Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boule, the law courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian dicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:—this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones (VI 766 D, E; IX 855 D, E). He is nevertheless aware that both in public and private suits there must be a popular element (VI 768 A, B). He insists that the whole people must share in the administration of justice—in public causes they are to take the first step, and the final decision is to remain with them. In private suits they are also to retain a share; “for the citizen who has no part in the administration of justice is apt to think that he has no share in the state. For this reason there is to be a court of law in every tribe (i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges are to be chosen by lot.” Of the courts of law he gives what he calls a superficial sketch. Nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his various accounts of them. It is however clear that although some officials, like the guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in the main popular. The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and fact between a judge and jury, which would have enabled Plato to combine the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher. Though desirous of limiting the number of judges, and thereby confining the office to persons specially fitted for it, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.
He would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and neighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions at issue (VI 766 E); these are called in another passage (XII 956 B) arbiters rather than judges. But if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to the courts of the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the party who is unsuccessful in the suit (XII 956 C, D). There is a further appeal allowed to the select judges, with a further increase of penalty. The select judges are to be appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one from every magistracy (VI 767 C). They are to be elected annually, and therefore probably for a year only, and are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law (VI 767 E). In cases of which death is the penalty, the trial takes place before a special court, which is composed of the guardians of the law and of the judges of appeal (IX 855 C, D).
In treating of the subject in Book IX (855; compare XII 956 E), he proposes to leave for the most part the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators; the procedure in capital causes he determines himself. He insists that the vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then to take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses. The eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and then the third. The interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the evidence is to be written down (IX 855, 856). Apparently he does not expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the council to be trained statesmen.
In forming marriage connections, Plato supposes that the public interest will prevail over private inclination (VI 773). There was nothing in this very shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance. Married life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state. The newly-married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective syssitia, even during their honeymoon (VI 780 B); they are to give their whole mind to the procreation of children (VI 775 D, E; 783 D, E); their duties to one another at a later period of life are not a matter about which the state is equally solicitous (VI 784). Divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper (XI 929, 930). As in the Republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and social ones. To modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in Plato’s treatment of the subject. Yet he also makes some shrewd remarks on marriage,
