Psychological functioning and individual responsibility
The satisfaction of personal or ideological motivations often conflicts with moral values and principles. How are such conflicts resolved? Do perpetrators consciously make moral choices? How do we judge their responsiblity, especially when they move along the continuum of destruction without reflection or conscious choice? I will explore these questions while examining the conduct of the SS and Nazi doctors in Chapter 10.
a It is impossible to identify here all the unusual and even aberrant motivations and personal characteristics that may lead to aggression. However, our discussion might apply even to highly unusual instances of violence. Consider, for example, Dennis Nilsen, an English serial killer. For ten years before his first murder he had had intense fantasies about death. This apparently related to the death, when he was six, of his grandfather, the only person in his life with whom he had a close relationship. In these fantasies death and love joined. The killer, while he functioned quite well, was a solitary man. His fantasies, and the murders, gave him a feeling of connection. After killing someone, he would keep the body with him for a long time, washing and dressing it, “caring” for it.13
b The original research on the authoritarian personality by Adorno and associates has been criticized. Although controversy persists, later work together with other data (e.g., research on the SS and on Greek torturers) suggests that at least an authority orientation is one predisposition of people who become perpetrators. Some criticisms were that the primary measure of authoritarian personality, the F (fascist) scale, excludes authoritarians of the Left; that the scale simply measures a tendency to say yes to questions; that the initial conception overemphasized maladjustment in authoritarian personalities.
Later research is more sophisticated; it indicates differences in both perception of events and response to them. Authoritarian persons or juries tend to favor greater punishment. Authoritarians are more punitive toward a citizen who killed a policeman at a rock concert if he is negatively described than if he is positively described; “equalitarians” are not affected by information about the character of the defendant. In contrast, authoritarians are unaffected by information about character when the defendant is a policeman, and equalitarians are more punitive toward a policeman who is negatively described. In an experiment where they act as teachers who shock a supposed learner, authoritarians are more punitive toward low-status victims, and equalitarians are more punitive toward high-status victims. More authoritarian persons also have more racist attitudes.
While the research findings have disconfirmed several aspects of the original theory, they do show that people differ in authority orientation and this difference affects the way they relate to ideas as well as people – especially people with differing authority or status. See endnote 22.
c All states, all organizations, all families have to deal with issues of authority. In the United States child-rearing practices have become less authoritarian. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s Public Health information to parents included the advice that infants be fed on a fixed schedule, rather than on demand (i.e., when the infant is hungry, which is the current recommendation).
6 Steps along a continuum of destruction: perpetrators and bystanders
Once perpetrators begin to harm people, the resulting psychological changes make greater harm-doing probable. However, early public reactions can counteract these changes and inhibit further violence.
Just-world thinking
One psychological consequence of harm-doing is further devaluation of victims. According to the just-world hypothesis, which has received substantial experimental support, people tend to assume that victims have earned their suffering by their actions or character.1 Perhaps we need to maintain faith that we ourselves will not become innocent victims of circumstance. However, blaming the victim is not universal; some people turn against the perpetrators. For example, a minority of individuals blame the experimenter instead of devaluing a student receiving electric shocks in an experiment.2 Prior devaluation should make it more likely that victims are blamed.
People believe in a just world with different degrees of conviction.3 Those whose belief is strong derogate poor people, underprivileged groups, or minorities. Strong belief in a just world is associated with rigid application of social rules and belief in the importance of convention, as opposed to empathy and concern with human welfare.4 It is ironic and seemingly paradoxical (although not truly paradoxical, because the belief that the world is just is not identical to regarding justice as an ideal or to the desire to promote justice) that the belief that the world is a just place leads people to accept the suffering of others more easily, even of people they themselves harmed.
People do not devalue victims whose innocence is clearly and definitely established.5 But how often can that be done? How can Jews or blacks, communists or anticommunists be cleared of misdeeds, evil intentions, or faults inherent in their nature, particularly in a climate of prejudice? Devaluation is especially likely if the victims’ continued suffering is expected.6 To feel empathy results in empathic distress. To avoid that, people distance themselves from victims. This can be accomplished by devaluation. Under difficult life conditions, concern about the self also diminishes concern about others’ suffering.
Learning by doing and the evolution of extreme destructiveness
The importance of learning by doing became evident to me through studies in which my
