Dialogues

and others who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable⁠—at any rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be good! Cleinias Excellent; let us do as you say. Athenian Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us, if you please, consider these matters. Cleinias By all means. Athenian Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves. Cleinias What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us? Athenian I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this. Cleinias They would be quite right. Athenian Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which are just are fair and honourable, in the term “all” we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions. Cleinias And what is the inference? Athenian The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable. Cleinias Certainly. Athenian And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out? Cleinias True. Athenian But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term “dishonourable” is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree? Cleinias What do you mean? Athenian A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying. Cleinias To what? Athenian We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition? Cleinias Such appears to be the case. Athenian In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just. Cleinias Very true, Stranger. Athenian Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters. Cleinias Consistent in what? Athenian I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state⁠— Cleinias What? Athenian That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference. Cleinias What is it? Athenian That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me⁠—Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes⁠—shall we legislate or not⁠—what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime? Cleinias Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections? Athenian That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us⁠— Cleinias Do what? Athenian Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions