If Hitler’s order to the OKW to study the matter is viewed as a decision to invade Norway, then the December 22 British War Cabinet directions to the Military Chiefs to plan for operations in Norway must be viewed in the same way. Furthermore, the British Chiefs presented their plans on January 2 and the Allied Supreme War Council was briefed on the final plans on February 5. The German plan was briefed to Hitler on February 29 and his directive was issued the following day. The two events—Hitler’s order after meeting Quisling and the War Cabinet’s directive to the Military Chiefs on December 22—should be viewed as part of contingency planning and were not invasion decisions.
Telford Taylor writes that there were two more meetings between Hitler, Quisling, and Hagelin, on 16 and 18 December. Most sources, including Quisling’s writings, mention only two meetings in total, those on 14 and 18 December. Taylor may have based his statement on Raeder’s testimony at the Nuremberg Trial where he states, “The Fuehrer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not present.”30 I believe there were only two meetings, on 14 and 18 December. The second meeting lasted about one hour. Hitler let it be known at the meeting that his preference was for a neutral Norway, but that if the enemy tried to extend the war into this area, he would be forced to react accordingly. He promised monetary support for Quisling and his followers, but Hitler did not inform Quisling that he had directed OKW to explore the feasibility of occupying Norway.
The primary sources of information we have about the two meetings Hitler had with Quisling are from the testimony of Raeder at Nuremberg and Quisling’s writings from prison. We should treat these with care. The charges against Raeder dealt largely with his role in planning the attack on Norway. It is reasonable to assume that he tried to downplay his role in the events leading up to Hitler’s decision. Likewise, Quisling wrote his account while in a Norwegian prison awaiting trial and execution for treason. An excerpt from Quisling’s writing on this subject might be worth repeating:
During all this [discussions with Hitler, Raeder, etc.] there was no question of any German occupation of Norway, certainly not of my giving any guidance and advice with a view to such an occupation. Hitler was, however, emphatically clear that if Norway did not vindicate her neutrality vis-à-vis Great Britain, Germany would attack with all her power. One may take if for granted that the German authorities themselves knew best how to carry out such a counter-action and that they were not willing to discuss it with a foreigner whom they were meeting for the first time….
Rosenberg’s writings about the political preparations for Germany’s operations in Norway, and other more circumstantial evidence, suggest that Quisling not only warned the Germans against real or imagined British plans in Scandinavia but also offered his and his party’s assistance to the Germans. The Germans were eager to use Quisling as a source of information, but they were not willing to compromise their thoughts or plans by sharing them with the leader of a small political party with little credibility in its own country. They merely supplied money to Quisling’s party and received periodic reports about conditions in Norway.
There is no evidence to suggest that the information received from Quisling had any major effect on German preparations, or that Quisling had any knowledge about Germans plans. Claims by some British authors, such as Churchill and Adams, that Quisling provided the Germans with detailed information on the Norwegian military and its facilities, are not supported by subsequent developments or by information in German sources. The fact that German intelligence was wrong on several issues well known to Quisling and his followers suggests that they provided little or no information of military value.
It made good sense for the Germans to keep Quisling in the dark. It would have been extremely foolish and reckless for the Germans to share their plans with Quisling and his followers, or to request the kind of information that would lead them to the obvious conclusion that an invasion was being prepared. Writers during and after World War II have blown the effect of Quisling and his followers on German plans and operations all out of proportion. It served as a convenient explanation by both the British and Norwegians for an embarrassing military defeat, but there is almost no evidence to support the various claims that are made to support this theory.31
Studie Nord
The wheels were now in motion. In response to Hitler’s directive, Jodl’s staff made a preliminary examination titled Studie Nord that outlined a plan for the occupation of Norway. A very small group headed by Colonel (later General) Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of the OKW operations staff, completed this study. Warlimont recommended that a staff headed by a Luftwaffe general with a chief of staff from the navy and an operations officer from the army should further develop the study. Hitler had instructed Keitel and Jodl to keep knowledge of the Norwegian study severely restricted, and this instruction was evidently followed to the letter.
Raeder recognized that the Norwegian venture carried great risk and that a truly neutral Norway would best serve Germany’s interests. Nevertheless, he kept up the psychological pressure on Hitler. The SKL received numerous alarming reports in December 1939 from Schreiber. These reports pointed to disturbing signs of British plans to land in Norway, using help to Finland as a pretext.
Raeder warned Hitler on December 30, 1939, in the presence of Keitel and Püttkammer, that under no circumstances should Norway be allowed to fall into Great Britain’s hands. He suggested that the British could carry out an “unobtrusive occupation”
