External bystanders
Many external influences contributed to the mass killing. I mentioned the shared ideology and examples of other South American countries and the common cause of their governments with the Argentine military during the mass killings. The rest of the world had tolerated torture and murder in South America for years, confirming for the Argentine military at least its acceptability, if not its Tightness.c
The United States had no role in creating the policy of disappearances, but its anticommunist zeal helped foster the ideology, institutions, and practices that became the cultural preconditions for mass killing. At the time of President Johnson’s inauguration, Defense Secretary McNamara told the U.S. Congress:
The primary objective in Latin America is to aid, whenever necessary, the continual growth of the military and paramilitary forces, so that together with the police and other security forces, they may provide the necessary internal security.75
Even during the disappearances, some countries withheld criticism, especially the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries: “The representative of the USSR even asked the UN ‘not to put to the Human Rights Commission any denunciation of Argentina’ adding that ‘new things are happening there with the takeover of power by a new government’ (he was referring to the Presidency of General Roberto E. Viola who had been the Army Chief of Staff during the crudest years of the dictatorship).”76 Other nations condemned the disappearances, but did nothing more. When some French nuns disappeared, the French government attempted to gain their release. Promises were made, but they never reappeared. Human rights organizations protested, and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States made a visit in Argentina. However, without the tangible support of nations, such organizations have limited influence, especially once mass killings have begun. By the time the machinery of destruction is in operation, the capacity of bystanders to influence the perpetrators has greatly weakened. The potential for influence is greatest at early stages – in the case of Argentina, during earlier military takeovers characterized by repression and violence.
One of the few exceptions to worldwide indifference was the Carter administration’s strong, vocal policy of support for human rights in South America and elsewhere. The U.S. Embassy was one of the few sources of support for the persecuted; the U.S. government intervened on behalf of individuals and also to halt the policy of disappearances in general. In South America Carter’s human rights policy was credited with an easing of repression. In contrast, it evoked skepticism in the American press.
Conclusions
The culture of the Argentine military and historical conditions created in part by the military gave rise to mass killings. Military self-concept, world view, ideology, and goals, the steps along a continuum of repression over decades, and the machinery of destruction inherent in the military were important contributors. The influential position of the military in Argentine society, both the ceding of rights to them and powerful segments of the population sharing their values, ideology, and goals, was also important. These predisposing characteristics joined with economic crises and political violence to create instability, chaos, and fear. The stifling of pluralism and political repression by the military also contributed. Internal and external bystanders contributed to the evolution of the cultural preconditions or even supported the mass killings.
Their failure in dealing with the economy and the increasing international attention given to their brutality eroded support for the military. Their inclusive definition of victims put many people in danger and further eroded support. After 1979 there were few disappearances. Many of the more obvious targets had already been kidnapped. However, given the seemingly self-perpetuating and frequently expanding nature of such group violence, new targets might have been found if the Argentine people and the world community had not become hostile. In April 1982, the military attacked and occupied the Malvinas, or Falklands, a small group of offshore islands ruled by England but claimed by Argentina, probably in the hope of fanning the patriotism of the masses. To their surprise, England sent a fleet, which defeated the Argentine army and retook the islands. The debacle brought down the military government and put an end to the disappearances. The present democratically elected government in Argentina, by prosecuting at least some of the perpetrators, may have contributed to a world in which governments will not torture and murder their own people.
a After the demise of the military dictatorship, Raul Alfonsin, the democratically elected president of Argentina, appointed a national commission on the disappeared. The published part of their report, Nunca Mas (never again), describes in detail the methods of abduction, torture, and murder used by the military and the nature and functioning of important social institutions of the society under the dictatorship. This is a document of great importance and provides data to test the explanations I offer here.
b In mid-April 1987, in response to a rebellion by a military unit, President Alfonsin called on the population to show support for his government. Hundreds of thousands of people assembled and demonstrated, expressing intense hostility to the military. As the Guardian, a London newspaper, noted on April 20,1987, “Bitter and rowdy mass protests against military regimes have been held in Argentina, but usually at the end rather than before the beginning of a (military) regime.” The behavior of the people as internal bystanders helped Alfonsin defeat the military threat. Unfortunately, Alfonsin also made concessions to the military by introducing a Due Obedience bill, which argues that junior officers were coerced by their superiors and should be absolved of human rights crimes. Although this might have been, or he might have regarded it as, the only way to save his government, Alfonsin’s capitulation reduced the effects of his other efforts to limit the role of the military
