Dialogues

and false? Hermogenes Certainly. Socrates But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? Hermogenes No; the parts are true as well as the whole. Socrates Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part? Hermogenes I should say that every part is true. Socrates Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? Hermogenes No; that is the smallest. Socrates Then the name is a part of the true proposition? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates Yes, and a true part, as you say. Hermogenes Yes. Socrates And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false? Hermogenes So we must infer. Socrates And the name of anything is that which anyone affirms to be the name? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? Hermogenes Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another. Socrates But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? Hermogenes There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all. Socrates What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man? Hermogenes No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them. Socrates Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? Hermogenes Not many. Socrates Still you have found them? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? Hermogenes It would. Socrates But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to anyone, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? Hermogenes Impossible. Socrates And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another. Hermogenes He cannot. Socrates Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all. Hermogenes There cannot. Socrates But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. Hermogenes I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. Socrates Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being? Hermogenes Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. Socrates Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all. Hermogenes I should say that the natural way is the right way. Socrates Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. Hermogenes True. Socrates And this holds good of all actions? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates And speech is a kind of action? Hermogenes True. Socrates And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure. Hermogenes I quite agree with you. Socrates And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak. Hermogenes That is true. Socrates And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action? Hermogenes True. Socrates And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own? Hermogenes Precisely. Socrates Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. Hermogenes I agree. Socrates But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something? Hermogenes Certainly. Socrates And that which has to be named has to be named with something? Hermogenes True. Socrates What is that with which we pierce? Hermogenes An awl. Socrates And with which we weave? Hermogenes A shuttle. Socrates And with which we name? Hermogenes A name. Socrates Very good: then a name is an instrument? Hermogenes Certainly. Socrates Suppose that