(On Point, final draft, pp. 201-03). But logisticians and operators by necessity hold themselves to the highest standards.
Logistics is a difficult and complex area to transform and early indicators were that 1990s transformation in logistics to support offensive operations in what the Army calls 'distributed battlespace' is a work in progress. Much was done in the 1990s to provide more 'total asset visibility.' Despite that and the extraordinary effort by soldiers and commanders, there were shortcomings as before. Moreover, the battle ambush and subsequent rescue of soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company showed the asymmetry of the modern battlefield and other focus areas. In addition, 'mobilization and deployment decisions slowed arrival of many logistic units or resulted in their elimination from the troop list altogether.' (On Point, final draft, pp. 471–475). LTG Christensen, now Army G-11, and General Paul Kern, Commander of Army Material Command, have accelerated logistics transformation for the future.
Medical care with hospital surgical teams was pushed well forward to be immediately available to wounded troops. Evacuation care capabilities were put into action to ensure top care all the way to major hospitals such as Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., where the best continuing treatment and rehabilitation care continues to be available. On the battlefield, medics risked their lives to aid fellow soldiers, as did Specialist Dwayne Turner of the 101st Airborne Division near the town of Al Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad. Although wounded by automatic weapons fire multiple times and weakened by loss of blood, Turner continued to risk his own life, saving the lives of at least three of his fellow soldiers (On Point, final draft, pp. 441).
Both U.S. Marine and U.S. Army forces were now speeding toward Baghdad. Battle commanders were all over the battlefield, up front with their troops talking directly with subordinate commanders. That face-to-face battle command method especially in a Force XXI electronic-networked system was key. V Corps commander LTG Wallace said he made 'every attempt to see division commanders each day' (Wallace, notes, January 2004). 3d Infantry Division conducted a series of attacks to defeat and destroy Republican Guard units around the key choke point they referred to as the 'Karbala Gap,' a narrow piece of land between the town of Karbala and Bar al-Milh Lake (On Point, final draft, p. 304). All the way to Baghdad, more than 300 miles in two weeks, Major General Blount had maneuvered his 3d Infantry Division brigade combat teams and his cavalry squadron to sustain the momentum of the attack as the 82d Airborne and 101st teamed to free the division to maintain momentum. Simultaneously with the attack on As Najaf on 31 March, Colonel Joe Anderson and 2d Brigade Combat Team of the 101st conducted a successful feint into the town of Al Hillah, one of the five simultaneous attacks to confuse Iraquis about V Corps' main attack. For this operation they were reinforced by Company B, 2/70 Armor (On Point, final draft, pp. 332-36).
After crossing through the Karbala Gap, Blount ordered his 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Wil Grimsley, to secure the final crossing sites over the Euphrates and attack to seize Saddam International Airport, believed to be key to securing Baghdad. To close the gap in the north, Blount ordered Colonel Dan Allyn commander 3d Brigade to conduct an attack to secure that last spot in the noose around Baghdad (Blount, Buford, Major General, U.S. Army, notes, February 2004). That action by the Division's 3d Brigade was similar in audacity, professional skill, and courage as the attacks by the 2d Brigade a few days later into the center of Baghdad (On Point, final draft, pp. 374-81).
'On 4 April, both Lieutenant General Wallace and Lieutenant General Conway, commanding I MEF, could view their situations with satisfaction. V Corps and I MEF had successfully held at bay the paramilitary that had attacked the supply convoys and threatened the LOCs. Moreover they had nearly encircled Baghdad… The Marines in I MEF had crossed the Euphrates at An Nasiriyah and were fighting their way up the Tigris River, approaching the city from the southeast. V Corps' five simultaneous attacks had taken the corps through the Karbala Gap and Al Hillah… isolating Baghdad from the south and west.'
(On Point, final draft, p. 391)
Blount was determined to see if the division could take Baghdad by shock, wanting to collapse it quickly, thus he and Wallace settled on a reconnaissance in force or what the troops call a 'Thunder Run'(On Point, final draft, p. 397). There were two 'Thunder Runs' into Baghdad. Thunder Run is a term from Vietnam, and refers to a rapid advance through a contested area or down a road without stopping even as small engagements popped up. The tactic uses shock and speed to surprise the enemy before they can react. The first of these actions by 1-64 Armor, a tank-heavy task force commanded by LTC Eric Schwartz took place on 5 April. At 0630 on 5 April, Schwartz and his leaders and soldiers carried out a 'show of force,' attacking up Highway 8 into central Baghdad, then back southwest to Baghdad International Airport. Greg Kelley of Fox News accompanied that attack on Colonel Dave Perkins's M113 (the 2d Brigade Commander who accompanied the raid to see for himself and provide Schwartz external communications so Schwartz could concentrate on commanding his own task force). The two-hour twenty-minute operation was intense from almost the time it was launched until completed. Courage and small unit initiative were shown everywhere as TF 1-64 completed its mission (On Point, final draft, pp. 402-07). The results showed that such tactics might indeed capture Baghdad. They also paid tribute to one of their own:
'SSG Stevon Booker, Tank Commander in Company A, 1-64 AR, and his platoon were in an intense direct firefight with a fanatical enemy using wave attacks and suicide tactics. He fired hundreds of rounds until his.50 caliber machine gun malfunctioned. SSG Booker exited the turret, assumed a modified prone position on top of the turret and began to engage the enemy with his M4 rifle. He protected the platoon's left flank and prevented the formation from being infiltrated by enemy vehicles. He continued to engage the enemy with his M4 until mortally wounded.'
(3 ID reference)
Two days later Perkins took his entire 2d Brigade Combat team into the heart of Baghdad. Their actions resembled those of TF 1-64 AR, which was also on this operation. Close combat ensued with Iraqi vehicles down side streets and charges by irregular troops at combat vehicles. During the operation their TOC (Tactical Operations Center) had significant casualties from a missile attack. They soon were back in operation despite losing three soldiers and two embedded reporters, and having seventeen wounded and twenty-two vehicles destroyed or damaged. Perkins, his commanders, and his soldiers would not be denied. They finished their attack and then stayed (On Point, final draft, pp. 409-22). This initiative to stay, supported by senior commanders, was one of those bold decisions in war, like capturing the Remagen Bridge in World War II, that has effects all the way to the strategic level.
'To give a sense of perspective, the 21-kilometer attack into Baghdad was equivalent to an attack on Washington, D.C., from the intersection of I-435 and I-95 in Springfield, Virginia, to the Mall in downtown Washington, D.C., seizing the area from the Capitol to the White House to the Lincoln Memorial to the Jefferson Memorial…'
(On Point, final draft, p. 416)
The end of this phase of the war was on 9 April 2003.
The Marines moved into the city from the other side, and the continuing route of the Iraqis in the west and north completed the isolation of the now fallen capital city. The campaign's cumulative casualties to that point had been 42 killed and 133 wounded for the Army, 41 killed and 151 wounded for the Marines, and 19 killed and 36 wounded for the British. On April 9 a tiny contingent of Marines and a crowd of jubilant Iraqis pulled down the Saddam Monument in the Shiite sector of Baghdad while breathless television commentary related the
