That evening, I got a quick update on the Iraqi units left in our sector and a look at our own situation. From the reports of the commanders I had visited earlier and from my own observations, it was clear to me that we had the Iraqis on the floor. A short briefing from Bill Eisel, G-2 at the TAC, confirmed it: The Iraqi intent was to continue to defend with what they had while attempting to withdraw their remaining units from the theater over pontoon bridges they were constructing over the Shatt al Arab[53] and the Euphrates. Since both these areas were outside VII Corps sector, and had been since late on 25 February, there was nothing we could do to stop the units leaving by that route. Meanwhile, the Iraqis we were facing no longer appeared capable of any kind of coordinated defense — battalion-sized actions, but not much more. We estimated that the Hammurabi Division and what was left of the Medina (by this time only a brigade) would defend around the Rumaila oil fields, or our Objective Raleigh (and about thirty kilometers from where the 1st CAV was now). It was still not clear to me how much of the Hammurabi was left in our sector, and whether they were joining the retreat, or were part of the defense. Other Iraqi military options in our sector were extremely limited at this point.
Our own situation was excellent. In the southern part of our sector, the British were racing toward Highway 8, with by now only scattered resistance, and the 1st INF was also in a pursuit, after having cracked through the Iraqi defense the night before and early that morning. Our biggest remaining future fights were going to be in the north, with what remained of the Hammurabi in Objective Raleigh. I figured that with the distance to Raleigh, that fight would take place late the next morning, 28 February, somewhere west of the Rumaila oil fields, and it would be over before the evening — very much like the Medina fight with 1st AD. Thus, I figured that by 1800 the next day, our double envelopment would be complete, and 1st CAV and the 1st INF would have accomplished their linkup somewhere north of Safwan on Highway 8, and we would have trapped the remainder of the Iraqi forces in our sector. By that time, we would have run out of both room to maneuver and Iraqi units to attack.
From there we could always continue north toward Basra, but that would take intervention and new orders from Third Army, and we had none. Nor did we have any new orders for finishing the current fight other than the ones we were trying to execute — i.e., our own double envelopment.
By then, I'd had VII Corps attacking for almost four days straight. Soon we would be at the limit of soldier and leader endurance. But we were not there yet.
I left the TAC and went outside to smoke a cigar.
When I returned at around 2130, Stan had been talking to John Landry at the main. There was talk of a cease-fire in the morning.
Total surprise. It was the second of the two great surprises of the war for me personally. The other was the order to attack early. Both were friendly actions. No warning order, no questions, no real evidence from the battlefield.
Cease-fire! 'Who the hell's idea is that?' I wanted to know.
I called John Yeosock right away, and John confirmed the news. 'There's talk about a possible 'cessation of offensive operations' effective tomorrow,' he told me. 'Nothing's definite yet,' he added. 'But in the light of that development, don't do operations that will unnecessarily cost any more casualties.'
I repeated that our situation was a combination of pursuit and hasty attack. Another twenty-four hours or so would finish it. 'Why now? Why not give us tomorrow? We have them where we want them. There is less and less organized resistance, but we are not done yet.'
John agreed. 'I already told the CINC we needed another day,' he told me. 'But I'll try to get all this clarified.' Meanwhile, he directed us to put out a warning order for a possible cessation of offensive operations in the morning.
I was stunned.
But we put out the warning order. None of my commanders came back on the radio to protest stopping.
This was the third set of orders given to the corps that day. First had been the double envelopment. Second had been the adjustment based on Ron Griffith's radio call, our orders to keep 3rd AD and 1st INF from running into each other, and the postponement of the 1st CAV attack based on Ron Griffith's late call. Now this. We would issue two more orders before the cease-fire the next day. It was not the kind of battle rhythm pace I liked when issuing orders to an attacking corps of 146,000 soldiers and 50,000 vehicles — in fact, it was the kind of pace that I had been used to when I was a captain with 137 soldiers and fifty vehicles.
As I let it all sink in, many things went through my mind. My initial thoughts were ones of frustration: We had not yet finished the mission. We had the Iraqis on the floor. Let's
Yet if someone knew something I did not, and if he thought we had reached our strategic goals, I was glad that our troops were done and there would be no more casualties. The corps was tired. In maybe another twenty- four hours, I would have had to start rotating units in and out to generate some fresh combat power.
I asked myself if I had been forceful enough in painting the local tactical picture to John Yeosock, and decided I had. We had been especially attentive to it since his earlier reports of the CINC's 'concerns,' and John got reports from not only me directly, but from Colonel Dick Rock and Colonel Carl Ernst, who had been at my 27 February morning planning session. Third Army had as precise a picture of our situation and the enemy's then as at any time in the war. As for CENTCOM, I had no idea what they knew, but I had to assume that it was whatever Third Army knew.
I did not bypass John Yeosock and call General Schwarzkopf directly to protest. I trusted Yeosock. He knew mounted operations and, even though he was in Riyadh, he had a great feel for what still needed to be done tactically in our sector of attack. I had made my case with him and that was it. At the same time, I trusted that the senior leadership knew what they were doing. We were not yet done tactically, but if there were other considerations that made a cease-fire a wise strategic choice, then OK, we would execute.
When I let the TAC know, their reaction was not unlike mine. First, they had questions: 'Is this right?' Then, like me, they asked, 'Why now?' Then, when the end appeared inevitable, there was a noticeable sign of physical letdown. With the adrenaline gone, the momentum and charged atmosphere of only a few moments earlier went away. I knew it would be like that all over the corps as the word got out.
It is here that human factors come into play in a large combat unit.
By 1800 that evening, I was using the combat power of the corps at full throttle, with maneuvers set in motion that would complete our mission in another twenty-four hours. We had four divisions committed, with a fresh division in the 1st CAV. The troops and commanders, while tired, were still capable of continuing the attacks at a peak level of intensity, stimulated both by the continuation of the attack and the prospects of victory. They were driving on. Yet if ever the momentum got interrupted, it would be hell getting it started again. It is a fact of soldier and unit behavior. When you're operating at close to endurance limits and pushing yourself and your soldiers to stay at that level, you must keep going. Any halt means a precipitous drop in energy level, because the stimulus is removed. Without that stimulus of movement and action, units fall idle very fast, like dropping off a cliff. After that, it is damn near impossible to rouse them to previous levels. I had seen it happen many times in training and in combat in Vietnam.
So when we confirmed the rumors of a cease-fire, the air went out of the balloon. When we put the order out just before midnight, we could just feel the corps attack momentum come to a halt.
VII CORPS ACTIONS
While all this was going on, actions in VII Corps continued.
First INF units had had almost four days of nonstop actions, accompanied by constant adjustment to retain unit integrity — to make sure the right units were in the right combination. These adjustments
