Dialogues

you mean, Socrates? Socrates I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so. Meno Yes. Socrates And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action⁠—there we were also right? Meno Yes. Socrates But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (φρόνησις), this we were wrong. Meno What do you mean by the word “right”? Socrates I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide? Meno Certainly. Socrates And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? Meno Certainly. Socrates And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth? Meno Exactly. Socrates Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion. Meno True. Socrates Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? Meno The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not. Socrates What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion? Meno I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion⁠—or why they should ever differ. Socrates And shall I explain this wonder to you? Meno Do tell me. Socrates You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus;97 but perhaps you have not got them in your country? Meno What have they to do with the question? Socrates Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away. Meno Well, what of that? Socrates I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. Meno What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth. Socrates I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them. Meno Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so. Socrates And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? Meno There again, Socrates, I think you are right. Socrates Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge? Meno True. Socrates And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful? Meno Yes. Socrates Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him⁠—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature? Meno Not I.) Socrates Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good? Meno Certainly not. Socrates And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching? Meno Yes. Socrates If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was taught? Meno Yes. Socrates And if it was taught it was wisdom? Meno Certainly. Socrates And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not? Meno True. Socrates But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue? Meno Yes. Socrates Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? Meno Certainly. Socrates And yet we admitted that it was a good? Meno Yes. Socrates And the right guide is useful and good? Meno Certainly. Socrates And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion⁠—these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. Meno I think so too. Socrates But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. Meno Clearly not. Socrates Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life. Meno I think not. Socrates And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves⁠—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. Meno That is probably true, Socrates. Socrates But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many