aware of the moral rules and dress code. Say you did some research. Tell her that you don’t think it will be helpful if she gets in trouble in Iran, because it may reflect on you as well. She must cover her body, including her feet. No bright colors are allowed. If you leave Tehran, I’d recommend she stick to black. If Erikka wants to swim at the hotel’s swimming pool, she must be covered completely. Women violating the dress code could be punished severely, even flogged.”
He continued. “Don’t offer a handshake to a woman, or touch a woman in public. Stay away from a religious debate-it can be dangerous. The Iranians are very fussy about their honor. What would be acceptable in Europe, or America, is forbidden in Iran.”
“Such as what?”
“Such as giving a thumbs-up.”
“Why?”
“Because that’s the Iranian way of saying ‘fuck you.’ ” Definitely good to know.
“Crossing the street in Tehran is like swimming across a crocodile-infested river. Car drivers ignore all rules but their own, which change momentarily while they drive. Pedestrians are considered a nuisance by motorists. Be particularly wary of motorbikes. They take the liberty of riding on the sidewalks or against traffic. If you pass the former U.S. Embassy building, don’t attempt to take pictures.
“Ask Erikka to teach you some basic words and expressions in Farsi. She will like that, and it’s important in more than one manner. Not only will it become handy, since very few people speak English, but it will also endear you to them.
“Show interest in people, as an author is expected to. I repeat, in people, not installations or strategic points. Good places for you to meet people are the public parks. Go there on Thursday and Friday nights, at a late hour when many families and their young children assemble until after midnight. Summer nights are hot, and people escape the heat of their uninsulated homes.”
“I’ll be there in the winter, I presume, but just in case, any particular place in mind?”
“Yes. Park-e Mellat is located to the north of Vanak Square along Vali Asr Avenue, in northern Tehran. It’s very popular among young families who bring food baskets and picnic. If you’re hungry, cross the street; there are street vendors and also small coffee shops. Most people don’t have money to go to fancy restaurants. Iran is a rich country, but the population is poor. In 1977, the average personal income in Iran was $2,450, same as in Spain. However last year, Iran’s per capita income was less than $1,640, same as the Gaza Strip.
“You will be given escape-route instructions separately, but you should know that there’s a weekly train from Tehran to Damascus leaving Mondays at 18:35. A one-way ticket is 330,000 rials-about $40. The ride takes sixty- five hours, including long waits at each border crossing. One is while crossing from Iran to Turkey, and the second while crossing from Turkey to Syria.”
“Syria? Why would I want to go there?”
“If you need to escape, a train to Syria may be a good idea. Of course you’ll get off in Turkey, but buy the ticket all the way to Syria. The Agency personnel will discuss it with you in more detail. One more thing particular to Iran: Terminal 2 at Tehran Airport is the international departures terminal. It’s easily confused with the domestic departures. Make sure Erikka goes through the female gate.
“There are a few more things you should bear in mind about Iranians. They’re hospitable, but may not be candid with things they tell you. Concealment of facts and flexible definition of truth is a traditional way of life. Iranians trust only their family, no others, and definitely not stranieri -foreigners. Feel free to negotiate and bargain everywhere. That’s acceptable, even expected.”
Three detail-intensive hours later, Reuven looked at his watch. “John will join us in a few minutes.”
I heard the doorbell ring, the main door opened and closed, and an elderly man with a sprightly gait entered our room escorted by the sour-faced woman.
“Hi Dan. I’m John Sheehan,” he said as he shook my hand.
“John will bring you up to date on more recent political history,” said Reuven while collecting his papers. “I’ll see you tomorrow.”
“Dan,” said John as we sat down, “we will spend the next few hours discussing the darker side of Iran, something I’ve been doing for the Agency for more than thirty years.”
“Shoot,” I said.
He leaned back on the couch. “Let me give you an overview of Iranian security agencies, your potential adversaries. There are six key entities for your purposes. The most notorious is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC, also known as Pasdaran. They’re entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the revolution, meaning being the muscle of the fanatic clerics to enforce their interpretation of Islamic rules.”
I stretched on the couch as he continued. “They grew from a regular small police force to a whopping several hundred thousand, organized independently or attached to military units. They even have small planes and boats. The Pasdaran were very zealous in monitoring the regime’s perceived inside enemies. To broaden their grasp over the lives of every Iranian, they recruited hundreds of thousands of volunteers, the Baseej. These volunteers report suspected behavior or activities of all citizens and arrest women who fail to follow the strict dress code that the revolution imposed.”
“What happens to violators?”
“If you’re lucky you get only an oral warning. Others receive written notices warning them of their ‘social corruption.’ Almost one hundred thousand people were actually arrested last year for violating the codes. Bear in mind that the Revolutionary Guards have other names for their units operating in foreign countries. That includes their subsidiary organizations, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. The names they use are the ‘Committee on Foreign Intelligence Abroad’ and the ‘Committee on Implementation of Actions Abroad.’ In essence, the Revolutionary Guards’ foreign units operate like any other clandestine intelligence operation. They mask their foreign activities by using front companies and nongovernmental organizations, trading companies, and banks.”
“I know the routine,” I said patiently. “While outside Iran, some of their agents operate out of the Iranian embassies to enjoy diplomatic immunity.” I remembered a case I’d been involved in earlier where Iranian agents in Europe had tried to shield themselves from arrest by using their diplomatic immunity. But they’d made one mistake: they’d worked at the embassy in Rome and operated in Munich. That transborder mistake had rendered their immunity worthless.
“Correct. They also started the ‘Foundation of the Oppressed and Dispossessed,’ or Bonyade-e-Mostafazan, used for infiltration into and then subsequent control of Islamic charities in many countries. Another clandestine unit of the Guards is the Qods-Jerusalem-Force. Our sources estimate that their size exceeds ten thousand men. They’re assigned to foreign activities, which include terror. The Qods Force maintains training facilities in Iran and in Sudan for the terrorists of the next generation. In addition to training, they also gather intelligence on potential targets for terror attacks and monitor dissidents of the Iranian regime.”
“Some of them sometimes mysteriously disappear,” I added cynically.
John smiled. “And some not so mysteriously. Tehran continues to provide logistic support and training to Lebanese Hezbollah and a variety of Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. What we need to discuss is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS, also known as Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar, or VEVAK. It’s the successor to SAVAK, the Shah’s notorious internal-security agency. Religious leaders had recruited former SAVAK agents to help the regime eliminate domestic opposition. Consequently, some intelligence officers and low-ranking SAVAK and army-intelligence officials were asked to return to government service because of their specialized knowledge of the Iranian left, which emerged as the only opposition. VEVAK extends its hold outside Iran as well. Its agents are disguised as diplomats in Iranian embassies and consular offices, or as employees of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance representatives. Light covers include employees of Iran Air, students, or businessmen. We even saw Iranian agents holding themselves out as members of the opposition groups.”
I could only imagine what happened to the poor souls who believed them and talked against Iran or participated in any anti-Iranian activities.
John continued with a thorough lecture on the other military and security organizations for three more hours. He poured coffee from a large thermos into a white mug and waited for my reaction. I was tired and becoming restless, and John could tell.
“OK. You’ll be picked up tomorrow morning for more Mossad briefing. At a later time I’ll give you reading material.”
