In the early stages the Germans did believe that there was an Armenian insurrection. Later they realized the true nature of events but continued to use insurrection as a justification. The German ambassador in Washington, once the atrocities became difficult to deny, defended them on the grounds that “the Armenians were disloyal and secretly aided Russia.”62
Just-world thinking, the devaluation of victims, fear of alienating their ally and a tendency to adopt its attitude, a focus on their own concerns in the midst of the war, and perhaps their own attitudes toward minorities all contributed to German passivity. An article in the Frankfurter Zeitung in October 9, 1915, reveals part of the German attitude.
“The Armenian.. .enjoys, through his higher intellect and superior commercial ability, a constant business advantage in trade, tax-farming, banking, and commission-agency over the heavy-footed Turk, and so accumulates money in his pocket, while the Turk grows poor. That is why the Armenian is the best-hated man in the East – in many cases not unjustly, though a generalization would be unfair.63
Dr. Johannes Lepsius went to Armenia to see, to protest, and also to aid Armenians, which was not allowed by the Ottoman government. Upon his return to Germany, his description of events in Turkey was criticized as exaggerated, even by liberal politicians.
Germany’s behavior with respect to Turkey during the First World War may have been one element that paved the way for the Holocaust. The Armenian genocide helped shape German attitudes toward violence against “internal enemies.” The quiet acceptance by the rest of the world also contributed. Even after Turkey lost the war, and despite new massacres of Armenians in 1922, little was done to punish Turkey or individual Turks. Hitler could later jsutifiably say, “Who remembers now the massacres of the Armenians?”b64
a In recent years questions have been raised about the authenticity of the Nairn “memoirs” – in reality not memoirs but fifty-two pieces purported to be documents, two letters, and fifty decoded cipher telegrams, with Nairn’s annotations explaining the individual items. There are also interspersed comments by Aram Andonian, the Armenian who received the material from Nairn and compiled it. Vakahn Dadrian examines the question of forgery and the factual errors contained in the documents but concludes that the errors can be explained and the material can be authenticated in many ways. Their validity is supported by the official and mostly secret reports of German and Austrian diplomats to their government, allied to Ottoman Turkey; by information that surfaced at the time of Turkish court-martial proceedings in 1919-20 that tried Young Turk leaders for their conduct of the war and the policy of extermination; by the German consul at Aleppo, Rossler, whose district was in the center of events described in the documents and who read the French translation and judged the documents seemingly genuine. While they are important, these documents are only one source of information about the genocide in Turkey.47
b After the military trials, Turkey reversed course and has ever since denied the atrocities. The reasons for this probably include psychological defenses (denial in the psychological sense, rationalizations, and justifications), fear of Armenian claims for reparations, and the unrealistic fear of an Armenian attempt to establish an independent state. Such denial is potentially very harmful. A society not facing up to atrocities it committed and not dealing with its own inhumanity is likely to continue or repeat such actions. In Turkey, interference with the cultural life of the Armenians, discrimination, and economic pressure have continued. Complicity by others contributes to the possibility of denial: for example, the U.S. State Department, apparently influenced by U.S. national interests in Turkey, decided in 1982 that the evidence of the Turkish genocide or atrocities was unclear. Later, Congress reasserted the earlier U.S. view recognizing that a genocide had taken place.65
13 Cambodia: genocide to create a better world
The killing of perhaps two million people in Cambodia was an example of human cruelty perpetrated to fulfill a vision of a better world. God made the Jews wander in the wilderness for forty years so that only a new generation, with souls uncontaminated by slavery in Egypt, would reach the promised land. The Cambodian communist leaders did not have the patience of God. They set out to create a radically new society immediately. Anyone bound to the old ways by their former status or present behavior was to die, to make this better world possible. In the resulting climate of violence and suspicion, many of the communists themselves were killed.
Historical (life) conditions
One popular view depicted Cambodia as a jungle paradise, filled with peaceful, gentle people, until the civil war that brought the Khmer Rouge into power. In this view the people were poor but contented; their Buddhism was a source of their inner peace, and the land was bountiful. Not only French colonials, but even the Cambodian elite saw the Cambodian peasantry this way. It was an image actively propagated by the Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk after the country gained independence from the French in 1954.
For Sihanouk and others this image may have served to fend off discontent. While there were elements of truth in it, it was far from accurate or complete. For centuries Cambodia had been invaded and at
