Churchill’s Mining Plan Approved
Plans for Allied action in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway, continued due to Churchill’s persistence. Information about Allied plans to help the Finns leaked to the press, and their failure to carry them out resulted in a storm of criticism directed at the governments in Britain and France. Daladier’s government fell, and the more aggressive Paul Reynaud replaced him as prime minister. The new French Prime Minister was more congenial to Churchill’s designs. He advocated an aggressive war effort and revisited the question of operations in Scandinavia, including taking control of the Norwegian coast.
Churchill and Reynaud had similar views as to the purpose of operations in Scandinavia, differing only when it came to details. Churchill’s primary goal was to entice the Germans into an area where British naval superiority could bring victories. In the process, the Allies would increase the effectiveness of the blockade, eliminate iron ore shipments to Germany via Norway, and possibly bring Sweden under their sway. This was only different from the views of Reynaud in scope and emphasis. He wanted to send an expedition into Norway in order “to create a new theater of war in which the Germans would use up their men, their materiel, and in particular their air force, and above all, their reserves, especially of petrol.”28 Chamberlain and Halifax were facing severe criticism in the press and from their colleagues, and it seems they were ready to do anything as long as it looked as if they were doing something.
Reynaud and his colleagues came to London on March 28, 1940 for a meeting of the Supreme War Council. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain finally threw his support behind Churchill’s long-standing proposal to cut Germany’s import of iron ore from Narvik. Reynaud readily agreed, and it was decided to mine Norwegian waters beginning April 5. The participants in the meeting agreed that a good pretext would have to be found to alleviate the adverse reactions such an operation would have in neutral countries, particularly in the United States. It was agreed that diplomatic notes should be sent to Norway and Sweden before the mining. These notes would state that the neutrality policies of the Scandinavian countries gave great comfort and help to Germany, and the Allies could not ignore these facts. In effect, this was tantamount to saying, “Either you are with us or against us.” They would remind the recipients that Hitler was diametrically opposed to the autonomy and rights of small nations, a cause for which the armies of both France and Britain were fighting.
The plan called for delivery of these notes to the Norwegian and Swedish governments on April 1 and 2. The mining operations, code-named Wilfred, were thereupon to proceed without further warning to the Norwegians. These operations were expected to result in German retaliation, and British and French troops were held in readiness for a rapid occupation of Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger (Plan R4).
It was hoped that the Norwegians, who were expected to be aware of possible German counter-measures, would not resist the mining, and in fact might welcome the Allied action. The planners were less certain about the Swedish reaction. It was hoped that Allied troops in Narvik would be able to move against the iron ore mines in Sweden and be in position to help that country against a German attack. The plan also called for mining the Luleå harbor with aerial deployed mines.
There can be no doubt that the sympathies of Sweden and Norway were with the Allies; nevertheless, it was over-optimistic to hope that they would not resist an attack. A more pragmatic approach would have been to assume that Sweden, in the face of Allied landings in Narvik, their advance on the iron ore district, and the mining of Luleå, would have acquiesced to German assistance if they thought it necessary. The subsequent Allied operations in North Norway demonstrated clearly that they would have been incapable of reaching the Swedish iron ore districts if faced with Norwegian and Swedish resistance, so Sweden may not even have needed to call on Hitler’s help.
The propaganda value to the German leaders of an Allied attack on two small neutrals was obvious. The Allies may well have lost the moral high ground they had secured after the German aggressions against Czechoslovakia and Poland. Even Churchill’s eloquence may not have been able to overcome the negative effects among neutrals.
It is difficult to understand why such intelligent and experienced policy-makers and military planners could have been so confident of Norwegian and Swedish support for their proposed gross infringement of neutrality. One possible explanation is that the Allies were so captivated by the perceived advantages of widening the war that they glossed over any serious objections.
In order to disrupt river traffic, the Supreme War Council also agreed to drop mines in the Rhine River and its canals at the same time, in an operation code named Royal Marine.
By including an attack directly against Germany as part of the plan, the Allies likely hoped to deflect some of the anticipated criticism that their first offensive operation of the war was carried out against a neutral country rather than the aggressor.
The French War Committee objected to Operation Royal Marine on April 3. Daladier, who was now Minister of Defense, argued that Royal Marine would lead to German reprisals against French industries. He pointed out that the fighter aircraft of the French Air Force would need three months before they were ready to protect French industries against German air attacks.
An irritated Chamberlain dispatched Churchill to Paris
