Evacuation
Admiral Cork and General Auchinleck were preoccupied with planning and executing the evacuation, especially after the recapture of Narvik. In order to give the Norwegian Government time to negotiate the Mowinkel Plan, Ambassador Dormer asked Cork to postpone the evacuation by one or two days. As a result, the first evacuation was scheduled for the night between June 3 and 4.
It was not an easy task to evacuate about 25,000 troops from various points in the Narvik/Harstad area, including disengaging those at the front without giving the enemy or the Norwegians any suspicions about what was transpiring. The bad weather that kept supplies and reinforcements from reaching General Dietl at the end of May and beginning of June also curtailed German air operations, shielded evacuation activities, and kept German bombers away when they could have caused serious damage to the operation.
The evacuated men and equipment were divided into a series of convoys and the first of these, carrying supplies and some French guns and tanks, left before the end of May. Cork had the cruisers Southampton, Vindictive, and Devonshire, the antiaircraft cruiser Coventry, 10 destroyers, one escort, and 13 armed trawlers at his disposal to cover the evacuation. He asked Admiral Forbes on May 31 to place naval escorts at his disposal for the convoys that were to carry the troops to Great Britain. Forbes ordered the aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Glorious to North Norway and they were offshore on June 2. Their mission was first and foremost to cover the evacuation with their fighter aircraft. Recovering the land-based aircraft operating from Bardufoss Airfield was a secondary mission.
Fifteen large troop transports were sent to evacuate the troops, but only 13 were used. To avoid air attacks, these transports rendezvoused 180 miles offshore and approached the coast in groups of two. The troops were ferried to the transports by destroyers and Norwegian fishing vessels. After taking aboard the troops, the transports proceeded back to the rendezvous point. During the nights of June 4-6, 14,700 troops were moved to six transports. These six fast ships made up the first convoy, assembled at the designated rendezvous point, and started out for Great Britain in the evening of June 7 escorted only by the old cruiser Vindictive.
The seven transports of the second troop convoy took aboard 9,800 troops during the nights of June 7 and 8. The convoy departed its rendezvous in the morning of June 9, escorted by the cruisers Southampton, Coventry, and five destroyers. Cork, Auchinleck, and Béthouart were aboard the Southampton. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal escorted by three destroyers attached herself to this convoy.
Eight transports were dispatched to Harstad to bring away equipment. This convoy, which sailed in the evening of June 7, was called the “slow” convoy and was protected by the destroyer Arrow, the sloop Stork, and ten armed trawlers. Another equipment and supply convoy consisting of three transports, one tanker, and a number of Norwegian merchantmen departed Tromsø. Its escorts were the destroyer Campbell and three armed trawlers. Vice-Admiral J. Cunningham in the cruiser Devonshire accompanied the convoy initially but they apparently parted company after reaching the open sea.
The naval protection provided for the convoys was woefully inadequate. Except for the ships coming from Tromsø accompanied by the cruiser Devonshire and one destroyer, the supply and equipment convoys had only armed trawler protection until destroyers that were involved in other duties could join them. The first troop convoy, carrying nearly 15,000 troops, had no escort initially except the aged and partially disarmed Vindictive because all destroyers were used to transport troops from embarkation points to the transports. The second troop convoy, carrying about 10,000 troops, had better protection although still inadequate in case of a German surface attack.
There were several reasons for the inadequate naval protection. First, the British were lulled into a false feeling of security since their numerous convoys between Great Britain and Norway had sailed unmolested for two months. Second, the British naval planners did not believe the German Navy was capable of or willing to make a determined sortie into northern waters, much in the same manner as they had miscalculated on this issue earlier in the year. Much of the convoy routes were outside the range of air protection but except for notifying the commander of Coastal Command in the strictest secrecy that an evacuation was underway, even long-range Sunderland aircraft were not employed to reconnoiter the routes. Finally, Allied naval resources were stretched thin. The events on the western front naturally caused the British to concentrate their ships against a cross-Channel invasion and few resources were diverted from this task. However, there were major units of the Home Fleet in Scapa Flow or in the waters between the Faeroes and Iceland.
The Norwegian Government held its last meeting on Norwegian soil in the afternoon of June 7. The king, crown prince, members of the government, the diplomatic corps, including Ambassador Dormer, boarded the cruiser Devonshire a few hours later.
All serviceable Norwegian naval vessels, aircraft with adequate range, and merchant ships were ordered to Great Britain. The remaining flyable aircraft were ordered into internment in Finland. The 1,500-ton Fridtjof Nansen carried the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Admiral Diesen, General Fleischer, and their families. The ship left Norway in the afternoon of June 8 and arrived in the Faeroe Islands in the morning of June 13 without any mishaps.
Most small warships reached their destination, but not all and not without difficulties. The patrol vessel Nordkapp and the armed trawler Kvitøy became involved in a gun duel with the British ships Raven and Northern Gem. Two hits were registered on Raven before the British ceased fire and headed out to sea.14 There was no serious damage or loss of life
