Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

crossing the berm between Kuwait and Iraq, then moving as fast as possible to Baghdad. Along the way there they would seize Tallil Air Base, making it available for Coalition air operations and logistics. They also would isolate the city of An Nasiriyah, seize crossing sites over the Euphrates, then hand those over to the I MEF (On Point, final draft, pp. 117–118). The I MEF consisted of the 1st Marine Division (MG Jim Mattis) Task Force Tarawa composed of a reinforced Marine regiment from the 2d Marine Division, the 3d Marine Air Wing (MG Jim Amos), and the British 1st Armored Division, which was tailored by the British with armor and infantry for this mission. After crossing the berm just to the north of V Corps, the Marines would seize the Iraqi oil fields at Rumaylah, while simultaneously attacking toward Basra and the ports in the Al Faw area. Following seizure of the oil field, the 1st Marine Division would continue the attack through An Nasiriyah across the Euphrates and up the east side toward Baghdad as the U.S. Army sped up the west side (On Point, final draft, p. 70ff).

I MEF seized the Rumaylah oil fields before the Iraqis could destroy them. Of the more than 1,000 Iraqi oil wells in the south, only nine were set afire, and they were all extinguished by the end of April (On Point, final draft, p. 127). It was a remarkable tactical feat with huge strategic implications for the future. As part of the I MEF, the British also seized Basra and the Iraqi ports in the Al Faw peninsula early in the fight.

Meanwhile, the 3d Infantry Division breached the berm in eleven different locations and attacked on two fronts. In the west, 3 ID was led by 3–7 Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Terry Ferrell, and in the east by Third Brigade (3 BCT), commanded by Colonel Dan Allyn. The 3 BCT quickly seized Tallil Air Base and the crossing site over the Euphrates and isolated An Nasiriyah (Blount, notes, February 2004). Following the 3 ID, the 101st first Airborne (On Point, final draft, p. 145) began a series of operations on 20 March to build refuel and rearm points and extended V Corps' reach all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad with attack helicopters. Having a mechanized infantry division combined with an air assault division and the 82d Airborne division with its brigade of parachute infantry in CFLCC reserve gave McKiernan and Wallace great versatility to adapt schemes of maneuver as the face of the enemy changed. It was a wise choice in unit combination.

Isolating cities along the way would be a continuing method of advance. On 22 March the 3–7 Cavalry reached As Samawah to the north and isolated it. The divisions' 3d Brigade relieved them on 23 March as division momentum continued north (On Point, final draft, pp. 161–167). At both As Samawah and An Nasiriyah, it became apparent that combat power would be necessary to deal with Iraqi irregulars attacking U.S. forces directly and also attacking along LOCs (lines of communication).

Adapting their plan as enemy actions became more clear and other options opened, McKiernan released his CFLCC reserve, the 82d Airborne Division to V Corps on 26 March along with 1/41 Infantry, a tank-Bradley task force (On Point, final draft, pp. 265, 268). Wallace immediately sent them into action to take As Samawah and release 3 ID to continue north. That urban fight in As Samawah by Colonel Arnie Bray's 82d Airborne 325th Parachute Infantry Brigade Combat Team was at close ranges, intense, and replete with small unit initiative so characteristic of U.S. infantry.

'The engagements included shots as close as ten feet… A Company 3d Battalion was ambushed on the northwest side of As Samawah, when the lead platoon executed a classic react to contact drill returning fire as the company dispersed to covered positions… the enemy continued to fire… without direction, the lead squad under SSG Pitts recognized that they needed to get closer and maneuvered to place effective fire on the enemy — keeping the enemy from accurately engaging the maneuvering platoons.'

(Bray, Arnold, Colonel, U.S. Army, notes, 1 2/3 1/03)

A squadron from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed by air from their base at Fort Polk, LA, and later joined the 82d in this fight to secure LOCs on 8 April (On Point, final draft, p. 276).

Under heavy contact at An Najaf, the 3 ID attacked to isolate the city. Colonel Ben Hodges and his 1st Brigade Combat Team of 101st Airborne, reinforced by Company A, 2/70 Armor, a tank-Bradley task force, began to clear the city on 31 March in an operation with tough urban fighting, including a mini 'Thunder Run' by a tank company they concluded five days later (On Point, final draft, pp. 326–332). Meanwhile the 3d Infantry Division continued north toward Baghdad and the U.S. Marines continued their advance to Baghdad on the east bank of the Euphrates River. On 28 March Colonel Greg Gass and his 101st Attack Aviation Brigade, conducted a successful two battalion (forty-eight Apaches) attack over one hundred kilometers against defending Republican Guard forces defending near Karbala and the approaches to Baghdad. And on 31 March, a daylight armed reconnaissance to protect the western flank (On Point, final draft, pp 248-49, 336).

While the sandstorm of 25–27 March was blowing, the Coalition forces pushed needed fuel, ammunition, and water forward while continuing local attacks. On 30 March LTG Wallace ordered five simultaneous attacks, three by the 101st, one by the 3ID, and one by the 82nd, which included those attacks described above and which apparently confused Iraqi forces into believing the main attack was coming from a different direction and causing them to begin repositioning forces. LTG Wallace said these were 'key to the fight… maintaining offensive tempo and spirit…' (Wallace, William, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, notes, January 2004). During this Iraqi repositioning, and also during the sandstorm, Coalition air forces hit Iraqi formations with precision attacks. It was lethal teamwork of ground forces conducting maneuvers that caused the enemy to be more vulnerable to coalition air strikes (On Point, final draft, pp. 316-40).

NORTH AND WEST

As vital as air power was to the advance from the south, it was even more instrumental to allied successes in the west and north. In the west thinly supported Special Operations Forces quickly over-ran airfields and neutralized potential Iraqi missile strikes. Packing little organic firepower themselves, they depended heavily upon aerial precision strikes to offset their shortcomings… Operations in both west and north progressed well, and distracted appreciable Iraqi forces while the climactic battle was shaping up in the south.

(Brown, John, Brigadier General, American Military History, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), coordinating draft, 2003, Washington, D.C., pg. 36)

In the west Special Operations Forces were joined by Team tank, in a precedent-setting combination of special operators and a tank company to continue their operations there. Beginning on 2 April, that company team of 10 M1A1 tanks was airlifted to an airfield in the west by Air Force C-17 aircraft to join special forces. (On Point, final draft, p. 311).

LOGISTICS

Major General Hank Stratman, CFLCC Deputy, and Major General Dave Kratzer, commander of 377 Reserve Theater Support Command, and their logisticians and commanders were able to open this theater of war, a formidable challenge by itself requiring anticipation and forward planning by the U.S. Army even as the Afghanistan operation was ongoing. Stratman, Kratzer, Major General Claude Christenson, CFLCC C-4, McKiernan's logistics commanders and logistics operators overcame many hurdles during the operation to sustain momentum of the attack. In 1991 VII Corps attacked 250 kilometers in 89 hours with each division consuming about 800,000 gallons of fuel daily. We certainly had our logistics challenges, most notably in fuel distribution, location of spare parts, and mail delivery documented earlier in this book. This attack would be over longer distances. These logistics challenges were met as in 1991 with teamwork, ingenuity, anticipation, skill, courage, and what I always liked to call 'brute force logistics.' Christenson would have high praise for the troops driving the trucks to get supplies forward