a In discussing war (and peace) I will consider past realities and future possibilities, using U.S.-Soviet relations as an example of conflict and antagonism.
b The group of sixty- to seventy-five-year-old Germans in Trier showed intense involvement in our discussion. After nearly four hours, only one had left; I had to stop the discussion because of other obligations. My impression was that many in the group had never had this kind of discussion before. As a result, they had only very partially restructured or reorganized their original experience in light of the full knowledge about the Hitler era that later became available to them.
The group of students had also failed to work through the past and integrate it with the present. Most of the students had little historical knowledge about the details of the Hitler era and even less “personal knowledge” handed down to them by the older generation. National self-awareness requires processes of exploration within the society.
c The image of the enemy has become a widely used concept. In my view, while images of the enemy are important in maintaining and enhancing hostility, they are just one component of a broader ideology of antagonism. Moreover, it is important to identify the roots of enmity and hence of enemy images – a central goal of this book.
d The vision of minimalist practice may seem idealistic. However, ideals are essential in the creation of new realities. Minimalist practice and the evolution toward positive connections among nations described in Chapter 18 can progress together and reinforce each other.
17 The nature of groups: security, power, justice, and positive connection
What characteristics of cultures and individuals and what social arrangements and relations among nations are required for caring, connectedness, and nonaggression among subgroups of societies and among nations to become both strongly held values and realities of life? How might we promote them?
Social change requires highly committed people, guided by ideals. Since abstract ideals can become destructive, these ideals must remain connected to the welfare of individual human beings. There are many examples of the influence of such commitment. A group of abolitionists in the first half of the nineteenth century greatly influenced attitudes toward slavery. Their ideals conflicted with the practice of slavery and the beliefs and values of much of society.1 By clearly expressing their ideas and bravely suffering abuse, they impressed other Americans with their character, and ultimately the virtue of their cause. More recently civil rights activists have had a similar impact. Many rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe became highly committed, and some influenced even perpetrators.
Serge Moscovici’s research suggests that by expressing and enacting values to which they are committed, a minority can affect the attitudes of the majority. If their beliefs and values are extreme relative to those of the majority, substantial change can still occur, although at first mainly in basic orientations (e.g., blacks are also human beings) rather than attitudes and values that directly guide behavior.2 The research on bystanders and the real-life examples I described also show that people can powerfully influence others.
In working to diminish group violence, and especially the nuclear threat, people often focus on short-term goals. Arms control and crisis resolution procedures are realistic goals. However, a lasting decrease in the likelihood of war or genocide requires deeper changes in consciousness and perspective, in personalities, culture, and institutions. Such changes require long-term goals and a vision of the road leading to them.
Theories of social change abound, but our knowledge of how to bring it about is limited. Actions often have unintended effects. But some movements for change are successful. Perhaps sensitivity to existing realities must be added to a focus on the desired outcome to foresee the pyschological and social consequences of a course of action.
The United States is the place I know best. Whatever its imperfections, the democratic nature of U.S. culture and society makes change possible. Given the power and influence of the United States, its practices and policies can greatly affect international relations and influence the internal practices of other countries, for the worse or for the better. For all these reasons, I will use the United States as the main example in discussing an agenda for change. However, the discussion applies to other nations as well.
Assumptions about human nature and the nature of societies
Does human nature or the nature of social groups limit the possibility of cooperative, caring, nonviolent relations? As I have noted, some philosophers, social thinkers, and psychologists assume that humans are good by nature, others that they are selfish, uncaring, or aggressive. I have stressed my view that human beings have genetic potentials for both altruism and aggression, which evolve through socialization and experience.
Theorists have also discussed the nature of groups and the implications of human nature for group behavior. Andrew Schmookler, in The Parable of the Tribes, offers “selection for power” as a central evolutionary concept. He says that social selection is not random, like biological selection; its main principle is power. It is likely to “discard those who revere nature in favor of those willing to exploit it. The warlike may eliminate the pacifist; the ambitious the content. . .modern industrialized powers will sweep away archaic cultures.” Given the unprecedented capacity for growth developed by civilized society, “a Hobbesian struggle for power among societies became inevitable.” In Schmookler’s view, the “problem of power is inevitable in human societies... .Inequalities of power lead inevitably to corruption, and human affairs tend naturally to create inequalities of power.”3 In the long run competitive strivings inevitably dominate over cooperative ones.
Reinhold Niebuhr, in his 1932 classic Moral Man and Immoral Society, argues that there is a “basic difference between the morality of individuals
