5 Maurice Harvey. Scandinavian Misadventure (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount, 1990), p.33.
6 Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 544-547.
7 Ibid, 544-545.
8 United Kingdom Public Record Office (PRO), War Cabinet (CAB), 66/5 WP (40) 60, 19 February 1940.
9 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 546.
10 See Patrick Cosgrave, Churchill at War, alone 1939–1940 (London, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 120-128.
11 Bjørnsen, Narvik 1940 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1980), p. 55.
12 An investigation by the Norwegian Navy was inconclusive. It could not ascertain with certainty that the sinking of two of the three ships took place within Norwegian territorial waters. They felt relatively certain that Deptford was sunk in territorial waters. This sinking claimed 30 lives, including two Norwegian pilots. It was determined during the Nuremberg Trial that the German submarine U38 had sunk all three ships.
13 Letter from Ambassador Wollbæk on January 12, 1940, quoted in E. A. Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945. 1. Sjøforsvarets nøytralitetsvern 1939-1940. Tysklands og Vestmaktenes planer og forbe-redelser for en Norgesaksjon (Oslo: Den Krigshistoriske Avdeling, Forsvarstaben. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1954–1958), p. 57.
14 François Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 24.
15 The Swedish Cabinet Secretary, Erik Boehman, had a stormy meeting with Pollock, the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Stockholm about the British note. Boehman asked Pollock if the British Government had not already sufficient number of small nations, whose destinies they had ruined, on their conscience (PRO, CAB 66/3, January 7, 1940). Bjørn Prytz, the Swedish Ambassador in London, espoused a completely different line after having delivered the Swedish protest to Halifax. In commenting on Boehman’s outburst in a conversation with Charles Hambro in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Prytz mentioned that he personally felt that the British should carry out their threatened action. He stated that the Norwegians would only complain loudly and try to blame Sweden (PRO, FO 371, 24820 WM (40) 7 CA, January 9, 1940).
16 Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly (eds), Time Unguarded. The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940 (New York: David MacKay Company, Inc., 1963), p., 228.
17 Sir John Kennedy, The Business of war: The War Narrative of Sir John Kennedy (Edited by Bernard Fergusson. London: Hutchinson, 1957), p. 49.
18 Ibid, 48.
19 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 1, p. 69.
20 The armed merchant ship Westerwald, flying the German naval flag, had been allowed to proceed through Norwegian territorial waters without inspection after a decision by the Norwegian Foreign Office. It was also allowed to proceed through the restricted area around Bergen under escort during daylight hours.
21 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 561.
22 Each torpedo boat had a crew of 21. Kjell had one 76mm (3-inch) gun and three torpedo tubes. Skarv had two 47mm cannons and three torpedo tubes. The patrol boat Firern arrived on the scene during the confrontation. This 247-ton vessel with a crew of 12 and a single 76mm gun did not change the enormous odds facing the Norwegians.
23 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940–1945, vol. 1, p.71.
24 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 562. The British later claimed that Captain Vian suggested the joint escort to Bergen to Lieutenant Halvorsen during their conference. Halvorsen denied that any such exchange had taken place. Churchill sent his orders to Vian at 1725 hours and it is therefore unlikely that Vian had these instructions at the time he talked to Halvorsen.
25 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol.1, p. 90.
26 Churchill, 564.
27 Steen, 1:99. It should be noted that Germany also violated Norwegian neutrality during this period. A German submarine–U21–ran aground in Norwegian territorial waters on March 27, and it was captured and interned. A German aircraft made a forced landing in Norway on April 3. The crew destroyed the aircraft before they were captured by Norwegian forces.
28 Christopher Buckley, Norway. The Commandos. Dieppe, 13.
29 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 584.
30 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol 1, p. 166.
31 Ibid, vol 1, p. 106.
32 Bjørnsen, Narvik, pp. 222-223.
33 Ibid, p. 220.
34 The actual composition of the various cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas changed frequently, as ships were attached or detached.
35 PRO, CAB 65/6 WM (40) 83, April 6, 1940. Also, Bjørnsen, Narvik, pp. 182 and 223.
36 Kersaudy, 26.
Chapter 2
1 Basil H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1971), p. 52.
2 Wolfgang Wegener, Die Seestrategie des Weltkriges (Berlin: E. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), p. 49.
3 The Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 fixed German naval tonnage at one-third of the British fleet. However, the German Navy’s desire to play a major role is demonstrated by the Z Plan, which called for the construction, by 1945, of 10 battleships, 13 pocket battleships (Panzerschiffe), four aircraft carriers, five heavy cruisers, 44 light cruisers, 68 destroyers, 249 large, medium, and small submarines, and 90 torpedo boats. Hans-Martin Ottmer, Weserübung. Der deutsche Angriff auf Dänemark und Norwegen im April 1940 (Oldenburg: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1994), p.13.
4 Kenneth P. Hansen, “Raeder Versus Wegener: Conflict in German Naval Strategy,” in Naval War College Review, September 22, 2005. Raeder was godfather to one of Wegener’s children and describes him as an intimate friend in his memoirs, but they developed such an animosity that Raeder refused to deliver the eulogy at Wegener’s funeral in 1956.
5 Quoted in Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, and Innovation. A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888-1940. (Lunde: Esselte Studium), pp. 286-287.
6 Gemzell writes, “Moreover, the results of our investigation make it possible to establish with certainty that, from the start of the war, Carls was greatly involved in the Scandinavian question and advanced opinion about the importance of bases in Denmark and Norway.” (Organization, p. 381)
7 Erich Raeder, My Life (Henry W.
