The senior officers in the German Navy had served during the four years of relative inactivity of the High Seas Fleet in World War I, imposed largely by geographical limitations. They had seen the effects of the previous war’s blockade on the German people and witnessed the drop in morale in the navy that eventually led to a mutiny of the High Seas Fleet. They were determined to avoid a similar situation arising in World War II. Their desire for bases in Norway was driven by a wish to complicate British blockade measures and open the door to the Atlantic.
Raeder shared this view, but he was in less of a hurry to acquire those bases. However, the urgency of acquiring them increased as evidence suggested that the British intended to seize the bases for themselves. Raeder was encouraged by Hitler’s approval of the Z Plan, but realized that if the iron ore supplies were limited the navy might suffer as a result of priority being given to the demands of other branches of the services. In the short term, therefore, his primary concern was to keep Swedish iron ore flowing to the benefit of the naval building program. Hitler’s main concerns were the uninterrupted flow of iron ore, not primarily for the benefit of the navy, but to the benefit of the German armament industry as a whole. He was also concerned with the air threat to Germany by Allied air forces operating from bases in Scandinavia. The other military services in Germany were far less in favor of the Scandinavian operations because they viewed them as distractions from the main effort in the west.
Hitler certainly had the ground and air assets to undertake the Scandinavian operations, as well as troops trained and capable of operating in the arctic mountain wilderness. The navy did not have the resources required by a thoughtful military plan, particularly as it involved Narvik and, to a lesser, extent Trondheim. The Germans could have carried out the operation in Norway without landing in Narvik, but it would have been more difficult. For the German Navy, it was an extremely high-risk affair. While the Allies risked losing ships, the Germans ventured their whole navy. Whether or not this happened hinged on secrecy and slow, irresolute, and faulty reactions by the Norwegians and the Allies, hardly the assumptions required in a prudent military plan.
The debate over motives and capabilities will never be settled. However, Churchill’s statement that the two admiralties thought in precision along the same lines and in correct strategy—while an excellent one-liner—fails to tell the story.
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GNORED
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ASSING IN THE
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“I wish I could believe this story. German intervention in Scandinavia is just what we want.”
NOTATION BY LAURENCE COLLIER, A HIGH BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL, ON RECEIPT OF NEWS THAT THE GERMANS WERE ABOUT TO INVADE NORWAY.
German Intelligence and Security
Already on January 4, the Abwehr reported that one division of alpine troops had been pulled out of the Maginot Line and the agent who made the report concluded that these troops were destined for northern Europe. On March 7, the Germans learned that 16,000 troops were being redeployed from France to England. The increased British naval activities off the Norwegian coast and repeated violations of that country’s territorial waters in March and early April were unmistakable signs that something more ambitious than troop redeployment might be afoot.
One source for German intelligence was Taylor G. Kent, who worked in the code room of the American Embassy in London. Since October 1939, he had forwarded important messages that came through the deciphering machine to the German Embassy in Rome. From there they were sent to Berlin. These messages included private communications between Churchill and Roosevelt.1
Reports received by the German intelligence services, particularly the SKL, indicated that the Allies would invade Norway and possibly Sweden even after the conclusion of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union. There were indications, supported by notations in the SKL journal on 15 March, that the peace had postponed but not altered Allied plans. These notations were based on intercepted and partially deciphered radio messages. A message from the British Admiralty to the commander of the Home Fleet on March 14 indicated that a large-scale embarkation of troops had been completed. The transports were prepared to sail and the troops were ready to board. The transports were to leave British Channel ports and proceed north on 48 to 80 hours notice depending on the political situation. Raeder and the SKL believed that Weserübung had developed into a race with similar British plans and they urged that landing operations be undertaken as quickly as possible. This influenced the selection of April 7 as the day of attack, later changed to April 9.
While Hitler’s decision on March 26 to launch the invasion in early April was primarily due to anticipated weather conditions, the correctness of that decision in Hitler’s mind was reinforced by continuous reports of Allied intentions to land in Norway. The Germans learned about the decision taken by the Allied Supreme War Council on March 28 and German intelligence intercepted a diplomat’s report on March 30 of a conversation with Paul Reynaud. This report indicated that the Allies would launch operations in northern Europe within the next few days.2
Hitler had placed stringent restrictions on the number of individuals who knew about the impending operations. However, this circle had to be widened as the date for the operation drew closer. The Germans tried to disguise their troop movements as maneuvers and some troops were left in the barracks to suggest ongoing normal activity. The
