringing the MGB into the Ministry of the Interior (the MVD). Perhaps unwisely, he ordered a reorganization of the MVD network in East Germany, and in the absence of nearly a thousand officers, an uprising took place that the newly promoted General Fadeykin failed to handle properly.
Beria had overplayed his hand, and on 26 June he was accused of being an ‘imperialist agent’ by the ruling Presidium. He was tried, convicted and executed for working for British intelligence, supposedly ever since he had worked in Baku in 1919 when the area was under British control.
While the MGB still formed part of the MVD, a foreign assassination mission went disastrously wrong. Operation Rhine was designed to eliminate Georgi Sergeevich Okolovich, a Ukrainian emigre living in West Germany. Instead of killing him, however, the assassin, Nikolai Kholkov, defected to the West; he was one of five agents who would transfer allegiance in the first few months of 1954, with defections from the Tokyo and Vienna residencies, as well as two in Canberra in April 1954.
By that time, the KGB had been reorganized one last time. Removed from the MVD, but downgraded to committee status, the KGB was attached to the Council of Ministers to keep it under some form of control — the post-Stalin leadership was determined that it would never have the unbridled power that its predecessors had enjoyed. That wouldn’t stop it from becoming one of the most ruthless intelligence agencies in the world.
5
CAT AND MOUSE
In the press, in Parliament, in the United Nations, from the pulpit, there is a ceaseless talk about the rule of law, civilized relations between nations, the spread of democratic processes, self-determination and national sovereignty, respect for the rights of man and human dignity.
The reality, we all know perfectly well is quite the opposite and consists of an ever-increasing spread of lawlessness, disregard of human contract, cruelty and corruption. The nuclear stalemate is matched by the moral stalemate.
It is the spy who has been called on to remedy the situation created by the deficiencies of ministers, diplomats, generals and priests.
Men’s minds are shaped of course by their environments and we spies, although we have our professional mystique, do perhaps live closer to the realities and hard facts of international relations than other practitioners of government. We are relatively free of the problems of status, of precedence, departmental attitudes and evasions of personal responsibility, which create the official cast of mind. We do not have to develop, like Parliamentarians conditioned by a lifetime, the ability to produce the ready phrase, the smart reply and the flashing smile. And so it is not surprising these days that the spy finds himself the main guardian of intellectual integrity.
That’s the way that MI6 regarded the work of the spy in the late fifties, in this circular by George Young, who was part of the joint MI6/CIA operation to remove Mossadegh from Iran, as well as the abortive coup against Egyptian President Nasser, and would later become Vice Chief of the service. It’s the background against which Ian Fleming created master spy James Bond. It wasn’t a world of glamour or mystique, just people doing their jobs to gain the information necessary to keep the world on an even keel.
It wasn’t just those in the West who saw it that way. Interviewed by CNN in 1998, after the collapse of Communism, East German spy chief Markus Wolf pointed out:
At that stage of the twentieth-century European history, developments at times bordered on a hot war, and that’s why I think that if something positive can be said about the work of the intelligence services, it’s that through their work they may have avoided this going over the threshold to a hot war…
I’m pretty sure that the intelligence services on the whole, and the spies both in the East and the West, tended towards a more realistic assessment of the balance of power than that of politicians and military leaders; so that actions, or even adventurous actions which could easily have led to an escalation [of tension] or even to a war, would have been desisted from.
The CIA were still intent on blocking Communism wherever they thought that it might gain a foothold. Building on their perceived successes in Italy, Iran and Guatemala, they sought to take a lead role in Vietnam, following the 1954 United Nations resolution that divided that country in preparation for national elections in 1956. The difference between their previous operations and working in Vietnam derived primarily from the nature of the country. As the CIA’s own history points out: ‘In the territory south of the 17th parallel, which Americans at first
