Dialogues

the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years. Anyone who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of the sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth of all of them. Cleinias What is it? Athenian That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity cooperate with Him in the government of human affairs. There is, however, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also; for I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having the aid of the pilot’s art. You would agree? Cleinias Yes. Athenian And does not a like principle apply to legislation as well as to other things: even supposing all the conditions to be favourable which are needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator must from time to time appear on the scene? Cleinias Most true. Athenian In each case the artist would be able to pray rightly for certain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then only require to exercise his art? Cleinias Certainly. Athenian And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were bidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so? Cleinias Of course. Athenian And the legislator would do likewise? Cleinias I believe that he would. Athenian “Come, legislator,” we will say to him; “what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?” How ought he to answer this question? Shall I give his answer? Cleinias Yes. Athenian He will say⁠—“Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that quality which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.” Cleinias I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance? Athenian Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of whom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods.390 I think that you must understand my meaning. Cleinias Certainly. Athenian Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny. Cleinias By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine? Athenian There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature? Cleinias You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature? Athenian Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has done all that he ever does for a state which he desires to be eminently prosperous; He has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase, and diminishes with the diminution of the number. Cleinias You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect form of government takes place most easily; less easily when from an oligarchy; and, in the third degree, from a democracy: is not that your meaning? Athenian Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state; and when the ruling element is numerically small, and at the same time very strong, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid. Cleinias How? I do not understand. Athenian And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny? Cleinias No, and I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one. Athenian And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking. Cleinias What do you mean? Athenian I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct, praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others, and degrading those who disobey. Cleinias But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set