Dialogues

of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician? Theaetetus We should ask. Socrates And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not? Theaetetus True. Socrates And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not? Theaetetus Certainly we should. Socrates And is Theodorus a painter? Theaetetus I never heard that he was. Socrates Is he a geometrician? Theaetetus Of course he is, Socrates. Socrates And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man? Theaetetus I think so. Socrates If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him. Theaetetus I should say not. Socrates But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to exhibit himself. Theaetetus Very true, Socrates. Socrates Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise anyone as he has been praising you. Theaetetus I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest? Socrates Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word. Theaetetus I suppose I must, if you wish it. Socrates In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And astronomy and harmony and calculation? Theaetetus I do my best. Socrates Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: “Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?” Theaetetus Of course. Socrates And by wisdom the wise are wise? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And is that different in any way from knowledge? Theaetetus What? Socrates Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know? Theaetetus Certainly they are. Socrates Then wisdom and knowledge are the same? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction⁠—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases⁠ ⁠… Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable. Theodorus The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off. Socrates Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is. Theaetetus Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me. Socrates We will, if we can. Theaetetus Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus⁠—geometry, and those which you just now mentioned⁠—are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all of, them, are knowledge. Socrates Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing. Theaetetus What do you mean, Socrates? Socrates Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes? Theaetetus Just so. Socrates And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements? Theaetetus I do. Socrates In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts? Theaetetus True. Socrates But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right? Theaetetus Perfectly right. Socrates Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing⁠—for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous? Theaetetus Truly. Socrates In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the