and the gates were closed behind them.
We took stock of our position. It was grim; we had the city’s strong walls around us, but it had been under siege for nearly nine months and its granaries and storerooms were empty. Our supply line to the coast was gone and Kerbogha’s army was big enough to completely enclose us and gradually tighten the noose. Worst of all, the city was full of bodies and we faced a fight against time to burn them before they contaminated the wells.
Having spent nine months in Purgatory outside the walls, we now faced a living Hell within them.
The Muslim army was so huge it seemed to occupy every foot of ground around the entire city. Their war drums boomed incessantly and their cries for vengeance filled the air day and night. There were soon many desertions from our ranks, including the previously faithful Ives and Aubrey of Grandmesnil, who lowered themselves down ropes and made a cowardly dash for the ships at St Symeon.
We were already feeble and demoralized, but conditions for our army soon got worse. The only foodstuff we had found in any quantity was a store of spices. Ingenious, if hardly appetizing, methods were devised to put it to use. One of them was to make a soup of spices from leaves plus a few thin slices of animal hide and enliven it with blood bled from our precious horses. It did little for the well-being of our horses, and probably did us more harm than good.
Kerbogha’s army attacked constantly, using a seemingly inexhaustible reserve of men. They always attacked more than one wall at a time, wearing us down in an ever downward spiral of despair. Often the Turks attacked in such great numbers that they reached the top of the battlements, where the hand-to-hand fighting was ferocious. Bohemond created small groups of his best men to act as elite squads and close any breaches in our defences.
Sleep was all but impossible, except in brief respites of no more than two hours twice a day. We were fortunate that the men still standing were the elite survivors of countless battles, deprivations and diseases and thus made of the sternest stuff. Bohemond was the strongest of all and relied more and more on Hereward’s experience and military acumen. They became very close, with Sweyn acting as their main aide-de-camp, delivering orders to the other princes and senior commanders.
Raymond of Toulouse became ill and was unable to lead the Council of War, so Robert took on the role. Hereward and Sweyn had devised an astonishingly daring plan, which they had shared with Bohemond, Robert and me. Bohemond was so impressed that he wanted to present it to the Council himself — and, of course, in doing so, take all the credit.
The Council, shocked at first, soon realized the merits of the plan and readily agreed. In fact, we had little choice; another week of the onslaught we were facing would have seen our resistance collapse.
On the 28th of June 1098, the great Battle of Antioch began.
Sweyn and Hereward’s strategy was based on careful observation of the way in which the Seljuks attacked, combined with simple battlefield psychology. Kerbogha kept the greater part of his army out of harm’s way at his main camp about five miles from the city, from where small units were despatched in waves to attack the walls, before retreating for rest and rearming.
We formed ourselves into four distinct groups within the walls: Godfrey of Bouillon led the Lotharingians and Germans; the Papal Legate, Adhemar Le Puy, took charge of Raymond of Toulouse’s southern Franks; Bohemond headed his Italian Normans; and Robert, together with Robert of Flanders, commanded the northern Franks as well as the Normans and my English contingent.
We poured from different gates of the city in the hottest part of the day, taking our attackers completely by surprise, and fanned out in a wide arc. The dual keys to the manoeuvre were speed and ferocity. Our momentum would force the Turks to retreat and try to make a stand — which we had to prevent them finding the ground to make — and our reputation as awesome warriors would strike fear into the hearts of our retreating enemies.
Few of us had steeds of any sort — some knights even took to going into battle on donkeys and mules — but we had to mount a classic infantry charge in full armour in the middle of the Syrian summer. Not a very tempting prospect, but one about which we had no choice.
The plan worked perfectly and the Turks began to fall back towards their main camp in droves. Then simple battlefield psychology played its part. As soon as he saw our attack, Kerbogha should have committed his main force, which would easily have halted our momentum and, caught in open ground, on foot and vastly outnumbered, we would have been annihilated. But he hesitated and prepared his army to hold its ground and defend our attack, rather than come out and meet it head on.
It was a crucial mistake.
Our much smaller army was made up of the most fearsome warriors in Europe, fighting for their survival; his much larger force was full of mercenaries, allies of dubious commitment and men whose homes and families were far away and far from peril.
As Kerbogha’s main force took up its positions, all they could see were hundreds of their colleagues streaming past them and all they could hear were their cries of terror and the sound of mayhem in their wake. Realizing that his army’s will to fight was beginning to desert it, Kerbogha compounded his original mistake in hesitating by ordering a belated attack.
It was the worst possible decision: some of his men followed orders and advanced with intent, others advanced, but reluctantly, while the remainder just turned and joined their fleeing colleagues.
It became a rout as Kerbogha’s massive army disintegrated and scattered, leaving the Atabeg to return to Mosul with his tail between his legs. The Crusader army achieved many remarkable feats on the battlefield; this was undoubtedly its finest moment.
The Atabeg’s tents were captured intact, full of gold and other treasures, including huge stockpiles of arms and strings of horses and, most important of all, food, the like of which we had not seen for months. We looked on in wonder, not at the chests of coin, the gold goblets, fine carpets and tapestries, but at the pens of sheep, the butts of wine and the sacks of corn and flour.
We were in the Garden of Eden, and Jerusalem beckoned.
However, Bohemond got his way and took control of the city. He was in no mood to strike out immediately for the prize we had come for. In truth, few were — enough was enough, and it was time to take stock.
Alexius failed to join us, as had been promised, and so there was no pressure on us to move on. The Emperor had set out from Constantinople, but had met Stephen of Blois halfway across Anatolia at Philomelium. Stephen told him that the Crusaders’ cause was finished and that most were already dead, and so Alexius returned home.
The rest of 1098 became a bizarre mix of blissful recuperation, interspersed with frequent bouts of squabbling between the Princes about who should be in control of the many cities that now fell within their sphere of interest.
Now that all the local sultans, emirs and atabegs had been neutralized, all the cities of Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia were at the Crusaders’ mercy, and they took full advantage.
The inhabitants of each city that fell were put to the sword without mercy, only adding to the already murderous reputation of the Crusaders. Sweyn used his ever growing influence to try to persuade the young knights of the values of chivalry and the importance of the Mos Militum. Many sympathized with his basic philosophy, but few were prepared to extend to their Muslim enemies the status of an equal and to treat them as fellow warriors worthy of respect. The hardships of the Crusade had been too great, the hatred of the enemy too ingrained. The preaching of zealots such as Raymond of Toulouse, which cast Muslims as inferior and heretics, was too powerful for most to resist.
Sweyn talked openly about leading a revolt against the zealots by the younger, more enlightened knights, but Hereward, Robert and I managed to persuade him to keep his arrows in his quiver for the time being — certainly until we reached Jerusalem.
In October of 1098, the few remaining Princes in Antioch who still determined to go on to Jerusalem — Raymond of Toulouse, Tancred of Hauteville, Robert and I — decided that we would prepare to march on the Sacred Places in mid-January, as soon as the worst of the winter rains had stopped.
Shortly afterwards, the most special moment of the year occurred: a bodyguard of Alexius’s imperial troops, accompanied by a platoon of Varangians, appeared through the Bridge Gate of the city. They were leading an elaborate covered carriage from the Emperor’s personal caravan. It was strange to see a body of men dressed, armed and behaving like highly disciplined soldiers; it had been such a long time since we had had the same bearing.
As soon as it came to a halt, Estrith rushed to greet us, shortly followed by Adela, who moved more slowly thanks to a severe limp and the hindrance of the care she had to show the bundle in her arms, a child they had not
