This three-way command relationship existed not only for the passage and landing but also for the entire operation. A territorial command for the air force was established, and this with General Erhard Milch’s Fifth Air Fleet absorbed the X Air Corps on April 12. All naval units in Norway after the landings would come under the leadership of Admiral Boehm, with headquarters in Oslo. He established subordinate naval commands in Bergen and Kristiansand.
At the various landing sites, an army officer was designated as commander of the landing forces and for operations to secure the landing site. The senior officer present from either the navy or the army would assume command after the landings were carried out. However, he could only issue orders to the other services within his area in emergencies.
Von Falkenhorst had his headquarters in Hamburg during the actual attack and was directly subordinate to Hitler through OKW. A group was established at OKW, including officers from each service, to serve as a link with Group XXI and as a coordination point, particularly for the flow of reinforcements and supplies after the initial landings. X Air Corps, under Lieutenant General Hans Geissler, also had its initial headquarters in Hamburg. The command and control of naval operations for the attack was divided. OKM decided that the operations in the Baltic, Kattegat, and part of Skagerrak should be under Admiral Carls with his headquarters in Kiel. Operations in the North Sea were under Admiral Saalwächter with his headquarters in Wilhelmshaven.
The fact that the planning for and conduct of the operation proceeded relatively smoothly must be attributed to the personalities and professionalism of the officers at the working level. This is also the conclusion reached by Group XXI in its after-action report:
That the commands and troop contingents of the three armed forces branches worked together almost without friction cannot be credited to purposeful organization of the commanding staff. It was, instead, entirely an achievement of the personalities involved who knew how to cooperate closely in order to overcome the inadequacies of the organization.53
The invasion plan called for one major naval expedition along the Norwegian coast to land the lead elements of the three assault divisions. The assault force designated for the attack was divided into six task forces in addition to a naval covering force. The assault troops were carried on warships. These task forces were scheduled to arrive at the entrance to all target ports shortly after 0400 hours, and the assaults were to be carried out within 30 minutes of arrival.
The targets were geographically separated by about 1,000 miles of water, so the ambitious timetable required not only precision planning and execution but also considerable luck. The dangers for the Germans were much greater in Narvik and Trondheim than at the other ports, which meant that those units would have to be self-sufficient until they linked-up with forces landed in other parts of the country. The Germans might get away with one naval sortie to Narvik, but a second expedition along the coast was completely out of the question. The situation in Oslo and the other parts of southern Norway was considered more favorable since those operations would, at least in part, be under the protective umbrella of German aircraft after the initial landing. A rapid build-up of forces in Oslo was considered feasible, and these forces would push inland as quickly as possible to prevent or disrupt Norwegian mobilization and to establish overland connections with other beachheads.
Task Forces 1 and 2, destined for Narvik and Trondheim respectively, sailed together, escorted by the battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Each battleship had a crew of 1,800. Admiral Wilhelm Marshall, Fleet Commander, should have commanded this combined force but he was ill and Vice Admiral Guenther Lütjens assumed command. The two battleships and the ships destined for Trondheim and Narvik were to sail together to designated locations. The battleships would then proceed on a northerly or northwesterly course in an attempt to draw any major British surface forces away from the Norwegian coast. The two battleships, Task Force 1, and Task Force 2 departed various north German ports shortly before midnight on April 6, joined forces at 0200 hours on April 7, and proceeded toward their destination. The fleet was given a strong fighter escort during daylight hours on April 7.
Task Force 1, commanded by Captain Friedrich Bonte, who flew his flag from the destroyer Wilhelm Heidkamp, consisted of ten destroyers. There were 3,140 officers and crew aboard the ten destroyers. The assault elements of Task Force 1 were commanded by Major General Eduard W.C. Dietl and consisted of the reinforced 139th Mountain Regiment, advanced headquarters and staff elements of the 3rd Mountain Division, and various support elements. The approximately 2,000 troops were distributed equally on the ten destroyers.
The naval elements of Task Force 2, under the command of Captain Hellmuth Heye, consisted of the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers. These ships had a crew of 2,860 officers and men. The landing force, commanded by Colonel Weiss, consisted of two battalions of the 138th Mountain Regiment, an engineer company, artillery battery, and support units. Total strength of the landing force was 1,700.
Task Force 3, which had the mission of capturing Bergen, departed Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven shortly before midnight on April 7. It consisted of the light cruisers Köln and Königsberg, the naval artillery training ship Bremse, two torpedo boats, five motor torpedo boats, and the support ship Karl Peters. The ships were manned by 2,420 officers and men and were commanded by Rear Admiral Huber Schmundt. The Bergen landing force, commanded by Major General Tittel, consisted of elements of the 69th Division staff, two battalions of the 159th Infantry Regiment, two engineer companies, two naval artillery batteries, and various support units. The total strength was 1,900.
The mission of Task Force 4
