Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

Magazine, Captain Ryan Welch, 'Operation Anaconda: The Battle for Shah-I-Kot Valley,' November- December 2003, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, p. 36). They would be the 'anvil' force. Wiercinski told his troops they had two missions that night: to defeat the enemy, and to never leave a fallen soldier on the battlefield. He said they would be 'good in combat… because of who you are,' then spoke of the camaraderie of the soldiers, saying, 'You will do it for each other.' (Cooper, Richard T., 'Fierce Fight in Afghan Valley Tests U.S. Soldiers and Strategy,' Los Angeles Times, 24 March 2002, pp. 1–2).

The 'hammer' for this anvil, called Task Force Hammer, the main attack force, consisted of friendly Afghan troops and their Special Forces advisors. They would move from Gardez south to the objective area by truck and assault the valley towns held by Al Qaeda. As they cleared the villages, Al Qaeda would be forced back into the mountains, where they would run into the anvil of Task Force (TF) Rakassan. Another outer ring of blocking positions around the valley consisted of other special forces and Afghan troops tasked to prevent Al Qaeda from escaping (Welch, Armor Magazine, op cit, p. 38).

On 2 March, TF Hammer began its move toward the objective area. After leaving the main roads they encountered difficulty on the muddy tracks with their loaded trucks. Then they came under heavy enemy fire and were also hit by mistake from circling AC-130 gunships. The combination of movement difficulty and enemy and accidental friendly fire proved deadly. According to one account, 'TF Hammer received one additional CAS (close air support) mission and one Apache fire support mission throughout that long day…' (Stewart, CMH, p. 38). All of these factors caused the force to halt and withdraw by nightfall.

Meanwhile, as the anvil in the plan, U.S. forces began their air assaults into blocking positions in the mountains. Almost immediately they came under heavy enemy fire. Every landing zone was 'hot,' meaning the enemy was firing on troops and helicopters. Nonetheless, by noon U.S. forces had occupied six of the seven assigned blocking positions (Stewart, CMH, p. 38). The second lift of troops could not get into place due to bad weather, leaving U.S. units at half strength on these positions for most of the first day. Lieutenant Colonel Paul LaCamera's TF 1/8 7, the battalion from 10th Mountain Division, part of Wiercinski's TF Rakassan, came under heavy mortar, machine gun, RPG, and small arms fire as they tried to occupy their two blocking positions. Particularly hard hit was Company C commanded by Captain Nelson Kraft whose 1st Platoon had almost 50 percent casualties. Kraft consolidated his troops on one strongpoint and for 18 hours held off Al Qaeda attacks. Specialist Eddie Rivera, a medic in Company C, is credited with saving many lives of his fellow soldiers that day with his heroic actions (Sack, John, 'War Stories, Anaconda,' Esquire, August 2002, pp. 118–123). LaCamera set up his battalion command post with Company C and they too were hard hit. By the end of the day, 10th Mountain soldiers inflicted heavy casualties on Al Qaeda forces even as twenty-five U.S. soldiers were wounded. Fighting in close combat in Anaconda in tough mountainous terrain, American soldiers were able to fight and win right in the heart of the enemy. They did so again in close combat a year later in Iraq against Iraqi fedayeen in urban terrain.

The following morning Hagenbeck adapted his plan to the situation. This is a key decision for any major unit commander — to fight the enemy and not your plan. You must adapt quickly. Knowing when to make that decision is the tough judgment major unit commanders make in a fight like this. You learn how to do that through years of tough battle-focused training and from experience gained from other operational missions. Hagenbeck did not hesitate. He designated U.S. forces as the main attack and reinforced them with Apaches, Marine Cobra attack helicopters, and close air support. Fierce close-range battles were fought over the next ten days as U.S. forces and additional Afghan reinforcements courageously battled Al Qaeda in caves and fortified positions. Captain Bob Mahowald, who was a lieutenant in the battles, wrote in a letter about small unit leadership, 'I will always remember witnessing two nineteen-year-old specialists who, as M 240 machine gunners, poured fire into enemy positions to cover their platoon-mates' advance. Their responsibility was tremendous, and they performed flawlessly' (Mahowald, Robert, Captain, U.S. Army, letter, March 2003). It was a clear indication of the toughness of U.S. forces, and their willingness and tactical ability to take the fight to Al Qaeda wherever they were.

The operation continued with some heavy fighting at close range and progressive clearing of Al Qaeda from caves. U.S. and allied forces cleared more than 129 caves and 40 buildings. They destroyed 22 heavy weapons emplacements and seized caches of weapons and intelligence. Al Qaeda had fought from well-placed positions and with modern equipment. They lost in some estimates perhaps as many as one thousand of their best troops (Stewart, CMH, pp. 42–45).

The 10th Mountain battle summary states that Operation Anaconda eliminated an Al Qaeda sanctuary, strained the Al Qaeda regional logistic system, and reduced the Al Qaeda threat by destroying hundreds of their most experienced fighters and trainers (Hagenbeck, notes, December 2003). It was a major victory in one of the first battles of this new war.

10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION REFLECTIONS

Many in the U.S. Army like to refer to T. R. Fehrenbach's book, This Kind of War, a richly detailed and candid account of the Korean War. The 10th Mountain leaders used Fehrenbach's book to call attention to the fact that you can attack land from the air, but if you want to control territory you have to put your own troops in there on the ground to do it. This operation clearly demonstrated the ability and will of the U.S. Army and military with our allies to do just that.

Those leaders also added,

'War on Terror demonstrates relevance of the Infantry… Soldiers who are proficient; up close, personal, brutal; our training works… skilled, tough, aggressive warriors. Small unit leaders are good — confident, initiative-taking, decisive, risk-takers. Our soldiers and leaders are innovative and flexible… Do the basics: PT, foot marching, marksmanship, live fire training… Focus on battalion, company and below air assault training, combined arms… '

(U.S. Army Infantry Conference, 'Lessons Learned,' U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, 2003)

IRAQI FREEDOM

Iraq was the second theater of war opened by the United States and our coalition partners in the ongoing war.

Because Iraq, too, is in its assigned area of operations, CENTCOM, under General Tommy Franks, also planned and conducted this campaign. As with its counterpart in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom was as swift as it was thoughtfully conceived. Simultaneous attacks from air, ground, and sea removed a brutal regime and its organized military forces in three weeks. It was swift but not easy, a phrase I used to describe our four-day destruction of Republican Guard forces in the VII Corps sector of attack in 1991. It is never easy for soldiers and Marines on the ground. The Iraqi Freedom three-week attack to Baghdad earns the title 'brilliant' because of the heroic efforts of soldiers and Marines in that tough arena of land combat. Commanders get them to the right place at the right time in the right combinations, but in the end they made it happen and won decisive victory.

Following the capture of Baghdad, the campaign shifted its focus to winning against insurgents who still oppose a free Iraq as some oppose a free Afghanistan. Stabilization campaigns continue in both countries as of this writing.

EXECUTION

General Franks, along with his service component commanders in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine