out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; until at length
Han Hsin and his colleague
張耳 Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of
Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of
Han. When the
Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the
Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the
Han army fell on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a great number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King
歇 Ya himself … After the battle, some of
Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: “In the
Art of War we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of
Sun Tzǔ and
Tʽai Kung. See
chapter IX, and
note 445.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?” The general replied: “I fear you gentlemen have not studied the
Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleagues round. What says the Military Classic (
經)?—‘Swoop down on the marketplace and drive the men off to fight’ (
敺巿人而戰之). [This passage does not occur in the present text of
Sun Tzǔ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have been a general
débandade, and it would have been impossible to do anything with them.” The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: “These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of.” (See
Chʽien Han Shu,
ch. 34,
ff. 4, 5.)
↩
Danger has a bracing effect. ↩
Tsʽao Kung says: 佯愚也 “Feign stupidity”—by an appearance of yielding and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yü’s note makes the meaning clear: “If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay of purpose that he may carry out his intention.” The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack. ↩
I understand the first four words to mean “accompanying the enemy in one direction.” Tsʽao Kung says: 幷兵向敵 “unite the soldiers and make for the enemy.” But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible. Mei Yao-chʽên is the only commentator who seems to have grasped the meaning: 隨敵一向然後發伏出奇. The Tʽu Shu reads 并力. ↩
Literally, “after a thousand li.” ↩
Always a great point with the Chinese. ↩
The Tʽu Shu has 是謂巧於成事, and yet another reading, mentioned by Tsʽao Kung, is 巧攻成事. Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence, after having thus translated the two preceding: “Discover the enemy’s intentions by conforming to his movements. When these are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even though he be one hundred leagues distant.” ↩
政舉 does not mean “when war is declared,” as Capt. Calthrop says, not yet exactly, as Tsʽao Kung paraphrases it, 謀定 “when your plans are fixed,” when you have mapped out your campaign. The phrase is not given in the Pʽei Wên Yün Fu. There being no causal connection discoverable between this and the preceding sentence, 是故 must perforce be left untranslated. ↩
夷 is explained by Mei Yao-chʽên as 滅塞. ↩
The locus classicus for these tallies is Chou Li, XIV fol. 40 (Imperial edition): 門關用符節貨賄用璽節道路用旌節. The generic term thus appears to be 節, 符 being the special kind used at city-gates and on the frontier. They were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate (司門 or 司關. Cf. the 封人 “border-warden” of Lun Yü III 24, who may have had similar duties.) When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorised to open the gate and let the traveller through. ↩
Either to or from the enemy’s country. ↩
Show no weakness, and insist on your
