Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:persona">Socrates Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own words: the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors.104 What will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men?⁠—we were saying that some of them are to be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking⁠—mere childish nonsense? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito:⁠—whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die tomorrow⁠—at least, there is no human probability of this⁠—and therefore you are disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this? Crito Certainly. Socrates The good are to be regarded, and not the bad? Crito Yes. Socrates And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil? Crito Certainly. Socrates And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only⁠—his physician or trainer, whoever he may be? Crito Of one man only. Socrates And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many? Crito Clearly so. Socrates And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together? Crito True. Socrates And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil? Crito Certainly he will. Socrates And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person? Crito Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil. Socrates Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice⁠—there is such a principle? Crito Certainly there is, Socrates. Socrates Take a parallel instance:⁠—if, acting under the advice of those who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has been destroyed is⁠—the body? Crito Yes. Socrates Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body? Crito Certainly not. Socrates And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body? Crito Certainly not. Socrates More honourable than the body? Crito Far more. Socrates Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us; but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.⁠—“Well,” someone will say, “but the many can kill us.” Crito Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer. Socrates And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition⁠—that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued? Crito Yes, that also remains unshaken. Socrates And a good life is equivalent to a just and honourable one⁠—that holds also? Crito Yes, it does. Socrates From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating one’s children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready