[A]ttempt to recover Philadelphia and destroy the enemy army there. What mode of execution to pursue and what force will be required against an estimated 10,000 men, exclusive of marines and seamen, whose aid may be called in? Attempt an attack by storm, by regular approaches or by blockade, and in what manner?
[T]ransfer the war to the north by attacking New York. Should this be done by a coup de main, with a small force, or make an attack with a large force? How large a force would be necessary in either case, estimating the number of the enemy in and around New York at 4000 men, and how to dispose of the troops to achieve the desired result, and to protect the country and secure the stores at the same time?
[R]emain quiet in a secure, fortified camp, drilling and disciplining the army. What post shall be taken so as to keep the army secure, to cover the country and magazines and to be in a position to counteract any future movements of the enemy?26
Duportail’s memorial on this occasion was a very significant document, as it had a profound influence in shaping Washington’s policy. It also indicated that Duportail was imbued with the American cause during the five months he had been in the Continental Army because he saw the cause of France in it. He understood English very well by this time and had listened to all the arguments of the officers in camp regarding the situation of America. He thought the victory at Saratoga blinded the people in the north to the true character of the American troops. His memorial emphasized, “Let us take care that the successes in the North do not occasion defeats here, where the circumstances are by no means the same.”27
He wrote the “Supplement” in English and in his own hand. This version of the memorial is Colonel John Laurens’s translation, which includes Duportail’s interlined corrections. It also shows how carefully he watched Laurens’s work to ensure that his ideas were conveyed accurately in the English version that the commander in chief would read. The memorial intended to state that England could never reduce America by arms if proper care were taken of the men and if France continued to keep England on guard by warlike preparations so that she retained a large part of her troops in Europe.
DUPORTAIL’S MEMORIAL
The memorial is as follows:
In all great Enterprises, the first thing to be done, is to form a general Plan of Conduct, to which all the particular operations are to have reference. This general plan is as it were the touch Stone by which all the subordinate projects are proved—according as they agree or disagree with it they are good or ill, deserve to be approved or rejected: now in this great Enterprise of supporting American Liberty by arms, I do not see that we have established the principles which ought to guide us in war, or, to speak more frankly, it appears to me that we have adopted defective principles. Almost every one considers the American Army in the same light as the British, thinks it capable of the same things, and would have it act in the same way; thus we see from time to time bold projects formed, rash resolutions proposed, which are the better received as they flatter those to whom they are proposed, by shewing them that the Nation is judged capable of vigorous actions—but this flattery may have fatal consequences, it may ruin America. Let it be our endeavor in this important business, to consider things in their true light.
It is an Axiom among Military men, that Troops which are not what are called Regular Troops cannot make head against regular troops in level ground or in any Situation that does not offer them very considerable advantages. The American Army therefore cannot stand against the British who are composed with British or German troops all Regular. perhaps some person too much prejudiced in favor of their Country, or not sufficiently instructed, will ask me, why I refuse to call the American Troops regular; I have no answer for the Persons who make this question; it proves that they do not know what Troops are—I address myself only to those who have an idea of what is understood by Discipline, Theory and Practice of Manoeuvres, System, Pride of Corps etc. . . . Such Persons will grant that the American Army new in every respect, and not having had a foundation of formed officers and Soldiers, cannot as yet claim the Title of regular Troops, and that it is therefore incapable, as I remarked above, of resisting the Enemy on equal ground. besides has not experience manifestly proved it? we were beaten at Brandywine—we were beaten at German Town altho’ we had the immense advantage of a complete Surprise. if any action is to enlighten us in respect to our troops, it is this—The dispositions on our side were excellent. General Washington was truly victorious over General Howe, since the latter was absolutely in fault and completely surprised, but his troops conquered ours and thereby they have saved the glory of their general and [they] gave a great proof of their superiority in plain [in even contest]. Let us therefore avoid committing ourselves in this way again—for it is farther a principle of war cautiously to avoid doing what your Enemy would have you do—Now let General Howe be asked whether he would like to meet the American Army on nearly equal ground for the issue of the present dispute, he will answer that it is the wish of his heart—that he desires only two or three such opportunities to decide the cause of America—because he is sure of beating us, and that the loss of general actions will soon have ruined our party without recourse. I know very well that many persons are not of
