After the war, I directed my G-2, Colonel John Davidson, to attempt to reconstruct the Iraqi plan in our sector from all sources, including captured materiel and prisoners. Although it was done quickly, the report gives a much different picture of Iraqi forces than the one we got from their frontline infantry or from those facing MARCENT near Kuwait City. The document is entitled 'The 100-Hour Ground War: How the Iraqi Plan Failed.'
Extracts show:
• That the Tawalkana did indeed defend generally along the 65 north & south gridline, with the 12th AD, 37th Brigade in the south. North of that brigade, the 9th, 18th, and 29th Brigades were on line south to north. It was the 9th Brigade and parts of the 18th that the 2nd ACR hit at 73 Easting. 'The 9th Armd Bde,' the report states, 'is amazed that it would be attacked during a rainstorm with blowing sand.'
• That the Medina was moving west to establish defensive positions: 'Four battalions of the 14th Mech Bde, Medina Division, move in a southwesterly direction to set up a hasty defense in the midst of the theater logistics site. Concurrently, 2nd Armd Bde moves approximately seven kilometers to the northwest to form a defensive line from QU0939 to QU0946. Two unidentified armored brigades depart the south to establish contact between the 14th Mech Bde and 2nd Armd Bde, and provide a coherent defense of the LOCs. These LOCs allow the escape of units from the south to Basra.'
• That the Hammurabi Division was assessed to be moving with its nine battalions to defend the Rumaila oil fields, or to take up the defense if the Tawalkana became combat-ineffective.
• That the 'mission of Iraqi ground forces,' on 27 February, 'continues to be a hasty defense in depth to delay the advance of Coalition forces until all forces withdraw from Kuwait, and successfully cross the Euphrates River. The remainder of the Tawalkana MECH Div and the repositioned Medina Armd Div of the RGFC are to block any further penetration of VII Corps forces coming from the west.'
Though I did not know all this on the morning of 27 February, I knew enough to determine that we were into a successive series of hastily defended positions, and that the troops we were facing were attempting to fight us, even though up to now the skill level and combat power had been a mismatch.
As soon as it began to get light, we flew the twenty minutes it took to find 1st INF. I wanted to get their assessment and decide early about the attack north.
Either 1st INF or 1 UK.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Knockout
EN ROUTE
A defeated enemy's equipment rushed underneath the helicopter as we flew to link up with the Big Red One. As far as we could see, there were burning vehicles. Tanks without turrets, burning. BMPs burning and overturned. Some equipment obviously hit from the air by LGBs (Laser-Guided Bombs), as the tanks were without turrets and the hulls were almost flattened. Trucks were on fire. Black smoke rose in small columns from burning vehicles littering the sand. Iraqi dead lay on the battlefield. We could see, picking their way through all this, the logistics and support trucks of the 1st INF Division support command, commanded by Colonel Bob Shadley, attempting to keep up the pace to bring needed fuel.
I had seen battle destruction before, but never like this. Visions from World War II newsreels made their way into my head as I searched for something to relate it to. There was brown sand and hundreds of broken and burning Iraqi vehicles all the way to the 1st INF TAC CP.
I was not thinking back—'Don't look back' had been my code ever since I'd decided to have my leg amputated — but if I had been of a mind to, I would have concluded that I had made the right choice to pass the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR to continue the attack the night before.
0630 TAC CP 1ST INF DIVISION
We circled before landing. I wanted to get a good look around, and Mark needed to find a spot where he wouldn't hit any destroyed Iraqi vehicles.
After landing, I got out and started toward the M577s of the 1st INF TAC. On the way, I glanced around. There was the TAC, which at that point consisted of two M577s, its extensions stretched out the back, but the sides rolled up now that there was daylight. About a hundred meters away were maybe a hundred Iraqi prisoners guarded by two or three 1st INF MPs. A little farther away were Apaches and scout aircraft from the division's aviation battalion.
My senses told me that, here, at least, the Iraqis were a beaten army.
I took a good look at the prisoners, who avoided my eyes. They were reasonably clothed in military uniforms, but were dirty and unshaven, and were eating MREs our troops had given them. They looked tired, but no more so than the U.S. soldiers guarding them. Unlike our soldiers, though, they were passive, shuffling around, not talking much with one another. They looked defeated.
Around the TAC was more evidence of the destruction that had been brought on by the 1st INF attack the night before. Burning tanks and other vehicles were nearby. If Hollywood had wanted to create a scene of a defeated army, complete with prisoners and destroyed equipment, this is what they would have made it look like. Finally, there were the areas containing unexploded U.S. munitions, mainly artillery DPICM, that the troops had wisely marked off with white engineer tape. The whole war was here in microcosm.
Brigadier General Bill Carter greeted me when I walked into the TAC. He was assistant division commander for maneuver and was running the division TAC. Bill was an experienced infantryman and a decorated Vietnam veteran, and was quick-minded and aggressive. I had gotten to know him well as a tactician when we had run the 1st INF BCTP in March 1990 at Fort Riley. I liked Carter and trusted his judgments.
'Bill, hell of a fight last night,' I said. 'Saw the destruction on the way over. Give me a SITREP. By the way, where's Tom?'
'It was a tough fight last night. We think we've broken through. Resistance is much less organized than what we ran into last night. Our advance is continuing east toward Denver and Highway 8, per your orders. Not sure what the Iraqis are doing, but they are not in any coherent defenses, and we are taking many prisoners — as you can see. Terrain is slowing us down some. [Just east of where we were, the wadi got deep and wide.] We did have a number of casualties last night. Do not have a final count, but we had about eight KIA and maybe thirty wounded. General Rhame is forward with one of the brigades in a tank. I have him on the radio.'
The casualty figure surprised me.
'Get him on the radio,' I said.
'DANGER 6, this is DANGER OSCAR' — the TAC CP call sign—'JAYHAWK 6 is here and wants to talk to you.'
'This is DANGER 6.'
'This is JAYHAWK 6, give me a SITREP.'
'We had a tough fight last night, but we have broken through. I estimate we can get to Denver by dark.'
'Roger, DANGER, well done. I saw the wreckage. I want you to press your attack east. Attack to Denver. I'll give details to Bill.'
'WILCO.'
