Dialogues

better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case. Athenian Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. But I now quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good. Cleinias Your remark, Stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly deny it. Athenian Here is another case for consideration;⁠—in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority. Cleinias Very possibly. Athenian And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not now considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws. Cleinias What you say, Stranger, is most true. Megillus Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone. Athenian Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking? Cleinias Certainly. Athenian Now, which would be the better judge⁠—one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy anyone, but reconciled them to one another forever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends. Cleinias The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator. Athenian And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war. Cleinias Very true. Athenian And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, everyone would wish to be quit of as soon as possible? Cleinias He would have the latter chiefly in view. Athenian And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or that peace and friendship should be reestablished, and that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies? Cleinias Everyone would desire the latter in the case of his own state. Athenian And would not that also be the desire of the legislator? Cleinias Certainly. Athenian And would not everyone always make laws for the sake of the best? Cleinias To be sure. Athenian But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace. Cleinias I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian. Athenian

I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest. Please follow me and the argument closely:⁠—And first I will put forward Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all men was most eager about war: Well, he says,

“I sing not, I care not, about any man,”

even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave warrior. I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them.

Megillus Very true. Cleinias And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete. Athenian Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds⁠—one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying,