(9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and materiel are at the front.
(10) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.
These are the main methods the People's Liberation Army has employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's Liberation Army in long years of fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are completely suited to our present situation… our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics.
'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 25, 1947),
Without preparedness superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack.
'On Protracted War' (May 1938),
9. THE PEOPLE'S ARMY
Without a people's army the people have nothing.
'On Coalition Government' (April 24, 1945),
This army is powerful because all its members have a conscious discipline; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them whole-heartedly.
The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.
'On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party' (December 1929),
The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after country-wide victory, our army will remain a fighting force during the historical period in which classes have not been abolished in our country and the imperialist system still exists in the world. On this point there should be no misunderstanding or wavering.
'Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ' (March 5, 1949),
We have an army for fighting as well as an army for labour. For fighting we have the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies but even they do a dual job, warfare and production. With these two kinds of armies, and with a fighting army skilled in these two tasks and in mass work, we can overcome our difficulties and defeat Japanese imperialism.
'Get Organized!' (November 29,),
Our national defence will be consolidated and no imperialist will be allowed to invade our territory again. Our people's armed forces must be maintained and developed with the brave and steeled People's Liberation Army as their foundation. We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy.
Opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (September 21, 1949).
Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.
'Problems of War and Strategy' (November 6, 1938),
All our officers and hghters must always bear in mind that we are the great People's Liberation Army, we are the troops led by the great Communist Party of China. Provided we constantly observe the directives of the Party, we are sure to win.
'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947),
The Party committee system is an important Party institution for ensuring collective leadership and preventing any individual from monopolizing the conduct of affairs. It has recently been found that in some (of course not all) leading bodies it is the habitual practice for one individual to monopolize the conduct of affairs and decide important problems. Solutions to important problems are decided not by Party committee meetings but by one individual, and membership in the Party committee has become nominal. Differences of opinion among committee members cannot be resolved and are left unresolved for a long time. Members of the Party committee maintain only formal, not real, unity among themselves. This situation must be changed. From now on, a sound system of Party committee meetings must be instituted in all leading bodies, from the regional bureaus of the Central Committee to the prefectural Party committees; from the Party committees of the fronts to the Party committees of brigades and military areas (sub-commissions of the Revolutionary Military Commission or leading groups); and the leading Party members' groups in government bodies, people's organizations the news agency and the newspaper offices. All important problems (of course, not the unimportant, trivial problems, or problems whose solutions have already been decided after discussion at meetings and need only be carried out) must be submitted to the committee for discussion, and the committee members present should express their views fully and reach definite decisions which should then be carried out by the members concerned… Party committee meetings must be divided into two categories, standing committee meetings and plenary sessrons, and the two should not be confused. Furthermore, we must take care that neither collective leadership nor personal responsibility is overemphasized to the neglect of the other. In the ar!-ny, the person in command has the right to make emergency decisions during battle and when circumstances require.
'On Strengthening the Party Committee System' (September 20, 1948),
The secretary of a Party committee must be good at being a 'squad leader'. A Party committee has ten to twenty members; it is like a squad in the army, and the secretary is like the 'squad leader'. It is indeed not easy to lead this squad well. Each regional bureau or sub-regional bureau of the Central Committee now leads a vast area and shoulders very heavy responsibilities. To lead means not only to decide general and specihc policies but also to devise correct methods of work. Even with correct general and specihc policies, troubles may still arise if methods of work are neglected. To fulfil its task of exercising leadership, a Party committee must rely on its 'squad members' and enable them to play their parts to the full. To be a good 'squad leader', the secretary should study hard and investigate thoroughly. A secretary or deputy secretary will find it difficult to direct his 'squad' well if he does not take care to do propaganda and organizational work among his own 'squad members'', is not good at handling his relations with committee members or does not study how to run meetings successfully. If the 'squad members' do not march in step, they can never expect to lead tens of millions of people in fighting and construction. Of course, the relation between the secretary and the committee members is one in which the minority must obey the majority, so it is different from the relation between a squad leader and his men. Here we speak only by way of analogy.
