news made headlines around the world. Goebbels was in a daze; it was likeliving in an eternal kaleidoscope: no sooner did he think he had seen it all, than therewas a totally new constellation. War still seemed likely, but with Poland’s only viableally now gone the conclusion seemed foregone. Goebbels and his staff threw themselvesinto the final war preparations. His first press directive the next morning spokeof a ‘sensational turning point’ in their relations with Russia; then caution prevailedand his next directive, while allowing editors to remark upon the ideological differencesseparating Berlin and Moscow, forbade them to quote even foreign commentarieson the probable consequences. ‘Any observations must be sober and objectivein tenor,’ his third directive that day added, ‘devoid of either triumph orSchadenfreude.’46The next telephone intercepts revealed ‘utter despair’ in the enemy camp.47 Out inLanke, where he and Magda were inspecting building operations, he received a phonecall from Hitler in euphoric mood. Goebbels congratulated him on his master stroke.48That day Hitler had summoned his generals in mufti to the Berghof to hear his planto attack Poland in four days’ time, and the astonishing news of the coming nonaggressionpact with Russia.49Early the next day, August 23, 1939, before flying down to the Berghof, Goebbelsaddressed the seemingly impossible problem of justifying Hitler’s new move. Editorswere reminded that their readers would not understand it if they suddenlysprouted ‘flowery and jubilant articles’ about German-Soviet friendship. Journalistsshould gradually warm to the pact to camouflage its opportunistic nature.50GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 551The Führer [Goebbels told his diary] is in conference with [Sir Nevile]Henderson. He has brought back a letter from Chamberlain: if Poland is attacked,this says, Britain will go to war. The Führer gives Henderson a robust response.Henderson is quite shattered. The Führer dictates a letter of reply to Chamberlain:if London mobilises, then Germany’s mobilisation will ensue. A stop will beput to the Polish provocations. This letter’s tone is quite adamant…The Führer greets me very cordially. He wants me to be with him over the nextfew days. In the afternoon he gives me a broad overview of the situation: Poland’splight is desperate. We shall attack her at the first possible opportunity. The Polishstate must be smashed just like the Czech. It won’t take much effort. More difficultis the question whether the west will intervene. At present one can’t say. It depends.London is talking tougher than in September 1938. So we’re going to haveto box cunning. At present Britain probably doesn’t want war. But she can’t loseface…Paris is holding back more and dodging the issue. But there too we can’t sayanything hard and fast…Italy isn’t keen but she’ll probably go along with us. She’s hardly got any choice.Japan has missed the bus. How often the Führer has urged them to join the militaryalliance, even telling them he’d have to join forces with Moscow otherwise…Now Japan is pretty isolated.Hitler described to Goebbels the letters he had exchanged with Stalin, and theresulting deal on eastern Europe, with the Baltic states and Poland being split betweenBerlin and Moscow.51 ‘The question of bolshevism,’ noted Goebbels, ‘is for thetime being of lesser importance.’ It was a throwaway line of breathtaking brevityconsidering all that he had fought against for fifteen years. As they waited for wordfrom Ribbentrop in Moscow, Hitler speculated that Chamberlain might even resign.By phone, Ribbentrop asked if the Russians might have the ports of Libau and Windau:‘The Führer approves this,’ observed Goebbels. They whiled away the hours watch-552 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICHing a movie, until the communiqué finally came through from Moscow. At one A.M.Poland’s fate was sealed. They sat up until four A.M. examining the implications.It was dawn when Goebbels returned to his quarters—still in the humble guesthouseto which Hitler had relegated him.52 Probably Hitler had by now told him thathe had confidently scheduled the attack on Poland to begin at dawn on Saturday thetwenty-sixth.On the twenty-fourth (Thursday) both men agreed that it was surprising that therehad been so little echo from the world’s press to the Moscow signing. Goebbels liftedthe ban on editors speculating on what the new pact would mean for Poland: ‘Youcan indicate that the purpose of this pact is to enable Germany and Russia alone tosettle all outstanding problems in the Lebensraum between them, i.e., in easternEurope.’53 A second directive that day probably reflected Hitler’s decision to strike intwo days’ time. Editors were now invited to comment on the speed with which theMoscow pact had been signed. ‘Newspapers are permitted to display a degree ofSchadenfreude, though not in their editorial columns.’54 Editors were still not to gointo specifics; reports about Polish mobilisation and atrocities, and about Danzig,were still to take precedence over the new pact.55They decided it was high time to fly back to Berlin.During the flight Hitler was on edge; Goebbels wondered how he kept his nerve incrises like this.56 That it was a crisis became plain when Goebbels read the telegrams:Chamberlain had told the House of Commons that Britain still stood by her promiseto Poland. The radio waves were filled with the chatter of panicking commentators—and Goebbels too lay awake for hours that night.57Friday August 25, 1939 dawned, the eve of war—or so Hitler had planned. At twothirtyP.M. the final mobilisation against Poland was due to start. At the noon pressconference the ministry instructed editors of the next day’s newspapers to highlightPolish preparations for attacking Germany, the Polish blockade of Danzig, and Polishacts of terrorism.58 A lieutenant-colonel briefed Goebbels that the attack was scheduledto begin at 4:30 A.M. the next day: a swift coup de main against Gdynia, Danzigto declare for the Reich, and then an all-out military onslaught against eastern Up-GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 553per Silesia. At midday Hitler told him to get two declarations ready, one to the peopleand one to the party. Forster phoned from Danzig—evidently heedless of telephonesecurity—and demanded leaflets for the Polish army and population. Goebbelsheard that the British ambassador had gone to see Hitler again, and that Hitler hadoffered Britain the closest cooperation after Poland had been dealt with. ‘Britaindoesn’t believe
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