Once the secretary had raised the alarm, Scotland Yard went into action and began searching for the yellow van. At the same time, ports, train stations and airports were put on the alert.
Stanstead Airport is also a cargo airport and is located around 30 miles north of London. The day before the kidnap took place, a Nigerian cargo plane had landed there, and now its holds were empty. The pilot claimed that he was to transport several crates of diplomatic documents from the Nigerian embassy back to Lagos. Nothing unusual up to this point. However, by order of the British police, the Nigerian security agents on board were not allowed to leave the airport premises. London also suspected the Nigerian military of wanting to take back those who had found refuge in Great Britain.
This fear suggests that the British had relatively accurate intelligence, even if they did not know that Dikko was being specifically targeted. Nevertheless, three hours after the Nigerian politician's abduction, a yellow van appeared at the gates of Stanstead Airport. A Nigerian citizen brandishing a diplomatic passport got out and demanded entry, saying that he had to load two cases onto the cargo plane that had landed the day before. The van was allowed in and the border police even allowed them to load the cases into the hold of the Nigerian 707 plane. This was certainly strange, given that Scotland Yard had already sent out a clear description of the van.
In fact, the police and the British customs officers were aiming to catch the Nigerians in the act. Under the pretext that he had heard a strange noise coming from one of the cases, a customs officer entered the hold and requested that the two large crates be unloaded. The crates themselves were addressed to Nigerian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which meant that they should have been protected due to their diplomatic status. In theory, however, there was nothing to prevent a customs officer from exercising his curiosity, providing it was legitimate. In many cases this often led to the discovery of weapons or even drugs concealed in diplomatic bags.
The two boxes were unloaded and taken to a hangar where they were opened in the presence of a representative from the Nigerian embassy. The first one contained Dikko, who was unconscious and appeared to have been drugged. But he was not alone! Next to him was a man with a syringe in his hand, who was later proved to be an Israeli anaesthetist who was supposed to inject a new dose of neuroleptic in case the prisoner woke up prematurely. Furthermore, to avoid suffocation this honourable practitioner was also charged with inserting a tracheal tube into the prisoner: it was clear that Dikko was intended to arrive in Nigeria alive, not dead. In the second box were two men, who coincidentally, were also Israeli citizens!
Liberation
109
[The newspaper firstly reported that this kidnapping case occurred at a time when relations between the Thatcher government and the military in Lagos were quite delicate.]
Even before the outbreak of this case, Britain had been the target of violent attacks from Lagos. On Thursday, the second-in-command of the military regime accused Britain of having exploited Nigeria and serving as a ‘refuge’ for Nigerian ‘fugitives’ who were responsible for the country’s economic crisis.
Yet it will be harder for the Iron Lady to be as brutal with Nigeria as she was with Colonel Gaddafi. An influential member of the Commonwealth, Nigeria is also a major economic partner: it is the tenth export market for Britain and its main market outside of Europe and the United States.
The case also reveals the choices of the military powers in Lagos, who are currently engaged in a wave of anti-corruption trials. Many ministers, governors, senior officials in the former regime have received very heavy prison sentences from private military tribunals, without the chance of appeal. A decree has fixed a minimum prison sentence of twenty-two years, with the maximum being life imprisonment. Britain had already indicated that it would refuse to extradite Umaru Dikko if he was to be tried under such conditions.
After the discovery of the two men in the other box, it appeared that three Israelis were involved. It was obvious that other agents were involved in the abduction, but they had taken the precaution of disappearing as soon as the operation appeared to have been successful. They were not to know that the boxes would be opened at the airport.
In total, Scotland Yard had got their hands on a dozen people of various nationalities. For their part, the Israelis claimed that they were mercenaries who had been charged by wealthy Nigerian businessmen to capture Dikko and bring him home. The continued to stick to this story and consequently laid no implications against Israel or the Nigerian government. This suited London as there was no wish to throw oil on the fire and cause a serious diplomatic crisis.
Yet the fire burned briefly between Britain and its former colony and the renewed tension led to the temporary retention of a British plane at Lagos airport: a simple retaliatory action by an upset military. Taking care not to directly accuse the Nigerian authorities, London was content to issue a diplomatic protest, although this still resulted in a mutual recall of their respective ambassadors.
Israel was not concerned in any way, even if it was established that the kidnappers had links to Mossad. Later on, during the trial, their defence (a famous British lawyer) was able to declare that the Israelis had most definitely had nothing to do with the whole affair.
However, London chose to accept the version given by the ‘mercenary' Israelis. Yet behind the scenes there was a severe critical analysis of documents between the British counterintelligence and the heads
