Πᾶς ἐστι νόμος … πόλεως συνθήκη κοινή: “Every law … is the general compact of the city.” (Demosthenes, Against Aristogeiton.) ↩
Νόμος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἕυρεσις: “The law is the finding out and specifying that which really is.” (Stobaeus on Plato’s Minos.) ↩
Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει: “Justice is founded in nature, is unalterable, and is equally in force everywhere; in the same manner as the fire burns here and in Persia.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) ↩
Even the Heathens believed that above all human κηρύγματα: “edicts” there were ἄγραπτα κᾀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα: “unwritten and unalterable laws of the Gods,” which mortals ought not to transgress: οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κᾀχθες ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ πότε ζῇ τᾶυτα: “because these are in force, not only for a day or two, but forever.” (Sophocles, Oedipus Rex.) Nec si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra … legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ … attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, et ad rectè faciendum impellens, et à delicto avocans: quæ non cum denique incipit lex esse, cùm scripta est, sed tum cùm orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina: “Wherefore if, in the reign of Tarquin, there were no written laws at Rome against whoredom, yet nevertheless Sextus Tarquinius acted contrary to an eternal law when he ravishd Lucretia; for there is such a thing as reason, which proceeds from the nature of things, and which urges us to do that which is right, and forbids us to commit any crimes; which (reason) does not then begin to be a law when it is written down, but was from the beginning; that is, it began when the divine mind began.” (Cicero, De Legibus.) ↩
Si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciunt, ut, quæ mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac salutaribus? aut cùr, cum jus ex injuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? “If the opinions or commands of weak and foolish men are of so great force as to overturn the nature of things by their majority; why do they not establish it by a law, that those things which are evil and pernicious shall become good and advantageous? And why cannot the same law make the things that are good evil, as well as make an injury a lawful thing?” (Cicero, De Legibus.) ↩
In person, or by proxy. ↩
Plato says when any man has seen our form of government, etc., and remains under it, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ὴμῖν: “that then we say, such a one does indeed agree with us.” (Crito.) ↩
Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia justa esse, quæ scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus. … Si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum, jurà constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur: “That’s very foolish indeed, to imagine that all those things are just which are establishd by the decrees and laws of the people. … If right were made by the ordinances of the people, by the decrees of princes, or by the sentences of judges, it would be right to rob on the highway; it would be right to commit adultery; it would be right to forge wills; supposing all these were allowed by the majority and by the decrees of the populacy.” (Cicero, De Legibus.) ↩
Manicheans of old, and some moderns. ↩
Like those particularly of Julius Caesar, of whom it is reported that anamadversâ apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quasi pertæsus ignaviam suam, quod nihil dum à se memorabile actum esset in ætate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset: “upon viewing the statue of Alexader the Great in the temple of Hercules, he gave a sigh, as it were, to reproach his own sluggishness that he had done no memorable thing, at an age when Alexander had conquered the whole world.” (Suetonius, Lives of the Caesars.) ↩
Some go to war ὣσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων: “in order to hunt down and worry men.” (Plutarch, Life of Alexander.) Not out of necessity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war, Πολεοῦμεν, ἵνα εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν: “We go to war, that we may procure peace.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Ita bellum suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud quàm pax quæsita videatur: “War should be undertaken in such a manner that nothing else but peace may be seen to be aimed at by it.” (Cicero, De Officiis.) ↩
Οὶ ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον, κ.τ.λ.: “Men do not marry for the sake of having children only, but for all the other purposes of life.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) ↩
Ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν: “It is natural for a man to love a woman; for man is as much made for the society of a woman, as for the society of each other.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Ὡς γὰρ ἡ μαγνῆτις λίθος … πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὸν σίδηρον ἕλκει· οὕτω τὸ τοῦ θήλεος σῶμα … τὸ τοῦ ἄῤῥενος σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ἕλκει: “For as the lodestone draws iron, so the woman attracts the man to unite with her.” (St. Basil.)
