I know very well that those who propose to attack the English in their lines, deduce their arguments from the American Troops having attacked and carried lines in the North, but let us take care that successes in the North do not occasion defeats here, where the circumstances are by no means the same. the Northern Troops may perhaps have attacked and carried some portion of Intrenchments, either illy made or injudiciously disposed, or not sufficiently lined with troops;—or perhaps they attacked with vastly superior numbers—but that they ever attacked with a number nearly equal to that of the enemy (which would be our case), Intrenchments such as those of the English at Philadelphia, supported on each flank by a River, secure from being turned and attackable only in front, is what I will never believe. I will add to this by way of explaining my idea, that if I were General Howe, and the Americans should advance to attack me in my lines, I would not give myself the trouble of defending them. I would retire some four or five hundred yards in the rear to some covered place, I would only leave a few poppers to deceive them and make them think they had forced the lines, and when they had once got within and were preparing to push their imaginary advantage, I would fall upon them like a thunderbolt. The aim of this conduct which at first appears whimsical, is as follows: General Howe by defending his lines seriously would soon disgust the Americans and oblige them to desist from the attack, which would produce nothing decisive for the English—whereas if they were once within the Lines and were repulsed to effect a retreat every one must regain the breaches made in the Entrenchments and abbatis, which is not very easy and exposes the greatest part of the army to be slaughtered or made prisoners.
Second Question—
Ought we at the opening of the campaign to approach Philadelphia? No. We ought not. we are even too near already, and for this reason—would we approach the enemy in order to be more certain of fighting him? this is altogether useless—he will certainly come to seek us. The English Minister does not send Genl. Howe with his army into America, to remain inactive in Philadelphia. he must fight us—must endeavor to destroy us. he must conquer the Country; not to do it, is to be conquered himself. it is to give gain of cause to the Americans. therefore General Howe will make it his business to find us. but at present I say, to wait for him ten or twelve miles nearer to or farther from Philadelphia makes for us the difference of having about two thousand men more or less to engage. this is clear. . . . supposing us more than thirty miles from Philadelphia, it will no longer be practicable for him to come upon us in one march, he must leave the City at a great distance; then if we had a sufficient body of militia conveniently posted for the purpose, at about fifteen miles from the Town, this body as soon as Genl. Howe should be at proper distance, might march to the Lines, destroy them, enter Philadelphia and burn the Magazines. To prevent this Genl. Howe would be obliged to leave a sufficiency of troops to guard the Lines and the Town, that is to say, about 2500 or 3000 men—this would be 2000 men less . . . which is certainly worth attention—on the other hand, as long as Genl. Howe has only to move twenty miles from Philadelphia to attack us—his rear, his Communications with the town are secure; we venture to interpose any Troops, as in case of a sudden retrograde motion of the Enemy such parties would be entrapped between his army and the Town or the Rivers. whereas if he were at the distance proposed, we might convert our numerous Militia which cannot be opposed in front of the enemy, to harrassing his Flanks, attacking his baggage, Convoys etc.
These are real advantages; what are those expected from approaching Philadelphia which can counterbalance them? To cover ten or twelve miles of Country? what a pitiful consideration is that in competition with the powerful interests above mentioned—To close in upon the Enemy, and render their subsistence difficult? we ought not to be seduced by this reason—this made us take and occupy the position of White marsh until the month of december, and it was very much better founded at that time, nevertheless what end did it answer—the Enemy still procured nearly all that they wanted—and for our part, by remaining in that camp, in a season already cold, in which the Soldiery suffered greatly, when the proximity of the Enemy and the dread of being attacked, obliged us to keep Tents, baggage, and provision waggons at a distance—by having amused ourselves that Camp, with the absurd plan of attacking the Enemy his Lines with an inferior Army—by having too long delayed to come and build our barracks and form Magazines of every kind—the Camp of White Marsh may be charged with the loss of three or four thousand men perhaps, of which we have been robbed by sickness, misery and Desertion—it may be charged with half the horses of the Army, which emacerated by the hunger they have suffered this winter, will perish on our first movements in the Spring, and leave, may be, our waggons and Artillery in the roads.
We ought therefore in my opinion to keep ourselves between 30 and 40 miles distance from Philadelphia, and since we have the advantage at present of obliging the enemy to march to our own ground to fight us, it is our part always to post
