Dialogues

to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question “Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,” to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle,92 will reply: “I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it,93 the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced,94 then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle”:⁠—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge⁠—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, “remembered”? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught? Meno I agree. Socrates Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? Meno Certainly. Socrates Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? Meno Certainly. Socrates The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? Meno Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. Socrates Do we not say that virtue is a good?⁠—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. Meno Certainly. Socrates Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? Meno True. Socrates And virtue makes us good? Meno Yes. Socrates And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable? Meno Yes. Socrates Then virtue is profitable? Meno That is the only inference. Socrates Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth⁠—these, and the like of these, we call profitable? Meno True. Socrates And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so? Meno Yes. Socrates And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used? Meno Certainly. Socrates Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like? Meno Surely. Socrates And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? Meno True. Socrates And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? Meno Very true. Socrates And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite? Meno That appears to be true. Socrates If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? Meno I quite agree. Socrates And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly? Meno True. Socrates And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly. Meno Yes. Socrates And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits⁠—and virtue, as we say, is profitable? Meno Certainly. Socrates And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? Meno I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true. Socrates But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? Meno I think not. Socrates If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state? Meno Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. Socrates But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction? Meno There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On