this opinion, and that they say, that having more men than the English and greater facility of procuring them we cannot fight the Enemy too often because even if we should be beaten, the loss of the Enemy, though less in itself would be greater relatively to their whole number, and consequently they must soon be ruined—but this opinion is built upon a foundation altogether false. our numbers are not superior to those of the English. doubtless measures were taken last year to get as great a number as possible, yet at Brandywine we scarcely had 12,000 men, the English had as many—besides let us remark one thing; we received in the month of October 1500 men from General Putnam’s army; in November 3000 from the Northern army; these added to the 12,000 men we had in the month of September would amount to 16,000 men. however when we quitted Whitemarsh we were scarcely between 8000 and 9000 men—that is to say, that in three months, the diminution from Battle and principally sickness and Desertion, has been half the Army; thus if the Campaign instead of opening in the month of September had commenced in the months of April or May we should not have had a man left at the end of the campaign. This proves that if we get men easily, we lose them in the same manner. besides with respect even to the facility of getting them, I do not see that many recruits arrive. On the contrary I hear that they experience great difficulties in procuring them. nevertheless the last Campaign, all things considered, was not unlucky, and the northern successes keep up the spirits of the people. if then notwithstanding these things, there is so little eagerness in enlisting, or so much facility in quitting the army; what would be the case if we were to be unfortunate in general actions the loss of which will not always be made up by great success in another part. What we ought to propose to ourselves, is to defend the country inch by inch, to endeavor to hinder the enemy from rendering himself master of it, consequently never to receive him but when we are protected by a natural or artificial fortification, in other words to carry on what is styled a defensive War. this is our true part and it is so obvious that in Europe, all Military men and even those who are not so, suppose this to be our Conduct—if the Americans could consult the modern daily publications, they should there find that the model offered to General Washington is principally Fabius, that wise Roman who ruined Hannibal by refusing to fight him in plain. Fabius however commanded Romans, but these Romans had been thrice defeated, they were disheartened, dreaded the Enemy, and were nearly reduced to the condition of new and unformed Troops. The Consul conducted himself accordingly, avoided general Battles, kept himself on the defensive, always occupying strong positions and where the Enemy could not attack him but with considerable disadvantage—it is true that this kind of war was not approved of at Rome; Men of leisure who loved to be amused by great events, men of impetuous dispositions, men whose discernment was not sufficient to judge of what circumstances required, in a word the particular enemies of the Consul, turned him into ridicule, affixed to him insulting surnames, but the sage General was unmoved by them. he knew that after all, the event would determine his reputation in the world—he therefore invariably pursued his plan, and by his firmness which was crowned with success, he merited the appellation of Savior of Rome.
Application of the foregoing Principles to our present Situation and what we ought to propose to ourselves.
Ought we to open the Campaign by an attack on the Enemy’s lines as I hear sometimes proposed?
If the English army were out of its lines at the distance of one or two miles in front, from the reasons just mentioned we ought not to attack them for we should expose ourselves to almost certain Defeat (I suppose our army so large as in its last Campaign): and because this army is covered by lines, because it has added to its natural Strength that of Fortification we would attack it? This is manifestly unreasonable. Fortification is the means used by the weak to enable them to resist the strong. We Engineers count that a good fortified place enable those who defend it to resist ten times their own number.—Field Engineering does not afford such considerable advantages, but according as the ground is more or less judiciously chosen, as the Engineer has traced his work with more or less skill, and afterwards as the Profiles are more or less respectable, executed with more or less care, this kind of fortification renders one equal to two, three, four, and sometimes more—I am not acquainted with the English lines in their whole extent, but I may judge by what I have seen, because it is a principle in fortification to establish as perfect an equality as possible in the different parts, so that no one be more attackable than another; now by what I have seen of the English Lines, I judge that the defenders may at least hold them against double their numbers. Their army may at present be 10,000 strong, consequently they may defend themselves against 20,000 composed of troops equal in every respect (I mean Regular Troops). Let us make the comparison and judge.
I cannot forbear making an observation here which is, that to judge by the rash or rather the [paper torn] Projects of certain Persons they would think, that they had originally imagined that the establishing of American Liberty was to be the business of one or two years. that being deceived in this respect they begin to grow tired of the war, and wish to bring the matter to a speedy decision one way or the other. in effect, if their
