The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence

centralized state, and federalists, who preferred a flexible federation.¹⁰ In the nineteenth century the country was ruled by an oligarchy of landowners. In the twentieth century political reforms resulted in a highly pluralistic many-party system. But none of the parties had enough power to rule. Groups outside the party system, especially unions and the army, increasingly exerted direct influence. The military regarded political instability as both an obligation to correct and an opportunity. It increasingly assumed the role of the dominant party.¹¹

A guide to political parties of South America states:

1930 (the overthrow of President Yrigoyen) marked the end of a period of Army indifference to political life which lasted three quarters of a century, and the collapse of the system for electing civilian governments. It is a curious fact that the Army’s progressive elimination of the political parties has taken place almost without a struggle; political leaders have of course openly condemned the military coups but the lack of anything more than a verbal reaction gives rise to the suspicion that most of them have accepted these interventions with equanimity, if not relief.¹²

When life conditions are complex and difficult, submitting to an authority that offers a vision can satisfy important needs and goals. The military, although unable to stabilize the country economically or politically, had become the big brother in Argentina. Much of the population and political leadership relied on it, and the rest accepted its dominance.

The military came to see itself as the savior of the nation. The colonels who took power in 1943, for example, “were intent on ruling directly, on the premise that whatever benefited the armed forces would also benefit the country.”¹³ Per6n originally gained influence through the support of right-wing nationalist officers with fascist views. Although he later acted to reduce the influence of the military, he continued to believe in “the tutelary role of the army as custodian of the supreme values of the nation embodied in Hispanic cultural tradition.”¹⁴

A 1966 publication by the secretary of war on the operation of civil affairs states that the tasks of the army include supervision, evaluation of civil authorities, including judges, and offering guidance to them. It also describes the conditions under which civil authority is to be replaced.¹⁵ This document, prepared to guide the military in establishing its rule after the coup of 1966, indicates the extent to which the military was willing to assume dominance over civilian structures.

The military saw the nation as a living entity, occupying territory in which it lives, gains strength, and expands. Their views were somewhat akin to German ideas about the special nature of the state; individual interests and rights had to submit to the greater good of the country. Substantial segments of the military had a “corporate” view of society: all in it are together, joined. Individual rights did not have a strong tradition in Argentina. All this contributed to the military’s paternalistic view of its relationship to society. Because the military created the policy of disappearances and was the primary agent of torture and killings, we must come to further understand its nature.

The self-concept and ideology of the military

In a 1970 publication Robert Potash described the self-concept and ideology of the Argentine military.¹⁶ His views are highly consistent with those offered after the disappearances. Argentine military officers saw themselves as heirs to a heroic tradition established in the wars of independence. Self-sacrifice, devotion, and duty were emphasized. The military vocation is like a priesthood; the permanent officer has mystical and passionate dedication. All members of the command corps were graduates of military academies whose rigorous curricula were designed to promote character, honor, and pride.¹⁷ They chose a branch of service early, and it became a lifetime association. The indoctrination of officers became well established under Per6n. Potash quotes a recent statement about the purpose of training: “A purely technical-professional efficiency has no meaning if it is not based on deep convictions, and on full faith in the values that are defended and in the success of the ideological struggle that divides the world” (italics mine).¹⁸

A strong sense of corporate identity developed. Army officers saw themselves as members of a unique elite organization; they often felt contempt for civilians and especially politicians.¹⁹ They had little faith in democracy and regarded political parties as unnecessary.

Army officers (and the society in general) regarded Argentina as a nation set apart from the rest of Latin America by its historic role in liberating other countries during the wars of independence, by its natural wealth, size, cultural advancement, and by what they saw as a racially superior population of primary European descent. The country’s steep decline greatly threatened their self-concept: as individuals, soldiers, and nationalists.²⁰

The threat was enhanced by other aspects of their self-image, view of their role in Argentine life, and ideology. First, as Potash noted in 1970, strong anticommunism had become a major factor in their thinking on both domestic annd international politics since 1930. They showed admiration for the German military and strong fascist sentiments during World War II. Argentine sympathies were primarily with Nazi Germany in that war. The military overthrew the government in 1943 partly to preserve Argentine neutrality. Argentina broke diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan only in 1944, when the outcome of the war was evident, to avoid isolation and retaliation after the war.

Anticommunism was strengthened by Castro’s success in Cuba, especially after he dissolved the Cuban army and executed many officers. Increasingly close relations with the U.S. military contributed to anticommunism. The United States trained Argentine army officers and provided antiinsurgency training in the fight against the internal enemy. President Frondizi was ousted in 1962 after a campaign in which the military depicted him as a communist.

The anticommunism of the Argentine officers was strengthened by their commitment to Roman Catholicism.²¹ While not all officers were devout, they saw themselves as defenders of the church, especially of Christian ideals. An intense anticommunism, representing a world view, an ideology, and even a self-definition, developed among the Argentine military.