Washington's Engineer

prodigious desertion, but the most Considerable and which can be Remedied is the bad situation of the Soldiers, the want of cloathing that (besides he must bear all the intemperatures of the weather) abases his profession in his own eyes and makes him disdain it—the want of provisions During many Days the more hard to be borne as when he has any he has too much—the want of Cleanliness in his tents which causes us shameful sicknesses that are the appendices of the extreme misery. the proofs of what I mention are before our eyes. we see that there are a great deal less depression in some battalions of artillery who are generally better provided with every thing and whose officers take more care of their Soldiers.

i will say no more on this subject because it is within reach of every body i thinck that great many persons have taken notice of it and proposed the means necessary to remedy the inconveniency above mentioned. as for me I have mentioned them only because I had an opportunity to share them in a prospect very striking since every body can perceive that upon this depends most the fate of America.

LE Ch^vr. DUPORTAIL²⁸

In a separate paper, Duportail addresses the several questions proposed and disposes of them by referring to this quoted memorial. He adds the following general observations:

it appears to me that there is a previous important point to be decided because all our operations ought to be subordinate to it—this point is to know, in case of our army suffering a check and not being able to maintain its ground here, in what direction our Retreat is to be made in preference—towards the blue mountains?—on the other side of the Susquehannah?—on the side of the Delaware? by determining this, we shall determine where the grand magazines of the army are to be formed—and then we shall be governed by these two considerations in the choice of our positions as well as in all our movements.

As for the determination of this capital point, viz. whether in case of a check we are to go to the North, to the South, or to the West mature deliberation is required—we are to consider, supposing the communication between the Northern and Southern States cut off, which of the two will be able to furnish the most numerous army, and provide it best with subsistence and stores—

as this is not proposed for our examination I shall say nothing more on it.

CH^vr. du PORTAIL²⁹

FRANCE RECOGNIZES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

This memorial was ready on April 23, several days before Washington received all the responses. While Washington was still considering the responses, Simeon Deane, brother of Commissioner Silas Deane, brought news from Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, on May 1 that France had recognized the independence of the United States and had signed a Treaty of Alliance with her. Deane had been entrusted with the precious treaties and secretly sent from France with them. He crossed on the frigate Sensible, landing safely on the shores of Casco Bay at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. He then proceeded on horseback as quickly as possible toward York, Pennsylvania, where Congress was sitting, spreading the good news as he went. Washington waited for authorization from Congress before announcing the event to the army.

That authorization arrived on May 5, and he proclaimed the following day as a day of rejoicing by the whole army. The day began with religious exercises to thank God for having “raised up among the Princes of the Earth a great and mighty friend.” There would be a feu de joie, cheers, and feasting, and every soldier was to receive a gill of rum.

Duportail gave his written report three days later, as did most of the other officers:

As to the first question—whether we ought to attack General How in his lines—I adhere to what is contained in my last memorial—Unless we have 25 thousand resolute men armed with good muskets and bayonets (for the latter will be necessary here) we ought not to think of it.

It is not in my power to discuss the second relative to the Attack on New York, as I am not acquainted with the topography, nor have ever seen any particular plan of the Town, or the fortifications in its vicinity and at Kingsbridge—I shall remark only that the expedition against N. York ought not to be attempted at the expence of the Army opposed to General How, for if this army should cease to be in condition to make head against the british—the latter would attack it, dissipate it, and march uncontrouled through Pennsilvania and Jersey—it is I presume needless to point out the consequences.

but if without prejudicing this army, we may have besides, a number of Troops which intelligent and experienced Officers acquainted with N. York and its vicinity, judge sufficient to attack it—in that case doubtless the attempt may be made—but measures must be prudently taken.

Lastly, as to the third object of discussion—what are the positions to be taken by this Army acting on the defensive—it appears to me that there is a previous important point to be decided—because all our operations ought to be subordinate to it—this point is, to know, in case of our armys suffering a check and not being able to maintain its ground here, in what direction our Retreat is to be made in preference—towards the blue mountains? on the other side of the Susquehannah? On the other side of the Delaware? by determining this, we shall determine where the grand magazines of the army are to be formed—& then we shall be governed by these two considerations in the choice of our positions as well as in all our movements.

As for the determination of this capital point, vizt Whether, in case of a check we are to go to the North, to the South, or to the West—mature deliberation is required—we are to consider, supposing the communication between the Northern and Southern