The officers (John Armstrong, Johann Baron de Kalb, the Chevalier Duportail, Horatio Gates, Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, the Marquis de Lafayette, Thomas Mifflin, Friedrich von Steuben, and William Alexander Lord Stirling), in a rare display of unanimity, signed a joint communication on May 9, recommending “to remain on the defensive and wait events; without attempting any offensive operation of consequence.”31
Neither Congress nor the army had any positive knowledge of what was going on in Europe. They had not received any dispatches from their commissioners at Paris in almost a year, since May 26, 1777. While a packet boat arrived at the beginning of 1778, it had no letters of political significance. The Committee of Foreign Affairs had written, announcing their stupefaction on January 12, 1778,
GENTLEMEN: Not having received any letters from you since the 26th of May, we were severely chagrined yesterday, upon the arrival of Captain John Folger, who, under the name of dispatches from the commissioners at Paris, delivered only an enclosure of clean white paper, with some familiar letters none of which contained any political intelligence. . . . We cannot yet prove whether he [Folger] was willfully connected with the robbers of the packet.
We shall endeavor to find whether the roguery was committed after Folger left France; but we must depend upon you to trace the circumstances from the time of your sealing till that of his embarking.32
This incident remained a mystery for many years, until the British spy correspondence relating to this phase of England’s struggle to maintain control of her American colonies became accessible. Franklin and Deane trusted Joseph Hynson, a young American privateer sea captain, but he was a secret agent for the British. He had orders to use any means to get control of any message sent by the commissioners to Congress.
When Hynson received a package of dispatches to be given to Captain Folger onboard his ship, he had a paid expert substitute blank papers for the dispatches without arousing suspicion. Folger took the package, unaware of what had happened. Hynson returned to London, where the British secret service gave him a handsome reward. In the meantime, he wrote a lying letter to the commissioners, relating an imaginary accident that prevented his immediate return to Paris.
Duplicate dispatches were sent soon afterward aboard another vessel, but they were cast into the sea when the vessel was chased by a British cruiser. A third set reached America after news of the Treaty of Alliance had been received. Had the stolen dispatches been delivered as sent, they might have wrecked the cause of independence. They contained news regarding the attitude of France toward America that was so discouraging that Congress, if it had received the dispatches, might have accepted Lord North’s Conciliatory Bills when they arrived in April. America had the added advantage that England was thrown off her guard because the American commissioners had almost given up hope of France forming an alliance with America.
Neither Washington nor Duportail knew any of these facts in April 1778. Congress had spurned the Conciliatory Bills, and the army was eager to attack General Howe in Philadelphia. Washington knew that public opinion and his generals supported him if he attempted any such action.
It began to seem certain that the enemy would soon evacuate Philadelphia without striking a single blow. The question then became, Will they march across New Jersey or go to New York by sea? The scouting parties watched every move intently and faithfully reported every detail to headquarters.
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS
The British commissioners sent to restore friendly relations between England and the Americans reached Philadelphia in early June. They immediately sought to enter into relations with the leaders of Congress. General Washington convened a Council of War on June 17 to discuss the situation.33 As usual, the officers were asked to send their opinions in writing. Duportail wrote,
I think we ought not to quit our position of Valley Forge—before the enemy has evacuated Philadelphia—he must have lost his reason to remain in that city without the means to defend it. Thus, either the intelligence which says there are no more than 2 or 3000 men there, is false—or the English have it in their power by the measures which they have taken, signals agreed upon, number of boats to recross in sufficient force—in case of our advancing to attack them—
The matter is besides reducible to this—Either the English are not going away—or they are—if the former be the case all that has hitherto been done is a feint on their part and conceals some snare into which they would draw us—
if they are really determined to go away—what can we desire more—here is a certain immense advantage—let us not risk the loss of it, by procuring another, which even should we obtain it, would not change our affairs—
However, as we have here 12,000 men and that our position may be defended by a smaller number, I think it would be well to send 1500 men into the Jerseys, to reinforce what is there already—the whole should be commanded by a person well acquainted with the Country—they ought not in general to oppose the enemy in front, on his march—but to follow him on his left flank—
When the English shall have passed the Delaware, we ought in my opinion to move to the banks of that River and prepare to pass it likewise—but certain precautions are necessary—if we learn that the English are advancing hastily towards N. York—we may likewise pass with celerity but if they should halt, or appear to march slowly—in that case I think our troops ought not to pursue the enemy as fast as they could cross the River but post themselves advantageously near the River, and wait till the whole Army has passed in
