The evacuation from Norway was not completed without serious losses. The Germans, without any knowledge about the Allied evacuation, had launched a naval operation in northern waters. In mid-May, OKW held a bleak view of the situation in Narvik. It appeared that Dietl would not be able to hold out much longer, that the weather in the Narvik area was too unpredictable for effective reinforcements by air, and that General Feurstein’s troops would not reach Narvik in time to save the 3rd Mountain Division. It was decided to employ German naval forces against the Allied bases and ships in the Harstad-Narvik area in order to reduce the pressure on Dietl’s forces. The mission was expanded on May 16 to include protection of sea supply routes for General Feurstein’s troops. The operation was given the codename Juno.
Admiral Saalwächter issued the directive for the operation to Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, on May 29. The main objective was to enter Andfjord and Vågsfjord to destroy enemy warships, transports, and base facilities. If the fleet commander found a penetration of Ofotfjord to Narvik possible, that would become the main mission. The protection of the sea routes for supplies to the 2nd Mountain Division was a secondary objective. The forces placed at Admiral Marschall’s disposal included the battleships Gneisenau (his flagship) and Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, and the destroyers Karl Galster, Hans Lody, Erich Steinbrinck, and Hermann Schoemann.
The German fleet departed Kiel at 0800 hours on June 4 and proceeded northward through Storebelt. It had a rotating escort of He-115s and 111s for portions of the voyage and aggressive air reconnaissance was carried out from bases in Norway. The fleet passed the latitude of Bergen during the night of June 6 and reached a position at the latitude of Harstad, 200 nautical miles southeast of Jan Mayen in the morning of June 7.
Marschall was informed by Group Command West that an analysis of British radio traffic indicated that the British were unaware of the presence of the German fleet. Group Command West kept Marschall informed about the location and movement of British surface units. A report in the evening on June 6 informed Marschall that the battleship Valiant, the aircraft carriers Glorious and Ark Royal, the cruisers Devonshire, Southampton, Vindictive, Coventry and about 15 destroyers were in North Norway. A message the following morning reported seven ships about 360 nautical miles northwest of Trondheim on a southwesterly course. These were the ships of the first convoy, carrying about 15,000 Allied troops. Marschall was about 110 nautical miles north of the reported sighting when he received the message. These fast liners were already out of reach of the German fleet. Marschall may have assumed that they were empty ships returning to England and the report did not cause him to change his plan to attack the Harstad area.
Heavy units of the Home Fleet were engaged in a chase after two mysterious warships reported by a British armed merchant ship. These mysterious naval vessels were 200 nautical miles northeast of the Faeroe Islands with a course towards the Faeroe-Iceland gap. Admiral Forbes, fearing a German breakout into the Atlantic, sent a strong naval force consisting of the battle cruisers Renown and Repulse, the cruisers Newcastle and Sussex, and five destroyers to chase this sighting. This left the battleships Rodney and Valiant at Scapa Flow. Valiant was sent to meet the first troop convoy, escort it around the Faeroe Islands, and repeat the operation for the second troop convoy two days later.
Marschall assembled his ship captains aboard his flagship in the evening of June 7 to discuss the attack on Harstad, which he intended to carry out during the night of June 8-9. While this conference was taking place, Marschall received a radio report from Group Command West (2155 hours) which read:
Air reconnaissance reports one cruiser, two destroyers, and two large transports at 1325 at the northern entrance to Andfjord on a westerly course at moderate speed, and two destroyers at 1345, 25 nautical miles from Andenes on a northerly course. Two aircraft carriers and two destroyers were dead in the water at 1400 about 45 nautical miles north of Andenes.21
This intelligence was several hours old when received, but it caused Marschall to revise his estimate of the situation. He became convinced that the numerous reports of British ship movements on different courses away from the Norwegian coast indicated that a major movement of warships and transports were underway and that the most important targets would not be found in the fjords around Harstad. An entry in his war journal reads, “It strikes me that that the noteworthy westerly movement [of British ships], may indicate a British evacuation of Norway, and that the convoys on a westerly course present valuable targets.”22
Marschall decided to operate against the British ships that had been sighted and to await further intelligence before moving against Harstad. He informed Saalwächter of his decision at 0400 hours on June 8. Saalwächter disagreed with Marschall’s decision and sent a message stating that the main mission remained as before, the destruction of enemy naval forces in the Harstad-Narvik area. There appears to have been some differences between Saalwächter and the German Naval Staff on this issue, resulting in a compromise which permitted the Hipper and the destroyers to search for the merchant convoy.
The Germans encountered the British tanker Oil Pioneer and its escort, the armed trawler Juniper at 0600 hours on June 8. Hipper sank the trawler with gunfire and 29 survivors were taken aboard the German ships. The Germans removed the crew from Oil Pioneer and sent the ship to the bottom with torpedoes. The two British ships were unable to send out messages warning other ships.
Aircraft were launched by Hipper and Scharnhorst to look for the convoy. This led to the sighting of the passenger vessel Orama and the hospital ship Atlantis. The liner Orama was one of the troop transports not used in the evacuation. It was
