There is evidence to support Hewins’ claim. Admiral Schniewind, Chief of Staff of SKL (a position comparable to that of Fritz Halder on the General Staff), has written that many important issues were classified “political,” kept from the SKL, and handled by Schulte Mönting. Schniewind claims Schulte Mönting arranged the contact with Quisling.18 Raeder’s adjutant, Freiwald, worked for Schulte Mönting and he reports that Schulte Mönting and Viljam Hagelin, a Norwegian business executive who was Quisling’s representative in Germany, were old friends.19 Hans-Dietrich Loock claims that there were close contacts between Schulte Mönting, Rosenberg’s people, Quisling, and Hagelin.20
Raeder related at his trial that Schulte Mönting informed him that Quisling had asked for a meeting. This request came through Hagelin who apparently had been sent by Rosenberg. In the same testimony, Raeder claims, “Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr Rosenberg, except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up to that point.”21
It was natural for Raeder, on trial for his role in the attack on Norway, to downplay his connection with Rosenberg and Quisling. However, it is not believable that Raeder had not heard about Quisling in the many reports from Schreiber, his naval attaché in Norway, who had excellent contacts with Quisling and his organization. In addition, Raeder had probably heard about Quisling from his Chief of Staff, Schulte Mönting.
Raeder was an astute politician, and his motive in arranging the meeting with Quisling through Rosenberg may have been calculated to ensure that any unpleasantness following the meeting of Hitler and Quisling fell firmly at Rosenberg’s door. However, by participating in these meetings, Raeder assured himself of some of the credit in case the enterprise proved successful.
Hagelin accompanied Quisling to the meeting with Raeder. Quisling told Raeder that the Norwegian foreign policy was “controlled by the well-known Jew, Hambro (President of the Norwegian Parliament), a great friend of Hore-Belisha (British Secretary of State for War),” and that British landings near Stavanger and Kristiansand were under consideration. Quisling claimed that Hambro and his followers were counting on Britain to keep the Soviets out of Scandinavia, but he saw it as a pretext for Britain gaining a foothold in Norway. Quisling and his followers wished “to anticipate any possible British step in this direction by placing the necessary bases at the disposal of the German Wehrmacht.”22 Admiral Raeder did not comment on Quisling’s statements but agreed to bring the matter to Hitler’s attention.
Rosenberg prepared a memorandum on Quisling’s visit. While the memorandum recognizes the growing anti-German feeling in Norway, due partly to the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, it is full of praise for Quisling and overestimated highly that individual’s influence and support among the Norwegian people and within the Norwegian Army.
Admiral Raeder made good on his promise to bring the matter to Hitler’s attention by briefing Hitler on December 12 in the presence of Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the OKW, Major General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations at OKW, and Hitler’s naval adjutant, Lt. Commander Karl von Püttkammer. Raeder’s briefing is in agreement with Rosenberg’s memorandum with respect to what Quisling is alleged to have said, but it is less laudatory. With respect to Quisling’s offer of cooperation, Raeder stated, “It is impossible to know with such offers how much the people concerned wish to further their own party schemes and how important German interests are to them.”23
Raeder recommended a cautious approach to the issue. He advised that Norway must not be allowed to fall into British hands, as such an event “could be decisive for the outcome of the war.” It is alleged that he went as far as telling Hitler that Quisling believed there was an agreement between Norway and Great Britain about an occupation of Norway.24 Raeder pointed out that British occupation of Norway would most likely turn Sweden against Germany and this could jeopardize Germany’s naval position in the Baltic and prevent German ships from reaching the high sea. The admiral tempered this by stating that German occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast would result in strong British countermoves, that the navy could not cope with the intense surface warfare that would surely develop over a sustained period, and that the free flow of iron ore from Narvik could be interrupted.
Hitler concurred that a British occupation of Norway was unacceptable, but stated that he wanted to hear Rosenberg’s opinion on the advisability of a personal meeting with Quisling. Raeder concluded his briefing by asking that, if Hitler was favorably impressed with Quisling, the OKW should “be permitted to make plans with Q. for preparing and executing the occupation” by peaceful means or by force.25
Hitler’s decision to receive Quisling, pending a recommendation from Rosenberg, resulted in consultations between Rosenberg and Raeder on December 13, and a letter from Rosenberg to Raeder stating that he would take Quisling to meet Hitler on December 14.26 Those present at the first meeting between Hitler and Quisling included Raeder, Keitel, Hagelin, and Hans Wilhelm Scheidt, head of Rosenberg’s Northern Department. Rosenberg was unable to attend because he had sustained an injury, but he had prepared a memorandum for Hitler on Quisling and his party, and Scheidt served as Rosenberg’s representative at the meeting. Raeder also visited Rosenberg at his home in the morning of December 14, before taking the two Norwegians to see Hitler.27
Although no record of this relatively long meeting has surfaced, Hitler must have been favorably impressed with Quisling, since he ordered OKW to “investigate how one can take possession of Norway.”28 The investigation was to focus on two alternative schemes. One involved minor German military support for a coup by Quisling and his followers, while the second was a military occupation of the country.
Churchill writes that Quisling arrived in Berlin with a “detailed plan” for political action in Norway and that “Hitler’s decision to invade Norway … was taken on
