had had little rest the last few days. I figured we could sustain the current attack tempo for another twenty-four to forty-eight hours, then we would have reached the end of endurance and I would have to begin rotating major units in and out.
Third AD had destroyed hundreds of enemy vehicles and captured many prisoners. Their attack tempo was swift and steady. During their attack, they found the same kinds of prepared positions (including reverse-slope defenses) and positions in depth that the 1st INF and 2nd ACR had found. The Iraqis fought back, and the fights were sharp and brutally lethal. There was depth to the Iraqi defense, either by design or because units were attempting to escape, but the Iraqis were no match for them.
1ST AD. First AD had likewise been attacking all night and were still at it. By now, Ron Griffith had brought his three maneuver brigades up on line and seemed tied in well with 3rd AD to his south. At this point, the division had almost 9,200 vehicles, and almost 2,000 of these were tracked. As they turned east, they soon came into contact with the northern brigade of the Tawalkana defense, which was located about fifty kilometers from where they had made their right turn. Continuing east all night, the division had destroyed the northern brigade of the Tawalkana and the brigade of the Adnan that had moved south into the 1st AD sector from the XVIII Corps sector. Colonel Dan Petrosky's Apaches of the 1st AD aviation brigade and CAS had hit the Iraqis deep in the sector, and they had located a sizable logistics base in the vicinity of their Objective Bonn. They had also discovered the Medina Division moving to protect that base. It was clear that this day the 1st AD would hit the Medina.
They still had an open flank to their north, for the 3rd ACR and 24th Division were about sixty kilometers to their rear, or west, after their ninety-degree turn. The Iraqis had already tried to take advantage of that gap by moving the Adnan brigade south. After meeting the combined artillery and air fires of 1st AD, the RGFC did not try anything like that again. That was the last troop movement south from the northern RGFC infantry divisions.
THOUGHTS
That gap continued to concern me, however, for two reasons. The first had to do with the security of the 1st AD and its vulnerability to attacks from the north, either by ground forces or artillery. The second was that if the Third Army was looking at a coordinated VII Corps/XVIII Corps attack against the RGFC, things would have to happen fast. However, I was not sure the Army maneuver was possible anymore, which meant that we might have to do what we could ourselves in our sector. The time lines we had discussed before the war indicated that Third Army would issue the order for the coordinated attack forty-eight hours prior to execution.
I reviewed our combat-power adjustments I had ordered for the final fights to the Gulf and the destruction of the RFGC:
The 2/1 AH-64 battalion (eighteen Apaches) had gone back to the 1st AD from 2nd ACR, so Ron's ability to attack in depth with Apaches would double. In addition, the 75th Artillery Brigade (24 155-mm howitzers, 12 8-inch howitzers, 9 MLRS, and 9 ATACMS-capable MLRS) also had joined the 1st AD late the day before, and now were firing in support of the division.
A corps AH-64 battalion, 2/6 Cavalry, had joined 3rd AD (also doubling their Apache strength to 36), plus the 42nd Artillery Brigade (48 155-mm howitzers, and 18 MLRS launchers) had rejoined the division and was already supporting their attacks.
The 210th Artillery Brigade (48 155-mm howitzers and 18 MLRS) was now with the 1st INF to add to the fires of its own division artillery.
I made no change with the British.
The 2nd ACR was in Corps reserve, with only its assigned units now, giving it less combat power.
I also had considered the option of a corps deep strike that night with Apaches into Objective Denver, yet at the rate at which the 1st INF was attacking, they might already be there by then. That conclusion led me to retain only one corps attack battalion and to commit the other to that day's fight with 3rd AD.
There were two decisions to be made that day: How to fit the 1st CAV into the fight to destroy the Hammurabi in the north? And what force to commit as the southern arm of our envelopment in the south, the 1st INF or the British? On the one hand, the British were available (they'd finished with the tactical reserve). I figured the Big Red One would still be in the middle of a fight they had begun the night before. If the 1st INF was still slugging their way through Norfolk, the British could get there faster. On the other hand, if the 1st INF had broken through, it meant they were closer, and I would use them. That is what I had to find out.
The main forces of the RGFC, of course, remained up north. From the early reports of the previous night's 1st INF attacks, and after looking at their position on the map, it looked to me as though I could use the Big Red One in the south and keep the British attacking directly east to Highway 8. That would shorten the southern arm by a good eighty to one hundred kilometers.
After an intelligence brief, I determined that I would make those two decisions after seeing for myself, and by visiting both commanders and getting their judgments on the immediate situation in their sectors. I also wanted to get away from the TAC, as they were again going to displace forward to keep up with the fight, which during the night had passed us by. As night turned to day, the sounds of battle had become more distant.
FLANKS. At this point, we had a poor picture of the situation on both of our flanks — XVIII Corps now to our north and west and the Egyptian Corps to our east. We had a better picture of XVIII Corps. We did know that the 3rd CAV was some distance behind the 1st AD, and would likely not close that gap today. Though our liaison with XVIII Corps had been keeping our main CP advised of other actions of XVIII Corps units, I was focused mainly on what the 24th MECH and 3rd ACR were doing, and whether they also would turn east to attack toward Basra, on our north. We also knew generally from the British that their southern flank was open, as the Egyptians were not yet ready to turn east toward Kuwait City. That did not bother me at all.
We also had a poor picture of what theater air was doing deep to interdict or otherwise isolate the RGFC in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. I had to assume they were interdicting Iraqi forces that were attempting to escape, and isolating the remaining forces in the KTO so that we could close in for the kill. With 1,500-plus sorties a day, I figured they were still very much in the fight. All the RGFC still appeared to be in the KTO that morning.
The previous day and night had been the biggest day of the war for CAS in support of VII Corps. We had used a total of 128 close-air-support strikes. And while we had gotten all that we asked for, that still represented only less than 10 percent of the daily air sorties flown, and we were the main attack.
ENEMY SITUATION. The picture of the Iraqi intent was clear that morning. They continued to use their theater reserve, the RGFC, to form successive lines of defense against our attack. These began with the Tawalkana, then shifted to the Medina, then the Hammurabi. Since some units remained in positions oriented south or southeast, as though we would still attack up the Wadi al Batin, the orientations were somewhat confused. Other units — especially RGFC units — were attempting to orient to the west, now that they had figured out that we were coming from that direction. The Tawalkana continued to set the initial line of defense with whatever forces became available, and because we knew they tended to shift brigades around from one major unit to another without too much difficulty, that doubtless accounted for the reports of unfamiliar units we were getting. Finally, the southern flank of the Tawalkana clearly turned out to be right where the 2nd ACR had said it was, and where the 3rd Brigade of the 1st INF was attacking. It might have accounted for the different type of defense encountered by Dave Weisman's brigade. Their night attack broke the back of that southern brigade (the 37th MECH) and exposed a flank.
At this point early in the morning of 27 February, I still had the corps in a series of hasty attacks, and the enemy still seemed to be capable of brigade-sized defensive sets and local counterattacks. We saw very little evidence that these forces were running away. In my judgment, we were not in any pursuit operation — not yet.
