Washington's Engineer

ourselves in such a manner as that he cannot attack us but under considerable disadvantages; and for this purpose to always choose Situations strong in themselves, and besides avail ourselves of the Succors of Art. We should farther prefer positions in which we might avoid a general Battle if we thought proper—we should esteem it an essential quality in our positions to have the Rear free and an easy Retreat in order that an unlucky action might not be attended with too extensive consequences. if we should discover in our position any capital Defect which did not at first appear, or which only became such in consequence of the movements of the Enemy, we would immediately decamp and go elsewhere.—we should be cautious not to give into the Snare, which our Enemies will not fail to lay for us, endeavoring by their Raillery on our Retreats, to make us establish it as a point of honor, rather to keep a bad position than to make a retrograde movement. we should not forget that in war, to advance or retire are neither honorable or dishonorable; that it is at the end of a Campaign that the Prize is given, and that Glory is his reward who has gained his end—besides if the Enemy in the movements which he should make to try us, to turn us, should give us an opening, should expose any of his Troops, Posts, Baggage, to be attacked with advantage; we should never fail to do it—for one must not imagine that defensive war consists in never forming any Enterprise against the Enemy, but in such war the whole army (I Confess) should not form enterprises against the whole ennemy’s army—enterprises are formed with Detachments, whenever you can assure yourself of attacking with greater numbers—these expeditions even ought to be sought for, and frequently repeated, for it is thus that new Troops are by degrees enured to War.—Care must be taken, only, not to expose them to too severe marches, excessive bad weather or the want of Provisions. it appears to me that this kind of War would greatly embarrass the Enemy: for at length, as it is absolutely necessary that he attack us, he would do it; but as we are supposed to be always well fortified, and choose positions in which the whole Army cannot be attacked at once as we support the points only as long as it can be done with advantage, and retire whenever the Enemy begins to get too great an ascendancy over us, he is always liable to suffer considerable Loss without procuring decisive Success—in fact if we retire, even if the greatest part of the Army should have been successfully employed in supporting the point attacked, it is after all no battle—it is a post forced—a particular Corps repulsed—and this has no consequence—the Retreat is peaceably conducted—another post is taken hard by, and the business is to begin again—but General Howe has not a sufficiency of Troops, to purchase ground so dearly—it is easy to see that by these means 20 miles of Country would cost him half his Army—it is when weakened to this degree, and advanced into the interior of the Country he would tremble to see himself surrounded by those clouds of Militia useless at other times, but serviceable then, that he would be forced to yield the Country to us, and retire to shut himself up in his lines—and this is all that we have to desire, because it would prove to the English their inability to reduce this State, and consequently America—for what would happen in this State would in like manner happen in any other by pursuing the same Conduct. Nothing therefore would be better calculated [to] disgust them from continuing useless Efforts; whereas if we pique ourselves upon making war as equal European Armies do, if we will engage in general Actions, attack the Enemy or receive him in any kind of ground and unprepared, we shall experience some considerable Check—the Enemy will not always commit the fault of which he was guilty at Brandywine (where he might have cut off our Retreat, made himself master of our baggages and have reduced us to a ne plus ultra between the Delaware and the Chesapeak Bays), he will pursue us vigorously, hinder our reassembling, dissipate us, drive us from the Pennsylvania State, then availing himself of the disaffection of the majority of the inhabitants, make it declare for the King, and perhaps take arms in his favor—an event of the greatest consequence relatively to the other States of America, which would not be unshaken by such an example—relatively to the English who would be encouraged by it to make the greatest Efforts. and lastly considered with reference to foreign powers who not being near enough to estimate such Events according to their real value—and distinguishing in them only a proof of the great Superiority of the English, or inconstancy of the Americans, would not perhaps involve themselves further by giving them unavailing Succors—

This translation is interlined here and there by Duportail, who adds with his own hand and in his faulty English the following:

Supplement

the more i reflect upon the matter above treated, the more it seems to me impossible that the English can reduce America by arms, at least so long as the Americans behave himself properly. provided also that the Court of france will not Change her political system and by the awe of War which she gives to England, will hinder its sending to America more troops than it has sent hytherto. if there is any cause of reducing it, we should look for that Cause in the American army itself. i have observed just now that in three or four months our army diminished one half without doubt principally by desertion. that is very frightful for everybody sees that if it continues so all America will soon be exhausted of men. there can be certainly many Causes of that