We are at present trying to secure (1) a more efficient government, and (2) a real not a nominal control of government by the people. The tendency to transfer power to the American citizenship, and the tendency towards efficient government by the employment of experts and the concentration of administrative authority, are working side by side in American political life today. These two tendencies are not opposed, and if the main thesis of this book has been proved, it is understood by this time why they are not opposed. Democracy I have said is not antithetical to aristocracy, but includes aristocracy. And it does not include it accidentally, as it were, but aristocracy is a necessary part of democracy. Therefore administrative responsibility and expert service are as necessary a part of genuine democracy as popular control is a necessary accompaniment of administrative responsibility. They are parallel in importance. Some writers seem to think that because we are giving so much power to our executives, we must safeguard our “liberty” by giving at the same time ultimate authority to the people. While this is of course so in a way, I believe a truer way of looking at the matter is to see centralized responsibility and popular control, not one dependent on the other, but both as part of the same thing—our new democracy.
Both our city and our state governments are being reorganized. We have long felt that city government should be concentrated in the hands of a few experts. The old idea that any honest citizen was fit for most public offices is rapidly disappearing. Over three hundred cities have adopted the commission form of government, and there is a growing movement for the city-manager plan. But at the same time we must have a participant electorate. We can see three stages in our thinking: (1) our early American democracy thought that public offices could be filled by the average citizen; (2) our reform associations thought that the salvation of our cities depended on expert officials; (3) present thinking sees the necessity of combining expert service and an active electorate.75
The increasing number of states which are holding, or are considering holding, constitutional conventions for the reconstruction of state governments shows the widespread dissatisfaction with our state machinery. The principal object of nearly all of these conventions is increased efficiency through concentration of responsibility. In our fear of abuse of power there has been no one to use power; we must change this if we are to have administrative efficiency. Most of the schemes for a reconstruction of state governments are based on (1) concentration of executive leadership in the hands of the governor, and (2) direct responsibility to the electorate. The former implies appointment of administrative officials by the governor, an executive budget, and readjustment in the relation of executive and legislative so that the governor can introduce and defend bills. The latter necessitates the ability of the electorate to criticize work done and plans proposed.
Therefore the tendency towards an effective responsibility through the increased power of our executive does not mean that less is required of citizens, but more. To the initiative, referendum and recall is to be added the general control by the people themselves of our state policies. Executive leadership may reduce the power of legislatures, but it will increase the power of the electorate both directly and indirectly: indirectly by weakening party organization, and directly by giving the people more and more control. It has been suggested, for instance, that in any dispute between governor and legislature the people might be called on to decide, either directly by passing on the proposed legislation itself, or by a new election. At any rate ultimate control must somehow be with the people. That this was not sufficiently provided for in the New York constitution submitted to the voters of New York a few years ago was one of the reasons for its rejection. What frightened the men of New York was undoubtedly the increased power of the state administrative without any corresponding increase in democratic control. To increase at the same time democratic control and administrative responsibility, while not an easy thing to do, is the task of our new constitutions.
With regard to direct government we are at present making two mistakes: first, in thinking that we can get any benefit from it if it is operated from within the party organization;76 secondly, in thinking that it is merely to record, that it is based on counting, on the preponderance of votes.
The question staring us in the face in American politics today is—What possible good can direct government do us if party organization remains in control? The movement for direct primaries, popular choice of United States senators, presidential primaries, initiative and referendum, the recall etc., will bear little fruit unless something is done at the same time to break the power of the party. Many people tell us that our present party system, with its method of caucuses, conventions, bosses etc., has failed, and they are now looking to the direct primary as their
