Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:persona">Socrates But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust just; or, best of all⁠—have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind? Theaetetus Never. Socrates And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one? Theaetetus Certainly not. Socrates But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that even you, lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word “other” alone (i.e. not insist that “one” and “other” are the same319). I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind. Theaetetus I will give up the word “other,” Socrates; and I agree to what you say. Socrates If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them is the other? Theaetetus True. Socrates Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other? Theaetetus True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all. Socrates Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us. Theaetetus No. Socrates But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven into many absurdities. Theaetetus What are they? Socrates I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the matter from every point of view. For I should be ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak. But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the seasick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and to do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty. Theaetetus Let me hear. Socrates I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a way in which such a deception is possible. Theaetetus You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a distance see someone who is unknown to me, and whom I mistake for him⁠—then the deception will occur? Socrates But has not that position been relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know? Theaetetus True. Socrates Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favourable issue; but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know? Theaetetus Certainly you may. Socrates And another and another? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate quality. Theaetetus I see. Socrates Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know. Theaetetus Very good. Socrates Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the following manner? Theaetetus In what manner? Socrates When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the possibility of this. Theaetetus And how would you amend the former statement? Socrates I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which must be excluded. (1) No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor (2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives; nor again (3) can he think that something which he